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NOTES
Antitrust Law-Reciprocal Price Information Exchanges
In United States v.Container Corporation of America,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that the exchange among corrugated container
sellers of prices recently charged or quoted to buyers constituted a per se
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.' The Court reasoned that
the effect of the exchanges, in their market setting, had been to keep prices
within a relatively narrow ambit, and that this interference with the price
mechanism in the market was unlawful.
The method used was simple. When a seller was requested by a buyer
to quote a price, he would sometimes ask his competitors who had sold or
quoted prices to that buyer what their prices were or had been. There was
no agreement that the seller seeking the last price or price quote from his
competitor would not undercut it. The exchanges between the defendants
were infrequent and the only compulsion to participate was the natural
one that a seller would not be able to obtain price information from his
competitors if he did not make it available to them. Moreover, industry
prices had not increased despite rising labor and material costs. The
industry, however, was competitive and, but for the exchanges, prices
might have decreased.
Generally the effects of the dissemination of price information are
determined by the economic setting and the type of information, and
thus the Court closely analyzed the economic conditions of the corrugated
container industry. It found that the industry was controlled by a few
dominant4 sellers and that the product was homogeneous. Since each
competitor's product was almost identical, price alone determined sales.
Moreover, each box was individually made to size and shape to fill a
specific order, with no standard unit that competitors could use to make
189 S. Ct. 510 (1969).
'26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
'See generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 27-36 (1959), quoted in
H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, ANTITRUST LAW 25-31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
BLAKE & PITOFSKY]; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 149-50 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as KAYSEN & TURNER]; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 325-26 (1955).

'For a factual breakdown of the concentration in the industry, see P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 531 (1967).
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a price list. The industry was also characterized by ease of market entry
and inelastic demand and there were competitive pressures from excess
capacity and large buyers. These conditions resulted in uncertainty as to
what sellers would charge and made the exchange of price information
meaningful.
There were four primary factors then in the market situation of the
container industry that served to facilitate interdependent pricing: (1)
the general oligopolistic structure; (2) product homogeneity; (3) excess
tapacity; and (4) inelastic demand. The effect each factor has on the
pricing structure must be understood before a critical appraisal of the
Court's decision can be attempted.
Exchange of price information among oligopolists obviously can be a
potent force for establishing price uniformity. By their nature, oligopolists
must anticipate the reactions of their rivals more closely than participants
in a more "perfectly competitive market," where power is fragmented
and decisions are not based as much on what a seller's rivals are doing
as what the seller himself is capable of doing. Uniformity of action in
the oligopolistic industry is more easily arranged and enforced without
resort to actual agreement. Hence, any agreement is harder to detect
because of this natural tendency towards price uniformity. Proof of combination or conspiracy without actual agreement is also difficult, so assuring
compliance with the antitrust laws by oligopolists necessarily becomes
harder.
Interdependent pricing is further facilitated in industries that produce
homogeneous products. Buyers are not persuaded by attempts at differentiation. Competition in quality or special appeal is eliminated, leaving price
as the only uncertain factor a competitor must consider in anticipating his
rivals' reactions. 5 Homogeneity encourages the tendency not to reduce
prices because the seller knows his reductions will be automatically met
by his competitors. 6
C6operation to defeat the market mechanism is more likely in industries characterized by excess capacity because there is greater incentive
to overcome that adverse economic condition .7 Industries dealing in
products for which there is an inelastic demand facilitate interdependent
pricing because the buyer has to place his order on an immediate need
Adelman, Effective 28.
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
1289, 1329 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Adelman].
"89 S. Ct. at 513 n.4. See also Adelman 1328.
BLAKE & PITOFSKY

HARV.

L.

REv.
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basis.' Price changes would, therefore, neither increase nor decrease
demand. Thus, there is less pressure to cut prices.
There are economic factors in the box industry that might have retarded the otherwise natural tendency towards oligopolistic interdependent
pricing: (1) ease of market entry, (2) high fixed costs, and (3) an individualized product. Ease of market entry generally diminishes the
effectiveness of oligopolists' efforts to maintain noncompetitive pricing.
If entry does not require a large investment and large profits are prevalent,
new businessmen are attracted to the industry and the oligopolists' share
of the market and their profits are thus reduced.9 But even this characteristic was turned against the defendants in Container Corporation.
New entrants were indeed attracted to the industry,' despite its excess
capacity. Businessmen, however, would not normally invest in an industry
with excess capacity unless there were some special attraction to do sofor example, an unusually high rate of return. The Court could thus
infer that the defendants' activities had operated to maintain prices at
a normally unexpected level and thus attracted the new entrants. Furthermore, although new entrants usually cause periods of price instability
in any market, 1 the Court noted that prices in the container industry had
remained relatively stable. These two factors indicated that there was
some outside force operating to stabilize prices and contributed to the
"irresistable inference" that the exchanges of price information had an
anticompetitive effect."
High fixed costs of operation (as opposed to low initial capital
investment) can also have a detrimental effect on noncompetitive oligopoly
pricing. In industries with high fixed costs, sales gains give an extra boost
to profits because the overhead cost can be spread over the expanding sales.
Where the commodity is homogeneous, however, sales gains can be
achieved only through off-list selling, secret rebates and other devices by
which prices are secretly cut. The incentive to use these devices becomes
even greater when high fixed costs are coupled with excess capacity as in
the corrugated container industry. The individualized nature of the
product can make price cuts more difficult to detect and therefore en' Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. Container Corp. of America, 89 S.
Ct. 510 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
' BLAKE & PIToFsxY 29-30.
1089 S. Ct. at 512.
"

12

BLAKE & PITOFSKY 31.

See 89 S. Ct. at 512.
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courage departure from noncompetitive pricing. When uncertainty is introduced into the market in this manner, the stability of the oligopolists'
control is disturbed.
However, if complete knowledge of current individual prices offered to
specific customers is introduced into a noncompetitive oligopoly pricing
situation, such as the corrugated container industry, the last doubt as to
a competitor's prices will be eliminated. Incentive to lower prices is
vastly reduced because the seller knows that lowering his prices will only
bring him the same share of the market at a lower return. 13 Price uniformity becomes even more probable. Also eliminated is the buyer's
option to withhold price information, thus injecting additional uncertainty
into the market that might stimulate price competition based on competitors' individual capabilities.14 In no instance has the Court sanctioned
dissemination of information that specifically identified the customer who
received a certain price.' 5
The Supreme Court in the past has not been unaware of the dangers
of co6peration among oligopolists to eliminate those uncertainties in their
markets that undermine interdependent pricing. Sugar Institute, Ite. v.

United States 6 involved a somewhat similar economic situation. The
sugar industry was dominated by a few sellers, and its product was homo-

geneous, but not individualized. Excess capacity and high fixed costs had
led to the use of off-list pricing and secret rebates. The members of the
Institute agreed to abide by published price lists. By eliminating off-list
pricing, the members had removed the only possible uncertainty left in
their market and the tendency towards price uniformity was greatly enhanced. The Court held the agreement violated the Sherman Act.' 7 The
second example of the Court's concern about the elimination of market
'3
14

3

See text at note 6 supra.
Brief for Appellant 34.

" See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) ; American Column
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
& Lumber
10297 U.S. 553 (1936).
', We have noted that the fifteen refiners, represented in the Institute, refine
practically all the imported raw sugar processed in this country. They supply
from 70 to 80 per cent, of the sugar consumed ....

Another outstanding fact

is that defendants' product is a thoroughly standardized commodity. In their
competition, price, rather than brand, is generally the vital consideration ....
The fact that, because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a strong
tendency to uniformity of price, makes it the more important that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired.
Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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uncertainties to implement noncompetitive pricing is found in its decisions
in the basing point system cases.' Again the industries involved were
characterized by excess capacity, high overhead and a standardized product
that encouraged the use of secret rebates. There were significant price
variations resulting from the varying freight charges. By -refusing to sell
FOB and by quoting railroad freight charges exclusively, the nonequidistant sellers were able to match their competitors' prices more easily.
The purpose of basing point and other similar systems was "to eliminate
a kind of uncertainty that is a potent force disrupting stable noncompetitive oligopoly pricing."19 Basing point systems agreements have been
condemned by the courts as "price fixing."' 20 Both examples indicate that
the Court believes agreements designed to eliminate uncertainty and not
having any dominant proper purpose should be condemned as per se
violations of the antitrust laws. 21 Other attempts to remove the uncertainties remaining in a market by co6perative dissemination of price information have been considered anticompetitive efforts rather than attempts to make competition more effective.2
The defendants in Container Corporation argued that the purpose
of the exchanges was to make competition more effective. Relying on
" FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700, 709-17 (1948) ; Sugar Inst., Inc.
v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 589-93 (1936); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC,
156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1946); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478
(7th Cir. 1946); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1945).
" Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 674 (1962). See also
Adelman 1327-47.
"0See cases cited note 18 supra.
21 See generally KAYSEN & TURNER 150.
But in markets where oligopolistic elements are present, some ignorance and
uncertainty about the behavior of rivals is an important competitive element
in the market, since it prevents "rational" oligopolistic calculation leading to
joint maximization of profits.
Id.
22 See Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956) (formula
pricing); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952)
(agreed prices); United States v. American Body & Trailer, Inc., CCH 1958 Trade
Cas. 69,063 (W.D. Okla. 1958) ; United States v. Garden State Retail Gas. Dealers
Ass'n, Inc., CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 68,493 (D.N.J. 1956) (agreed list prices);
United States v. Electrical Solderless Serv. Connector Inst., CCH 1940-43 Trade
Cas. 56,081 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison,
Inc., CCH 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (estimated prices). Cf.
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (past prices
permissible); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949);
56,028
United States v. National Container Ass'n, CCH 1940-43 Trade Cas.
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).

886
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Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United Statesm they
pointed out specifically that the exchanges were an attempt to protect
themselves from buyers who misquoted offers from other competitors.
But their argument can be dismissed on three grounds. First, as the
Court pointed out, the cases are factually distinguishable. 24 In Cement
the sellers exchanged information as to what orders had been filled to
protect themselves from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement
than a contractor needed for a specific job. The defendants in Container
Corporationhad no legal right to get the correct price from the buyers.
No tort had been committed by the buyers. Second, the defendants already
had manuals which enabled them to calculate their competitors' prices, 2 and
if they did not want to sell at as low a profit margin as their competitors,
they did not have to. Third, it is now clear that the Court does not condone conspiracy to overcome competitive evils, or unethical conduct on the
part of competitors or customers who use methods that would otherwise
be per se violations of the antitrust laws.2"
The Supreme Court's finding that the exchanges constituted a violation of the antitrust laws is not surprising. Past precedent supported if not
compelled the outcome. The application of the per se rules was, however,
an additional stepY Generally, the application of a per se rule depends
upon a finding that the activity usually has bad effects, that good effects
are rarely present and hard to prove, and that there is thus little need to
examine effects or invite litigation over them. The per se rule is applied
when the Court feels that the defendant should not be allowed to deny
that which logic and experience indicate is the principle purpose of the
activity. The difference between gains and losses from making conduct
per se illegal28 and the concomitant administrative advantages must justify
23268 U.S. 588 (1925).
2"89 S. Ct. at 511.
25 Id. at

512.
"Fashion Orig. Guild of Amer., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
"'The per se rule was not applied in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Colunm & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
" Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) ; International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Orig.
Guild of Amer., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (tying clauses).
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any arbitrariness involved.2 9 In Container Corporation,the gain derived
from making the price exchanges illegal was the elimination of a method
used by already powerful oligopolists to remove one of the last obstacles
to noncompetitive pricing in a market ideally receptive to such pricing.
The oligopolists are denied a method by which they could interfere with
the independent operation of the price mechanism.30 Against this gain
must be balanced any loss of potential benefit. The defendants do lose an
easy method of determining which of their customers are misquoting prices
to them. But since sellers are supposed to make independent decisions as
to price based on their own costs and capabilities, this loss seems insignificant. 31
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall asserted that the per seirrule
should not be applied because the ease of market entry in the box industry
would preclude the success of any anticompetitive activities. 32 His approach seems unrealistic for several reasons. First, competitors would
still be controlling prices within the margins set by both the competitive
price and by what they could get noncompetitively without inducing entry.
Second, there is a lag between the time prices get high enoi-gll'tt"i'duice
f
di
l
entry and the time the entry actually takes place. Competit6'Wb
manipulation, may exploit this time lag to make profits, t, en?, cut prices
back in time to discourage new entry. Third, why shbuld, the Cpurt
when
depend on the second line defense of the economic mechanism,
If-t
F.[UI
Jthe
,
activity is unlawful? Fourth, the pressures created by, ease Of market
entry are more than counterbalanced by the factors -facilitating interdependent pricing. Fifth and last, the finding by the majority that price
competition had been held within a narrow ambit despite new entries into
:)' ,(
4
)I
4f~I tq
the market indicate that Mr. Justice Marshall's hoped for effects had' not
e uicy m
and would not take place. New entrants would realize a
ers, would
lowe
the industry of buyers splitting orders among
f
the
mnat
a a lower
their
same
share
result in their maintaining
i,
ri - l
; .
.V)S i I,
return.
relatiye
clarity,
,sefof
per
se
rules,
are,
three
The administrative advantages
enforcement, and less need for litigation to actiieve' a given evel 0 enorcement.
b!'r1 o;cdl fr,
, Mil
KAYSEN & TURNER 142-43.
"Irrefutable precedent for the application of the per se rule for that purpose
iuifil'Oil Co.,
is found in the famous footnote 59 to United States v. Socon V
abllable
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), the language dfirhidh' ud i6'1V
:?,'. 111
"r '°'/U
0 yw-'
' ":
to this case.
3
Container Corporation repreiiited -af ekclen op fftiiyfdr t'1t.6,uQdrt.to
set down its policy. This was not a treble damage suit afale' d fendants' did not
0
,
stand to lose financially.
1289 S. Ct. at 515 (dissenting opinion).
-fll

*
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Container Corporation indicates that the Supreme Court is acutely
aware of the economic setting in which the cooperative activities of businessmen take place. The Court is particularly insistent that oligopolists,
because of the tremendous control they already have over the market,
the natural tendency to price uniformity in oligopolistic industries, and
the advantageous position they are in to defeat the competitive processes,
not be allowed to remove any of the uncertainties that prevent them from
obtaining even firmer control of the market. The corrugated container
industry was ideally conducive to oligopolistic manipulation, except for
the uncertainty created by the individualized nature of the product. The
exchanges of price information eliminated that uncertainty. The Supreme
Court was unwilling to allow the defendants, already rich in power, that
additional luxury.
BEN F. TENNILLE

Arbitration-The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose Past Business
Relationships With a Party
"[W] here your treasure is, there will your heart be also."' This generally recognized element of human nature-that a man will be partial toward his own self-interest-is the reason for the rule that "no man shall
be a judge in his own cause." 2 Acceptance of society's insistence that
disputes among its members be resolved through the use of a judicial
process, rather than through the use of violence or other forms of "selfhelp," depends to a great extent on the evident fairness and impartiality
of the judicial system.3 In the leading case of Tuiney v. Ohio,4 the
Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process to subject a
defendant's liberty or property "to the judgment of a court the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case." 5 In Tumey, the defendant was tried
and convicted by the village mayor, who received additional compensation
from all those tried by him only if they were found guilty. The Supreme
'Matthew
6:21.
'Dr. Bonham's
Case, 8 Co. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
'See Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in THE HAYDEN
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT AND METHOD

'273 U.S. 510 (1927).
rId.at 523.

51-56 (1958).
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Court reversed the defendant's conviction; it did not matter that there
was no evidence of actual bias against the defendant:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true0between
the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
The extent of the judge's self-interest needed to constitute a denial
of due process cannot be defined with precision. 7 "Circumstances and relationships must be considered."" But "the administration of justice should
reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact."9
The law regarding disqualification of judges because of self-interest
applies equally to administrative adjudicators.' In both the administrative
and judicial setting, the law forces the parties to accept the findings and
judgment of the adjudicator; their right to a fair and impartial hearing
is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution. 1' A related,
but different, problem regarding impartiality is presented when parties by
agreement go outside the judicial system for settlement of their disputes,
as in arbitration, where the constitutional right of a fair trial would not be
2
applicable.'
"Arbitration ...

is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their

disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for
a decision based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before
the arbitration tribunal."' 3 Protection against a partial arbitrator must
come either from the arbitration agreement itself, or from an applicable
4
statute.'
Id. at 532.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1954).
"See
8 Id. at 136.
'Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) (statement of reasons
for self-disqualification by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
" See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.03 (1958) ; see
also Note, Administrative Law--Bias: "No Man Shall Judge His Own Cause," 47
N.C.L. REv. 677 (1969).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1955).
"

M. DOMxE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE

OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

§ 1.01, at

1 (1968). See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS (1930).
' See discussion and cases cited in M. DOMKE, supra note 13, § 33.02.
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In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 a
subcontractor had sued the sureties on the bond of the prime contractor
for money allegedly due for a painting job. The painting contract included
an agreement to arbitrate such controversies."6 Each party named one
arbitrator, and these two selected the third. The third arbitrator, owner
of an engineering firm that provided services to construction companies,
had in the past done. business with the prime contractor involved in the
dispute. The panel voted unanimously in favor of the prime contractor.
The subcontractor challenged the award in the district court on
grounds, inter alia, that it did not know and had not been informed by
either the "neutral" arbitrator or the prime contractor of these previous
dealings between them. There was no contention that the arbitrator was
not entirely fair and unbiased. The district court refused to set aside
the award 7 and the court of appeals affirmed.18 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari"9 and a divided Court reversed the lower courts and
vacated the arbitration award.2 0
The United States Arbitration Act 2 ' governed the controversy in this
393 U.S. 145 (1968).
The arbitration agreement in the contract read as follows:
If any question of fact shall arise under this contract, either party hereto may
demand an arbitration by reference to a Board of Arbitration, to consist of
one person selected by Contractor, and one person selected by Sub-contractor,
these two to select a third, and in case these two fail to select a third within
three days, he shall be named by the Architect or his authorized representative.
In case either Contractor or Sub-contractor fails to name an arbitrator within
three days after requested to do so, the Architect, or his authorized representatives, shall name an arbitrator to represent the party so failing to name
one. The written decision of any two of this Board shall be final and binding
on both parties hereto. Each party shall pay one-half of the expenses of such
reference. Arbitration of a demand or decisions by the Architect or Owner
shall be made within 5 days following notification to Sub-contractor of such
demand or decision, otherwise Sub-contractor shall be bound thereby, unless
the Owner shall agree to arbitration after that period. Provided, nothing
contained herein shall excuse Sub-contractor from completion of the work in
the manner provided in this contract nor-shall the pendency of any dispute
or arbitration proceeding excuse any delay, deficiency, default, or noncompliance therewith.
Quoted in Brief for Petitioner at 4,5 and Brief for Respondent at 7-8 n.5, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
17 The decision by the United States District Court for Puerto Rico is not reported.
"8Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (Ist
Cir. "1967).
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
"0393 U.S. 145 (1968).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1964).
1
1
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case.2 2 Section 10 of this act denotes the reasons for which an award may
be vacated. 2 The Court felt that the provisions allowing vacation of the
award where it was "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means" or
"where there was evident partiality . . . in the arbitrators" showed an

intent on the part of Congress that arbitration be impartial. 24 While there
was no charge that the third arbitrator was guilty of fraud or bias or
that he had any improper motives, the failure to disclose the past business
relationship with one party violated "the strict morality and fairness
Congress would have expected on the part of the arbitrator and the other
party in this case."23

26
The Court reasoned that the constitutional basis of the rule in Tumey
should not prevent its application to non-judicial adjudication that is
governed by statutory language embodying the same concept of impartiality.2 7 A rule of the American Arbitration Association2 1 providing
for disclosure by arbitrators of past relationships with parties, as well as
22

393 U.S. at 146-47.

2' In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
2'393 U.S. at 147.
25Id. at 148.

"273 U.S. 510 (1927).
393 U.S. at 148.
Section 18. Disclosure by Arbitrator of Disqualification-At the time of
receiving his notice of appointment, the prospective Arbitrator is requested
to disclose any circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or which
he believes might disqualify him as an impartial Arbitrator. Upon receipt of
such information, the Tribunal Clerk shall immediately disclose it to the
parties, who if willing to proceed under the circumstances disclosed, shall,
in writing, so advise the Tribunal Clerk. If either party declines to waive the
presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall be filled in
accordance with the applicable provisions of this Rule.
Id. at 149, quoting AMERICAN ARBITRATio AssocIATIoN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRA"

TION RULES § 18.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 47

a canon of judicial ethics 29 providing for the avoidance of actions that

might raise suspicions, neither of which were directly applicable to this
controversy, were noted to show that these concepts of disclosure and of
avoidance of suspicions were accepted elements of what is to be considered
fair conduct on the part of those who perform adjudicatory functions.3 0
The concurring. opinion by Mr. Justice White3 ' declared that the
Court's ruling did not hold arbitrators to the standards of judicial decorum
required of judges, but only that disclosure was required "where the
arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than
trivial business with a party ... ."2 Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent33 denied

that the failure to volunteer information constituted "evident partiality"
under the Arbitration Act where there was no claim of any actual partiality, or bias, or improper motive.34
In its successful efforts in the lower courts, 35 the respondent prime
contractor relied on the case of Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v.
AmericanL Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp.3 0 for the proposition
that "the mere fact that there is some business relationship between
the arbitrator and one of the parties to the arbitration is not in and
of itself sufficient to disqualify the arbitrator."3' The court in Ilios reasoned that since the objecting party knew the arbitrator was employed
in the insurance business, he should have inquired as to any relationship between the arbitrator and the other party.38 Failing to do this,

knowledge of the relationship will be imputed to the objecting party
and he will be deemed to have waived his objection for failure to assert
it earlier."9 Thus, one basis of the holding in Ilios is the imputed knowledge the objecting party had of the relationship between the arbitrator
Social Relations.
...[A judge] should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be particularly careful to avoid such actions as may reasonably tend
to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct.
Id. at 149-50, quoting ABA CANoNs OF JUDICIAL ETHIcs No. 33.
'o Id. at 149-50.
1I1d. at 150 (Mr. Justice Marshall joining).
2
' Id. at 151-52.
2933

33Id.
0 Id.

at 152 (justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissent).

' 148
37

F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957).

at 154.

' 382 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1967).
Id.at 700.
$aId.
9

Id.
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and the other party. In Commonwealth, on the other hand, the Supreme
Court emphasized that
the facts concerning the close business connections between the third
arbitrator and the prime contractor were unknown to petitioner and were
never revealed to it by this arbitrator, by the prime contractor, or by
anyone else until after an award had been made. 40
While this may be one manner of distinguishing the Ilios case, there
is considerable authority supporting the view that an arbitrator's failfire
to disclose past business relations with a party does not constitute "evident partiality" under the Arbitration Act. 4 At the same time, there
are instances where the opposite view has prevailed-where the failure
to disclose the relationship resulted in vacating the contested award. 42
The differences in result would seem to hinge on fine distinctions
in the fact situations. Should the possibility of the relationship have been
apparent to the objecting party?13 Was the relationship vague and
remote,44 or was it close enough to cause concern as to the arbitrator's
impartiality ?4' Although finding in favor of respondent in Commonwealth,
the court of appeals noted the closeness of the distinctions involved:
In our opinion there is a difficult line between what should, in good
faith, be volunteered, and what may be left for inquiry. We may agree
with appellant that where there is a disturbingly close relationship the
very failure to make disclosure could be evidence of partiality, and we
think it would have been far better if there had been disclosure here.
However, we cannot say that the relationship was sufficiently close to
establish 'evident partiality' within the statute as a matter of law.46
Undoubtedly, the trend of the courts has been to set strict limits on
judicial interference with arbitration awards. 47 Frequent court inter393 U.S. at 146. In a Petition for Rehearing filed January 16, 1969, the re40

spondent contends "[tjhere is not a scintilla of evidence to support" the Court's conclusion that "the facts concerning the close business connections between the third
arbitrator and the prime contractor were unknown to petitioner ....
." Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing at 1.

"'See, e.g., Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123

(E.D. Ky. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Schering Corp., 165 F. Supp. 295 (D.N.J. 1958), aft'd,
271 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959).
" See Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v. American Anthracite & Bituminous
Coal Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957).
"'See Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Ky. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).

See American Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934).
"382 F.2d at 1011-12.

"See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flo6f& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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ference might frustrate "the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to
dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended
court proceedings. 48 Although the action of the Court in Commonwealth
in vacating the arbitration award and imposing a rule requiring disclosure
on the arbitrator might at first glance appear to run counter to this ideal,
a closer analysis indicates that the contrary is more likely. Certainly it
was the aim of the Court, in formulating its rule requiring disclosure, to
minimize the judicial role in arbitration. The rule formulated by the
Court-that an arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias-should strengthen
the arbitration process and minimize judicial interference in at least two
ways. First, requiring disclosure should give the parties additional faith
in the fairness of the proceedings. Mr. Dooley advised: "Trust everybody-but cut the cards.""0 A duty of disclosure is an additional "cut
of the cards" that should tend to lessen suspicions of a losing party that
he was treated unfairly. With this additional confidence in the settlement
process, the loser is less likely to take his complaint to the courts. Second,
the rule requiring disclosure will provide an easily recognizable standard
of conduct for the arbitrator. A hazy standard regarding impartiality
might lead the losing party to attempt to obtain a favorable court interpretation. Judicial re-view of an arbitration award would appear to be sought
less often where the demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct is clear. Thus, the decision in Commonwealth should serve to
strengthen the participants' confidence in arbitration, and should decrease
further the possibility of unnecessary judicial interference in the arbitration process.
JoHN M. MURCHISON, JR.

Civil Procedure-Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies
The plaintiff, a New York resident, is injured in an automobile accident in another state. The wrongdoer, who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in New York, is insured under a liability policy issued in the
state of his residence by an insurance company that does business in New
See generally, Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Altitude, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 519 (1960) ; Comment, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial
Role, 52 MixN. L. REv. 1218 (1968).
"' Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc.. 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d
Cir. 1967).

" F.

DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S

PIn.oso.:[v (1900).
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York. Plaintiff brings his suit in New York against the insurer,1 and
contends that the insurance policy obligations constitute an attachable res
2
in a quasi in rem proceeding.
Confronted with these facts, the New York Court of Appeals in Seider
v. Roth8 held that an automobile insurance policy issued by an out-of-state
insurer that does business in New York was an attachable debt within the
statutory definition of "debt." 4 The debt subject to attachment was found
to be the obligation of the insurance company to defend and indemnify
the assured upon the occurrence of an accident.5 This novel theory of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, which has caused both uncertainty and speculation among commentators,' was followed recently by the District Court
'It would not matter that suit was brought in a federal forum, for as stated in
Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), "the amenability of a foreign
corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance
with the law of the state where the court sits. ... ." Id. at 223.
2 For a discussion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 15-16 (2d ed. 1966). The author states:
[I]f any property belonging to the defendant is within the state, such property may be seized (levied upon) pursuant to an order of attachment, and
the property so levied upon is then deemed to constitute a "res" within the
state, permitting the court to adjudicate whether the debt claimed by plaintiff
should be satisfied out of the attached property.

Id.

, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).

' See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw §§ 5201, 6202 (McKinney 1963). Section 5201 provides:
(a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which
is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor,
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or
non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the
judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned
or transferred accruing within or without the state.
(b) Property against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any property which could be assigned or
transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and
whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Id. § 5201. Section 6202 provides that debts described in section 5201 are subject
to attachment. Id. § 6202.
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
'See Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv.
1108 (1968); Note, Foreign Attachment: Attaching Liability Insurance Contract
Rights as a Means of Securing Jurisdiction of Non-Resident Defendant, 10 S.
TEx. L.J. 59 (1968); Note, Civil Procedure-The Insurance Policy of a NonResident Insured May Be Subject to Attachment in New York, 18 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 631 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction--Attachment of Automobile Liability Insurance-Insurer'sObligation Is Attachable if He Does Business Within the State,
35 U. CiN. L. REv. 691 (1966).
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Smith.7

for the Southern District of New York in Barker v.
In Barker, the insurance contract was written and the accident subsequently occurred in Michigan. The corporate offices of both the insurer and the insured were also located in Michigan. Since Michigan had
previously neither permitted the attachment procedure sanctioned in
Seider nor authorized a direct action against the insurer,' the New York
rather than the Michigan attachment procedure had to be applied to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. The court in Barker found that the
expenses and pain suffered by the plaintiff in New York coupled with the
fact that the insurer was doing business in New York constituted sufficient
"activities relating to the contract" to apply the New York rule treating
the policy obligations as an attachable debt."
Prior to Seider, attachment of an insurer's obligations would not
have been possible primarily because the interpretation given to the statutory definition of an attachable debt in New York did not include these
obligations. Thus, a necessary prerequisite for in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction-the presence of an attachable res within the state"-had
been absent. Then, in Seider, the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify the insured was held to be the attachable res. This reasoning
appears to be consistent with the rule of Harris v. Balk12 that the situs
of a debt follows the debtor and is subject to garnishment wherever the
debtor is found. That case emphasized, however, that it was dealing with
a simple debt,1" which can only be in one place at one time. 14 But if the
insurance company's "debt" is found to be in New York because the insurance company is doing business in New York, the debt also exists in
every other jurisdiction in which the insurer is doing business. Moreover, the general rule is that an obligation subject to a condition precedent
is not attachable. 5 Yet the courts in Seider and later in Barker, finding
that certain obligations of the insurance company accrue as soon as it
'290
F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8
Louisiana and Wisconsin consider the insurer to be the real party in interest
and allow a plaintiff to sue the defendant's insurance company directly. See LA.
REv. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. § 260.11(1) (1965).
'290 F. Supp. at 713.
20 Id.

"See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722-23 (1878). There must also be effective seizure and adequate notice
to the owner to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction.
12198 U.S. 215 (1905).
a1 Id.at 222.
"'See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"See, e.g., 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 87 (1943).
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receives notice of an accident,' 6 held that the entire face amount of the
policy, including the insurer's contingent obligation to indemnify, was
garnishable, and thus expanded the definition of "debt" to include obligations subject to a condition precedent.
A secondary conflict-of-laws problem was encountered in the fact situations of Seider and Barker. Since an insurance policy is not an attachable
debt in Michigan, New York had to apply its laws interpreting the contract
to find an attachable res. Initially, the situs of the contract 7 was the
only relevant constitutional consideration under the territorially oriented
vested-rights theory. The Supreme Court later modified this rule when
it decided that a state with a "legitimate interest' 8 in the application of
its law may apply it without overstepping constitutional limitations, although it remains unclear exactly what minimum contacts are sufficient
to result in such an interest. Although Seider disregarded the problem
of minimum contacts, the court in Barker established two prerequisites
necessary before a state can constitutionally define the contract obligations
under a liability insurance policy written beyond its borders without
interfering with the sovereignty of sister states.' 9 First, a state must have
a legitimate interest in the application of its laws, and in Barker the court
found that the interest of New York in preventing its citizens from becoming public charges satisfied this requirement.2 Second, activities must
have occurred within the state that are "neither too slight nor too casual
to make application of its law inconsistent with due process."'" The expenses and suffering of the plaintiff and the insurer's doing business in
New York were held sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 2
The attachment procedure sanctioned by Seider seems to contain "few
1" Typical obligations accruing as soon as the insurer receives notice of the accident are obligations to investigate and to defend. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281
F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 332 (1934). Interpreting the

contract solely by the law of the jurisdiction in which it was consumated emphasized the importance of the situs in which the vested contract right arose. See

Note, Direct-Action Statittes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 HARv. L. REv. 357, 387-92 (1960).
" Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 387 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). For a

recent New York application of conflict of laws theory, see Miller v. Miller, 22

N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), reviewed in Note, Conflict of
Laws-Choice-of-Laws: The Greatest Interest Rule, 47 N.C.L. REV. 407 (1969).

10290 F. Supp. at 712.
"Id. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 313, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673, 287

N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (1967).
2 290 F. Supp. at 713.
22Id.
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if any limiting conditions on the bringing of an action in New York. It
appears that the plaintiff need not even be a resident of New York. '
The emphasis that Barker placed on the plaintiff's suffering and medical
expenses in New York, however, may imply that mere domicile of the
plaintiff and business contacts of the insurer in the attaching state are insufficient contact.2 4 If this implication becomes the rule, the attachment of
insurance obligations as in Seider would be limited to some extent. 25
Neither Seider nor Barker attempted to resolve whether attachment
of an insurance obligation comports with due process requirements of
2
the fourteenth amendment. The district court in Podolsky v. Devinney
found that garnishment of insurance policies was violative of due process
because New York did not permit the insured to make a personal appearance and defend on the merits without subjecting himself to in personam
jurisdiction and to the possibility of a judgment greater than the policy
limits. 2 7 Also found objectionable was that in the event of the insured's
default, "there is no way that the insurance company can appear to
litigate its interests. 28 In response to this decision, the New York Court
of Appeals in Simpson v. Loehmnnam 2 held that if the insured were
required to defend, in personam jurisdiction would not be extended beyond
the limits of the policy. The risk remains, however, that the insured might
refuse assistance to the insurer.
The problems arising out of the insurer's inability to defend either its
or the insured's interests result from applying the rules applicable to the
garnishment of simple debts to the attachment of insurance obligations.
Generally, the garnishee is considered as having no interest in the res
and therefore may not "set up matters which affect the defendant only." 8
SPodolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 498 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
",The Supreme Court, in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532 (1935), indicated that a plaintiff's domicile might have a constitutionally
supportable interest, but this case, unlike Seider and Barker, involved a plaintiff
who would otherwise have been remediless. Louisiana and Wisconsin, which allow
direct actions against insurers, do not permit suits when the accident occurred
outside of their state, possibly implying sufficient contact only when the accident
occurred within its borders. See LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1952); Wis.
STAT. § 260.11(1) (1963).
" In a very recent case, the second circuit also implied that Seider may not
be validly applied where the state was neither the place of injury nor the plaintiff's residence. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1968).
" 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
27
Id. at 489.
2
8Id. at 499.
2921 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
3038 C.J.S. Garnishnent§ 196, at 432 (1943).
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In the application of its garnishment law, New York has held that if the
insured "chooses not to appear, any unauthorized appearance on his behalf
by attorneys retained by the insurance company would be a nullity as
against him."'" The difficulties are apparent in analogizing an insurance
policy to a simple debt, for "the obligation to defend an insured is not
to be regarded simply as a duty owed to the holder of the policy but also
as an essential right which the insurance company reserves to itself in
2
order to protect itself against unwarranted liability claims."" This problem has not been directly confronted by the New York Court of Appeals,
but dictum in Simpson v. Loehmann3 3 Would allow the insurer to use an
insured's failure to comply with the terms of the policy as a defense. It
34
is not certain, however, that New York will follow this position. Regardless of whether the defense of non-cooperation is allowed, if New York
prohibits the insurer from asserting the insured's defenses, there are
obvious opportunities for collusion. Possible collusion between the insurer and the insured exists if a defense of non-cooperation is permitted;
collusion opportunities between the insured and the plaintiff arise if such
defense is disallowed. In contrast, in a direct action the company can
"contest the assured's liability and raise its policy defenses since here
it does not have the option of withdrawing from the case without a complete default on the merits."35
There will be additional problems if other jurisdictions adopt similar
attachment procedures. For example, if an accident occurred involving
plaintiffs who were citizens of New York and of another jurisdiction that
allowed such attachment, and the defendant's insurer was doing business
in both jurisdictions, would the debt be situated in both states at the
same time ?36 A related problem arises when attachment is levied in New
31 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
Earl S. Peed Organ., Inc. v. Gray, 40 Misc. 2d 471, 473, 243 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113
(Sup. Ct. 1963). These cases were decided on the basis of N.Y. INs. LAW § 167
(McKinney 1966).
2
' Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3321 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at 670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2. See
also Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-Problems for Both Sides, Notes and Views,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1968, at -.
" Louisiana and Massachusetts do not permit the defense of non-cooperation.
See, e.g., West v.Monroe Bakery, 217 La.190, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) ; MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 175, § 113A(5) (1959).
" Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARv. L. Rzv. 357, 366 (1960).
" See Note, Jurisdiction-Attachment of Automobile Liability Itsurance,Insurer's Obligation Is Attachable'if He Does Business Within the State, 35 U.
CIN. L. REV. 691 (1966).
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York by one of two plaintiffs injured simultaneously in a foreign jurisdiction and the other plaintiff has obtained an in personam judgment
against the defendant and seeks execution out of the attached insurance
37

policy.

New York is the first jurisdiction in which the highest state court
has "enacted" the equivalent of a direct action statute"' By an extremely
broad definition of a simple debt, an expanded conflicts test, an extended
jurisdiction test, and a novel use of the garnishment process, New York
has protected its residents under the guise of a quasi in rem proceeding.
Admittedly, the state of the plaintiff's residence has a definite interest in
protecting its citizens. Barker, however, dismisses the interests of the
insurer and the insured by recommending that "inconvenience or hardship ...

may be alleviated by way of a motion for a change of venue.''"

This statement is based on the assumption that the parties will be able
to obtain federal jurisdiction or that the forum will allow a change in
venue.40 Even though Barker allowed the attachment of the insurance
obligation, there is no necessary implication that all attachments possible
under Seider are valid. The basic issue remains a determination of
whether there are sufficient interests and contacts in New York to sustain
jurisdiction over a corporation's intangible obligations on a cause of action
arising out of state." It has been suggested that the insurance contract
See Note, Civil Procedure-The Insurance Policy of a Non-Resident Insured May Be Slibject to Attachment in New York, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 631

(1967).
8

See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Note,

Juris-

diction-Quasi-in-Remv---Insurance-Attachmentof Automobile Liability-Insurer's
Obligations to Defend and Indemnify, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. R.v. 147 (1966);
Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingewt Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation,67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550 (1967).
" 290 F. Supp. at 714. The court here employed the approach of Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), which held that when "a contract
affects the people of several states, each may have interests that leave it free to
enforce its own contract policies." Id. at 73. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), the Court stated that a party who challenges
a court's choice of laws "assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational
basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum." Id. at 547-48. While Watson may allow a state
to apply its law if it has sufficient contact regardless of the other state's interests,
Alaska Packers seems to imply a balancing of competing interests.
"' The insurer may be unable to obtain federal jurisdiction for diversity or
jurisdictional amount reasons and the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought may
not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
4' See, e.g., Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long
Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLum. L.
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should be regarded merely as another contact and not the sole determinant
of jurisdiciton over an out-of-state cause of action.4" Perhaps a legislative
solution to this problem might resolve the present uncertain status of
43
New York attachment law.
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN

Civil Procedure-Serving Statement of Case on Appeal in North
Carolina-An Unfortunate Interpretation
In North Carolina two formal steps are required in appealing a
decision from a trial court. The appellant must prepare and serve to the
appellee a statement of the case on appeal, and the case must be docketed
on the appellate court's calendar in accordance with the rules of the higher
court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-2821 allows only fifteen days to serve statement
of case on appeal and ten days thereafter for counter case or exception,
but the statute includes a proviso that gives the trial judge discretion
"to enlarge the time in which to serve statement of case on appeal and
exceptions thereto or counter statement of case." 2 The statute does not
expressly authorize any subsequent extensions of time to be ordered by
the judge hearing the case. As a practical matter, however, it is sometimes impossible for the appellant to secure a copy of the transcript of
the trial and to prepare his statement within the original extension period
set by the judge. Often the delay is occasioned by an official of the court,
but the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that this does not excuse
a failure to serve the statement within the time allotted.3 Consequently, it
has been common practice for the trial judge, even without specific statuREv. 550

19

(1967); Note, Quasi In Rem JurisdicitonBased on Insurer's Obligations,
L. REv. 654 (1967).

STANFo1

" See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation,67 COLUm. L. Rnv. 550, 567-71 (1967).

" Such a statute should at least do the following: (1) allow the insurer to set

up the defenses of the insured, (2) resolve whether the insurer can defeat an

action successfully on the insured's failure of cooperation, and (3) clearly specify
the minimum contacts in New York sufficient to attain jurisdiction.

IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-282 (1953).
2Id.
'State v. Wescott, 220 N.C. 439, 17 S.E.2d 507 (1941) (illness of the court
reporter); Rogers v. City of Asheville, 182 N.C. 596, 109 S.E. 685 (1921) (stenographer busy).
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tory authority, to grant a second and even a third extension for service of
the case upon request by the appellant.
Most appeals are now taken to the new intermediate appellate court. 4

Rule 5 of the North Carolina Court of Appeals provides that the case on
appeal must be docketed within ninety days after judgment.' Yet, the trial
judge is authorized to extend the time for up to an additional sixty days
for good cause shown. Construing § 1-282 and Rule 5 together, the
reasonable and practical construction would be that since the trial judge
can extend the time for both serving and docketing the case on appeal and
since there is no express limitation on his granting successive extensions
for service or docketing, he has the authority to grant successive extensions
of time for service and docketing. The only implicit limitation would be
that the extensions of time for service of case on appeal cannot exceed
the one hundred and fifty day limit for docketing imposed by Rule 5.'
Interpreting the statute narrowly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held in Roberts v. Stewart7 that additional extensions of time granted
by the trial judge for service of the case on appeal were entered without
authority because upon filing the notice of appeal the case was removed
to the court of appeals.' Since there was no case on appeal before the
court, the court reviewed only the record proper for error, and finding
none, affirmed the decision of the superior court.
As authority for its decision, the court in Roberts relied principally
upon American Floor Machine Co. v. Dixon.' There the supreme court,

in interpreting the statute creating a county civil court,"0 held that upon
filing notice of appeal from the county court to the superior court the case
was removed to the higher court, thereby making the trial judge functs
officio." The judge thus no longer had jurisdiction to extend the time
for service of case on appeal beyond his original order setting the time
'See Steed, The North Carolina Court of Appeals-An Outline of Appellate
Procedure,46 N.C.L. REv. 705 (1968).
N.C. CT. APP. R. 5 (the rules may be found in the 1967 supplement to Volume
4A of N.C. GEN. STAT.).
' In granting extensions of time for service, the trial judge must allow sufficient
time to settle the statement of the case if the appellee files exceptions, so that
docketing may still take place under Rule 5.
'3 N.C. App. 120, - S.E.2d - (1968).
8
Id. at 124, - S.E.2d at - (1968).
9260 N.C. 732, 133 S.E.2d 659 (1963); accord, Pelaez v. Carland, 268 N.C.
192, 150 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
"0Ch. 691, § 59, [1937] N.C. SEss. LAWS (repealed 1967) (this statute providing for the establishment of county civil courts was repealed in 1967 when the
statutes setting up the new district court system became effective).
21260 N.C. at 735-36, 133 S.E.2d at 662.
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for service. 12 His only remaining authority was to resolve the statements
of case on appeal, if the appellee filed a counter statement or exceptions
that gave a different account of the events at trial, or to adjudge an
abandonment of the appeal. 13
It is arguable that the court reached a correct result in Roberts since
the supreme court's ruling in American Floor Machine Co. was rendered
in 1963 and the profession and bench should have been aware of the
opinion. Yet, the court was not interpreting § 1-282 in American Floor
Machine Co., even though the situations were analogous in that both involved an appeal to a higher court. Moreover, to apply the familiar fiction
that an attorney and judge are deemed to "know the law" seems unnecessary and even unfair in this circumstance where practicality should
be a paramount consideration and where a contrary result could have
rested upon a more reasonable interpretation of the purposes of the statute
and court rule.
The fact that the court of appeals heard three other cases in 1968 dealing with extensions of time for service should testify to the frequency of the
practice. In the first case, Smith v. Stevens,' 4 the court chose not to dismiss the appeal ex inero motu, the appellee not having moved to dismiss.
The court considered the appeal on the merits and granted a new trial,
although the trial judge had granted subsequent extensions to serve the
statement of case on appeal under color of Rule 5, but had not extended
the time for docketing the case. Another case, Williams v. WVilliams,' 5
was dismissed under Rule 1616 because the statement was served one
hundred and fifty-three days after judgment was entered. In State v.
Farrell,17 decided after Roberts, the appellant had been granted successive
extensions of time totalling one hundred and twenty days to serve the
case. The court said the appeal should be dismissed. The court reviewed
the record, however, "to determine that justice is done," and found no
prejudicial error,' s even though, unlike Roberts, no order was entered
extending the time for docketing, which took place one hundred and fifty
days after the judgment. In a parenthesis in the opinion, the court said:
12

Id.

1d.

"1 N.C. App. 192, 160 S.E.2d 547 (1968).
1 N.C. App. 446, 161 S.E.2d 757 (1968).
16Rule 16 provides for a motion, before argument on the merits of the case, to
dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with the requirements of statutes or rules
of the court in perfecting an appeal.
"73 N.C. App. 196, - S.E.2d - (1968).
S.E.2d at -.
18 Id. at 200, -

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Each of these extensions of time was consented to by the Solicitor and
upon this record we make no decision whether the trial judge has
authority under G.S. 1-282, with or without the consent of the parties,
to extend the time for serving case on appeal beyond that contained
in the original order extending the statutory time. 19
This statement could indicate that the court itself did not "know the law"
it had so recently set forth. On the other hand, the court may have thought
that this issue was not ripe for consideration because no extension had
been granted for docketing.
The technicality in appellate procedure raised by the court's decision
in Roberts was rectified in early 1969 by newly adopted Rule 50.
If it appears that the case on appeal cannot be served within the time
provided by statute, rule, or order, the trial judge (or the chairman of
the Industrial Commission or the chairman of the Utilities Commission
as the case may be) may, for good cause and after notice to the opposing
party or counsel, enter an order or successive orders extending the time
for service of the case on appeal and counter-case or exceptions to the
case on appeal, provided this does not alter the provisions of Rule 5
20
relating to the docketing of the case on appeal.
It is interesting to note that the North Carolina Supreme Court in effect
overruled the decision in Roberts by adoption of a court rule rather than
by judicial decision.
It is arguable that § 1-282 pre-empts the field of service of the case,
thereby making the supreme court's promulgation of Rule 50 technically
improper.2 1 Service of the case, however, seems to be a procedural requirement for appeal and the supreme court has exclusive authority under the
constitution 2 and by statute23 to provide rules of practice and procedure
for the appellate division. Thus, if Rule 50 is interpreted to be in conflict
with § 1-282, the statute would seem to be invalid because the legislature
cannot change a rule of the court.24 Yet, Rule 50 may be seen as nothing
29Id. at 198-99, - S.E.2d at -.
" N.C. CT. APP. R. 50 (since this new rule was only adopted Feb. 11, 1969, as of
this writing it may only be found in advance sheet No. 3 to 3 N.C. App. at xv).
" See Lehnen v. Hines & Co., 88 Kan. 58, 127 P. 612 (1912) (dictum) (court
may enforce reasonable rules regulating practice in pending cases, but times set by
statute within which steps are to be taken cannot be shortened by rules).
"N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 11.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33 (Supp. 1967).
" State v. Martin, 210 N.C. 459, 187 S.E. 586 (1936); Calvert v. Carstarphen,
133 N.C. 25, 45 S.E. 353 (1903); accord, Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So. 2d
33 (Fla. 1963).
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more than a clarification of the meaning of § 1-282,25 in which case Rule
50 would not be an implicit declaration by the supreme court that § 1-282
is invalid as an infringement on the court's right to promulgate procedural rules for the appellate division.
As a word of warning to the practicing bar, it should be emphasized
that Rule 5 itself does not specifically authorize the trial court to enter
successive orders extending the time for docketing the case on appeal.
Possibly, then, a trial judge may have jurisdiction to issue only one
order extending the time for docketing the appeal. Thus, it may become
necessary for the supreme court to adopt a docketing rule, similar to
Rule 50, authorizing the trial judge to grant successive extensions of time
for docketing the appeal within the one hundred and fifty day limit of
Rule 5. Hopefully, in making future rulings on appellate procedure, the
new intermediate court will be less narrow in its view of the processes
of appeal and will accommodate its interpretation of the rules to the
practicalities involved.
ROBERT A. WICKER

Contracts-Contracts To Devise-Effect of Excluded Forced Heirs
A contract to make a will necessarily juxtaposes the law of contracts
and of decedent's estates and brings into conflict the policy of compelling
performance of a promise with that of allowing free testamentary disposition.' A recent case, In re Estate of Stewart,2 injected a third basic consideration: the effect of an excluded forced heir upon the distribution of
property willed pursuant to an antenuptial contract to devise. The California Supreme Court held the contract beneficiaries' interest paramount
to the forced heir's claim, thus upholding the policy for contractual certainty of performance against the challenge posed by the conflicting policy
disfavoring spousal disinheritance. The court's treatment of the problem
brings the factors involved sharply into focus.
In 1936, Walter Stewart, his wife Jennie, and his brother John, cotenants of specific real property, entered into a written contract to devise
See text accompanying notes 5 & 6, supra.
Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third
Parties,18 HASTINGs L.J. 423 (1967); see generally, 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 963 (1965).
- Cal. 2d -, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
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their respective one-third interests in the property to the survivors for life

and to their respective children on the death of the last survivor.' Each
made a will pursuant to the contract. 4 Upon John's death in 1947, Walter
and Jennie held as cotenants for life, with Walter, due to a lapse in John's
will, taking the remainder in John's one-third interest in fee.' When
Jennie died in 1949, Walter took her interest in the property for life,
and became vested with John's interest in fee simple. Walter subsequently remarried. When he died in 1965, his survivors included his
widow, a brother, and six stepchildren (Jennie's children by a previous
marriage). His estate consisted of the one-third interest in the realty
he owned in 1936 plus the one-third interest he inherited from his brother
John.' The widow was appointed administratrix, and the decedent's 1936
will was admitted to probate. As administratrix, the widow petitioned
for a decree determining interests in the decedent's estate.
The trial court found that, as a California statute7 revoked the will
as to the pretermitted spouse, Walter's widow took one-half of the
estate,8 with the remaining one-half passing under the will to the stepchildren? The court of appeals" ° determined that the contract was made
'Id. at -,

444 P.2d at 338, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 546.

'Id. Walter left his interest to Jennie and John, or the survivor, remainder in
equal shares to his daughter, who predeceased him, and his six stepchildren.
' Ili re Estate of Stewart, 63 Cal. Rptr. 548 n.1 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Walter
and another brother, Sankey, were John's heirs, but for reasons undisclosed in the
record, Sankey did not share in the property. Hence Walter had a life estate in
cotenancy by virtue of John's will with a remainder in fee by intestate succession,
which, upon Jennie's subsequent death extinguishing the intervening life estate in
cotenancy, merged into a fee (the court's language is imprecise here).
' The remainder of Jennie's one-third interest passed to her six children (Walter's stepchildren) under her will when Walter died, and was not included as
part of Walter's probate estate.
CAL.

PROB.

CODE

§ 70 (West 1956). It provides that

[i]f a person marries after making a will, and the spouse survives the maker,
the will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has been made for the
spouse by marriage contract, or unless the spouse is provided for in the will,
or in such a way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such
provision ....

23 (West 1956) provides that a mutual will may be revoked "in
like manner as any other will."
' CAL. PROB. CODE § 223 (West 1956) provides:
If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and no issue, the estate goes onehalf to the surviving spouse and one-half to the decedent's parents in equal
shares, or if either is dead to the survivor, or if both are dead to their issue
and the issue of either of them, by right of representation.
9
Two supreme court justices would have affirmed the trial court's decision.
Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 340, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
li re Estate of Stewart, 63 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
CAL. PROB. CODE §
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"expressly for the benefit" of the stepchildren as required by Civil Code
§ 1559," and reasoned that the decedent could not have effectively willed
the property to anyone except them,' 2 thus reversing the trial court.
The California Supreme Court, however, vacated the decision of the
court of appeals,' 3 and held that the widow was entitled only to half of
that half of the estate that the decedent had inherited from his brother

John.
Although the decedent's post-testamentary marriage resulted in partial revocation of the will, the supreme court stated that such revocation "does not impair the stepchildren's right to enforcement of the
contract, for such a partial revocation can no more prejudice their rights
than could a total revocation in repudiation of the contract." 4 The court
reasoned that since the decedent had received the benefits of the contract,
lie "became estopped from making any other or different disposition of
the property. . ," nor could he "avoid this estoppel ... by a subsequent
marriage. . . ,,'5 As the property belonged in equity to the stepchildren
the widow's right could attach only to property both legally and equitably
owned by the decedent, which was the one-third interest he had inherited from his brother John. This half of that interest, the court concluded, is all she would have taken had the decedent died intestate; to
give her more when the decedent performed his contract than she would
16
have received had he breached it "would be anomalous."'
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have been confronted with
the problems involved in contracts to make mutual wills and have
resolved them upon widely disparate principles. That contracts to make
wills are valid and enforceable' 7 both in law'" and in equity' 9 seems well" CAL. CIv. CODE § 1559 (West 1954) secures third-party beneficiary rights.
See note 32 infra. The court of appeals cited with approval Brewer v. Simpson, 53

Cal. 2d 265, 349 P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1958), where remaindermen after a
similarly-created life estate were allowed to enjoin alienation by the life tenant.
" The court of appeals relied on Allen v. Payson, 170 Misc. 759, 11 N.Y.S.2d
28 (Sup. Ct. 1939). There, in construing a statute similar to CAL. PROB. CODE

§ 70 (West 1956), the court held that the statute did not affect enforceable contracts, whether those seeking enforcement were creditors or cestni que trusts.
Bitt see note 58 infra, and accompanying text.

-. Cal. 2d -, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
1d. at -, 444 P.2d at 339, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
Id., quoting Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 55, 113 P.2d 495,
500 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
'0 - Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 340, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
"1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 10.1, at 432 (1960).

"E.g., Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 584, 147 P. 259, 263 (1915).
"E.g., Baylor v. Bath, 189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d 139 (1938).
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settled. But the time such contracts become enforceable and the extent
and manner in which they can be enforced are not so clear.
Generally, bilateral contracts are enforceable from the time a promise
is given in exchange and as consideration for another promise."0 Contracts to make mutual wills, however, do not seem to be treated in
accordance with the rules governing ordinary bilateral contracts. Some
cases state that parties may repudiate without liability for breach of
contract while both are still living;"1 indeed, this has been said to be
the general rule.2 2 According to this view, the contract becomes binding
when, as in Stewart, one party dies with a will pursuant to the contract
in effect.2" If the survivor probates such a will and receives its benefits,
24
the surviving party is held estopped from repudiating his contract.
The reason usually advanced to support the application of these principles is that the privilege of free testamentary disposition should not be
subject to the usual rules of contract law. Enforceability of a contract
as of the time of creation might shackle the essentially ambulatory and
revocable attributes of wills. "Certainly, some freedom to change one's
mind is necessary for free intercourse between those who lack omniscience." 21 Conseqeuently, contract law attempts to balance between this
freedom to change one's mind and the interests of others that merit
protection." Such flexible principles of equity as mutual assent, consideration, and fraud were developed to avoid undue harshness resulting
from compelling performance of a promise.
Since future actions are
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 74, 77 (1932).
" [W]hile both or all of the parties
to such an agreement are yet alive, any
party may recede therefrom, and revoke his will or make a different disposition ...

on giving proper notice ...

or where such other or others have

actual knowledge... provided such other is afforded an ample opportunity
to make a new will, and has not changed his position, to his detriment, in
reliance on the agreement.
97 C.J.S. Wills § 1367, at 306-07 (1957). As indicated, most courts require notice
of the revocation. E.g., Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909). For
a thorough analysis of this proposition, see Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts To
Devise or Bequeath Prior To the Death of the Promisor (pt. II), 53 MicH. L.
REv. 215, 222-31 (1954).
2

Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 52, 129 P.2d 813, 820 (1942).
'"But see Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P.2d 148 (1931), which suggests that the contract is binding when the mutual wills are executed.
"4E.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949). In some
jurisdictions the contract may not be binding until that time. See Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N.J. Eq. 346, 112 A. 665 (Ch. 1921).
" Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 573 (1933).

"°See 1 A.

CORBIN, CONTRACTS

§ 1 (1963).

"' "The proposition that an agreement to make mutual wills is unenforceable
without estoppel, is perhaps the result of a latent dislike for the rule .

.

. that a
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naturally subject to change, as is a will, the power to break a contract
always exists; it is the right to do so without incurring liability that
contract law seeks to determine. This determination is guided by principles sufficiently flexible to derive just results. The application of the
estoppel doctrine in the Stewart context seems an unnecessary importation; the contract should be enforced, if at all, on contract principles."8
While in Stewart the result is the same under either analysis, in cases
of a breached contract to make a will, the conclusion reached can vary
with the theory applied. The use of the estoppel doctrine rather than
normal contract rules to implement enforcement seems a deviation from
sound jurisprudence, the principal result of which is confusion. 9
The extent and manner of enforcement of contracts to make mutual
wills presents difficulty especially where, as in Stewart, third-party
beneficiaries seek enforcement. Third-party beneficiary rights are enforceable in most American jurisdictions," and are established in California by both case law 3' and statute. 32 The theories upon which these
rights rest, however, are frequently disputed. 3 The court in Stewart
seems to regard equitable title to the property as vested in the remainderpromise may serve as consideration for another promise." Note, SeparationAgree-

ments to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
423, 439 (1967). "What logical justification is there for holding mutual promises
good consideration for each other? None, it submitted." Williston, Consideration
In Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L. Rxv. 503, 508 (1914) (quoting Pollock).
"[I]t is also true that whatever may be the requirements of sufficient consideration,
those requirements, like all rules of law, are in a broad sense dictated by public
policy." Id. at 504-05.
.8 "Our law has no separate concept of 'will made in pursuance of contract'; we
must treat the will part as a will and the contract part as a contract." T. ATKINSON,
WILLS 224 (2d ed. 1963). See B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS (1956)
[hereinafter cited as CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS].
" For a study of the evolution of estoppel doctrines to enforce contracts to make
wills in California, see Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for
the Benefit of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 425-27 (1967), where it is
asserted that the concept developed through error.
" Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (concerning a creditor-beneficiary),
is perhaps the leading case and is said to be the forerunner of third-party beneficiary rights in the United States.

" The right to enforce such a contract to make a particular disposition of
property on death is not restricted to the promisee. Where two parties agree
to make mutual wills ...

to [benefit] certain third persons ...

the intended

devisees and legatees are entitled to enforce their rights as beneficiaries under
the agreement.
Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
82 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1559 (West 1954): "A contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
thereto rescind it."
" See Sparks, supra note 21.
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men prior to decedent's remarriage, 34 and cites with approval cases treating the life tenant as a trustee for the remaindermen. 5 At the time the
contract was entered into, however, no present transfer of any interest
was intended; it was simply a promise to execute a document effectuating
such a transfer in the future. Perhaps a more accurate statement is
that the equitable title vests at the time of the promisor's death, subject
to funeral and administrative expenses.3" The closest analogy is said
to be that to a contract to sell at a future date.3" "Hence the beneficiary
has an equitable right to demand a conveyance or transfer at [death]
• . . , but does not have equitable title."3 The distinction is important
where the subject of the contract is "all my estate" or some other indefinite quantity;30 fortunately, the imprecision here, where specific realty
was concerned, was not fatal to correct adjudication.
The difficulties inherent in a contract to make mutual wills are
sharply compounded when the policies underlying its enforcement are
confronted with a contest by a pretermitted spouse. 40 "[T]he rights of
the wife and widow [are] vested under a contract most strongly favored
by the law

.

.,'

and the tendency of courts to give spousal rights prefer-

- Cal. 2d at -, 444 P.2d at 339, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
Id. Several cases cited therein rely on "constructive trust" theories to enforce breached contracts to make mutual wills. Blit see Sparks, supra note 21, at
215.
"'In re Stevens' Will, 192 Misc. 179, 183, 78 N.Y.S.2d 868, 872 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts To Devise or Bequeath PriorTo the Death
of the Promisor (pt. I), 53 MicH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1954); Sparks, supra note 21,
at 219.
" Sparks, supra note 21, at -. This view also avoids "the technical responsibilities attaching to life tenancies with frequent accounting to the probate court.
Meador v. Manlove, 97 Kan. 706, 711, 156 P. 731, 733 (1916).
" This theory creates very serious difficulties in case of contracts to will all
or a fractional part of one's estate. What is there to have a life estate in and
in what does the promisee have a remainder? The promisor may consume
any or all of his property during his life or he may exchange any or all of
it . . . . Even it is explained that the life estate is a life estate with the
power to consume, there is the further difficulty of explaining how the
future acquired property is brought within the life tenant-remainderman
status. It is difficult to conceive of a relationship wherein one party owns a
life estate in everything possessed by him and another owns the remainder
in fee, but the life tenant is capable of disposing of any or all of the property in fee simple, and any future property coming to him immediately
assumes the status of a mere life estate in him and a remainder in the other
party. Not only would this be a new and unusual estate, but it would be a
new and unusual estate which served no useful purpose.
Sparks, supra note 21, at 218-19. See CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 106.
'

"°See CONTRACTS
"Owens

TO MAXE WILLS

167-78.

v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 453, 45 P. 710, 713 (1896).
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ential treatment increases the complexity of an already complicated area
of the law. Furthermore, manifestation of the deference accorded surviving spouses excluded from testamentary disposition is to be noted
in various state statutes giving such spouses rights of dissent from their
decedent spouses' excluding wills." Most states provide for some extent
of revocation, by operation of law, of wills executed prior to marriage.4"
This legislation has recognized one or a combination of four types
of such revocation. 4 4 A subsequent marriage may be deemed to revoke the
will absolutely,45 or merely partially revoke it, giving the surviving
spouse an intestate share.4" Or the statute may revoke the will unless it
was executed in contemplation of the marriage,47 or revoke except when
a marriage contract or other arrangement provides for the surviving
spouse or the spouse is so mentioned in the will as to indicate an intention
that the will not be revoked by marriage. 4 These statutes reflect varying
legislative appraisals of the extent to which marital rights should outweigh the privilege of free testamentary disposition.
Judicial efforts to balance the interests of excluded surviving spouses
and those of the beneficiaries of the decedent's bounty in another area,
inter vivos alienation of property to avoid the claims of the surviving
spouse,40 may also prove helpful by analogy, as the policies involved are
similar to those considered in Stewart. The courts have taken various
approaches to reconciling such conflicts. Perhaps these might be outlined
as the "fraud" approach or New York rule,"0 the "balancing of hard"2See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1, -3 (1966) (right of dissent); id. § 29-30
(election of life estate or "statutory dower").
" For an annotation of state legislation in this area, see 95 C.J.S. Wills § 291
(1957).
" See Note, Wills-PartialRevocation For the Benefit of a PretermittedSpouse,
17 U. MIAMi L. REV. 229 (1962).
" E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §

197 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 114.130 (1965).
A statute, unless expressly so providing, will not be construed to allow partial revocation; rather, the will will be struck down in its entirety. In re Tenner's Will,
248 N.C. 72, 102 S.E.2d 391 (1958).
"E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra. Some statutes,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, -3 (1966), accomplish the same result by providing
for dissent from the will by the surviving spouse, rather than for partial revocation.
"'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-162 (1958).
"E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra.
" These efforts have focused particularly on cases where a spouse, to avoid
leaving a substantial estate to his surviving spouse, has established revocable and
tentative ("Totten") trusts with rights of survivorship in third parties.
"See In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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ships" approach or Maryland rule, and the "estate inclusion" approach
taken by the Restatement of Trusts, 2 in which the value of the inter
vivos transfer is included in the decedent's estate for the purpose of
determining the surviving spouse's forced heir's share, but is subjected
to that obligation only if necessary and only to the extent necessary to
satisfy it.5 3 While these considerations in an area involving similar
conflicts to those found in Stewart bear some relevance to that determination, their application is limited. All to some degree give weight to the
decedent's intention or lack of intention to defraud the surviving spouse's
marital rights.54 Where, as in Stewart, the decedent in good faith contracts several years prior to the marriage, and indeed contracts with his
then spouse, any application of policies based on fraudulent intent is
clearly incorrect.
The status of the contesting parties is relevant, 5 but here hardly
determinative. The widow was not mentioned in the will, a circumstance in which California legislation 6 seems to presume an oversight
by the decedent, rather than an intention to exclude her. In her pretermitted status, then, the widow would seem deserving of judicial indulgence. Her status, however, as a second wife who did not jointly
contribute to the acquisition of the property in question tends to nullify
this consideration.57 Whether the status of the contract beneficiaries
entitles them to more protection is also questionable. As donee-beneficiaries, they gave "no consideration in the past, [give] none in the
" See Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1954).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 58, comment e, at 157-58 (1959).
"' These various approaches were compared in Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183,
130 N.W.2d 473 (1964), noted in 34 U. CIN. L. R-v. 179 (1965). The court, criticizing the New York rule as inequitable and the Maryland rule as uncertain, concluded that the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS approach was the most satisfactory. Id.
at 196, 130 N.W.2d at 481. See generally B. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 (2d
ed. 1965); 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
569-71 (1949); A. SCOTT, LAW OF
TRUSTS § 58 (3d ed. 1967); Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.L.
REV. 214 (1963).

" Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) rejects such a subjective test and implements a "real or illusory nature of the transfer" test instead;
but this would seem to be merely one of a number of means of ascertaining the
presence of fraudulent intent.
" See Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
" CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956). See note 7 supra.
"'Fora legislative manifestation of this view, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b)
(1966) (giving second or successive surviving spouse dissenting from a will only
one-half the amount otherwise provided as a forced heir's share by the Intestate
Succession Act where the decedent has lineal descendants by a former marriage
surviving, but none surviving the second or successive marriage).
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present, and [promise] nothing for the future." ' s Although they are
stepchildren of the decedent, he seemed by his contract and will to be
disposed to treat them as his children. The decedent's intent seems on
balance to have been that the property go to the stepchildren, but when
the widow is taking under a forced heir's statute, this intent is clearly
not entitled to much weight. Other factors entitled to judicial consideration in a given case 9 might include the length of the marriage, the
widow's age and ability to support herself, and the quantum of inter
vivos gifts given to her by the decedent spouse. Evidence of such factors,
however, is lacking in this case.
Correct distribution of the estate involved in Stewart thus requires
a balancing of the policy of protecting the widow from destitution
against the policy of upholding the certainty of contractual obligation,
and this balancing must control the decision almost to the exclusion of
other factors. This approach, rather than a formal application of real
property theory, should be accepted. "[O]nly those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them ... [w]hether it is
a property right is really the question to be answered." 6 That such a
decision, in the absence of legislation on the point, should appropriately
rest in equity jurisdiction has long been accepted. It is submitted that
in the absence of a showing of hardship by the pretermitted spouse the
contractual obligation should hold sway."
DAVID

G. CROCKETT

58 Page, The Power of the Contracting Partiesto Alter a Contract For Rendering Performance to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. REv. 141, 184 (1937). Although
the California statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 1954) (set out at note 32 supra),
does not distinguish between donee-beneficiaries and creditor-beneficiaries, California courts have noted the distinction. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co.,
204 Cal. App. 2d 747, 751-52, 22 Cal. Rptr. 540, 543-44 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
" See Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
" United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945)
(opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson). It is asserted that the property theory has been
consistently applied by the Court: "It is incorrect to say that the judiciary protected property; rather they called that property to which they accorded protec-

ion." Hamilton & Till, Property, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

528, 536 (1934).
"1While the arguments on both sides are cogent, it is submitted that it is better
to permit a person to disinherit his future spouse than to break his contract.
Hirsch, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath (pt. II), 9 Wis. L. REv. 388, 391 (1934);
see Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y.S. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Burdine v.
Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900); but see Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939).
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Copyright Law-CATV-A Plea for Legislative Revision*
A community antenna television system (CATV) is a sophisticated
television receiving antenna through which signals, once received, are
instantaneously amplified, separated, and relayed by coaxial cable or microwave facilities to the homes of subscribers, who pay an installation fee
plus a monthly rate unrelated to the number of shows viewed. Technically
a "mere adjunct of the television receiving sets [the service] enables a
set disadvantageously located to operate like an ordinary set."'- Originally
it was designed to service television sets that could not receive clear signals
due to mountains or distance from regular television stations. 2 In recent
years, because of clearer reception and greater program variety,' CATV
has encompassed many new markets. Hence, complex questions have
arisen concerning its proper relationship to the television broadcasting
industry, for until recently only the latter has been subject to regulation by
the Federal Communications Commission.'
Local stations first became concerned over the competition for audience viewing time because CATV did not carry the local stations.3 The
* This paper has been entered in the 1969 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, and is published here by permission of the American Society, of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers.

'Lilly v. United States, 238 F.2d 584, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1956). For a technical
discussion of CATV systems, see generally United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); B. RUCKER, THE FIRST FREEDOM 175 (1968) [hereinafter cited as RucxER].
Television signals travel in a straight line and thus their direction and power
are dissipated by the curvature of the earth and other factors. Five hundred thousand
viewers in Manhattan, for example, do not receive adequate television signals due
to the interference of tall buildings. RUCKER 175.

' RUCKER 176. Note, Copyright-Telecomnunicatio--CATVCarriageof Copyrighted Material Does Not Constitute Infringement, 21 VAND. L. REV. 854, 856
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, CATV Not Copyright Infringement].
' CATV initially was not regulated by the FCC because CATV used cable
facilities and was not a "broadcaster" for purposes of the Federal Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1958). Arguably, CATV should be regulated by the
Common Carrier Bureau, a branch of the FCC which regulates non-broadcast
services such as telephone and telegraph. Objections to such regulation are made

on both historical-it does not strictly involve interstate commerce-and policy

grounds. However, the microwave portion of CATV is regulated by the FCC.
See generally Note, The. Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HAiv. L. REv.
366 (1965); Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: On a Clear Day You Can See
Forever, 52 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, On a Clear Day].
Huntley & Phillips, Community Antenna Television: A Regulatory Dilenmma,
18 ALA. L. REv. 64 (1965):

In most basic terms, the threat which CATV poses for the established local
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FCC now requires CATV to relay the local station's broadcasts. However, the national television networks and the local stations, who had to
obtain copyright licenses for their broadcasts, desired further protection
from CATV as it received their programs free of charge. The copyright
holders feared the potential loss of revenue when CATV sold copyrighted
programs to its subscribers without paying for the programs. These
parties initially sought to attack CATV in actions for unfair competition,' since the object of CATV was to take a share of the audience's
time. The courts, however, were unanimous in refusing relief on that
basis. 7 For instance, in Cable Vision, ihw. v. KUTV, Inc.,' a local station
counterclaimed for damages from a CATV operator on two theories:
unfair competition and tortious interference with contractual relations.
The court held that the landmark cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co." and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,"° would not permit
using common law tort theories to protect what was in fact a copyright
interest. "[O]nly actions for copyright infringement or such common
law actions as are consistent with the primary right of public access to
all in the public domain will lie.""' An action against CATV on the basis
television station is the threat of competition-the threat that there may be
some penetration of the competitive insulation which television stations have
heretofore enjoyed .
Id. at 77.
'For a thorough treatment of the origins and developments of the law of unfair
competition, see generally Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289
(1940). Actions for unfair competition typically involve a seller of goods attempting to convince the consumer that his merchandise was that of a competitor, i.e.,
"palming off." Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665
(1901). See 2 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 60 (2d
ed. 1950); Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEo. L.J. 585 (1940).
The landmark cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffl Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964),
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), held that a
state unfair competition law cannot impose liability for, or prohibit, the copying
of an article not protected by a patent or copyright. The Court thereby announced
a firm policy of free access to anything in the public domain. For an exhaustive
study of these two cases, see Bender, Brown, Derenberg, Handler & Leeds, Product
A Right or Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1178 (1964).
Simulation:
7
See, e.g., Intermountain Broadcasting & Telev. Corp. v. Idaho Microwave,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961); Herald Publ. Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So. 2d 469 (Fla. App. 1965).
s 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'g 211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
10376
11335

U.S. 234 (1964).
F.2d at 350.

[CATV may] freely and with impunity avail [itself] of such.-works to-any
extent [it] may desire and for any purpose whatever subjed only to the
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of copyright infringement seemed to be the only private remedy for
stopping its allegedly unfair practices.
There followed an effort to require CATV to obtain copyright licenses.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,12 the respondent,
United Artists, had given a limited license' 3 for five of its copyrighted
motion pictures to several television stations, which the petitioner, Fortnightly, a CATV system, had received and retransmitted to its subscribers. These subscribers could not receive any of the five television
stations with ordinary antennas. At no time did the petitioner obtain any
license under the copyrights from United Artists or from any of the
five television stations. The respondent claimed that Fortnightly had
infringed its exclusive right under the Copyright Act of 1909 to "perform .. .in public for profit" nondramatic literary works and its right
to "perform . . . publicly" dramatic works. 4 Fortnightly responded that

its system did not "perform" the copyrighted works at all. The district
court found for United Artists, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the CATV system of Fortnightly
did not infringe the respondent's copyright.
Generally a copyright holder is not granted control over all uses of
his copyrighted work by the Copyright Act, 5 but rather is given certain
enumerated "exclusive rights."' Hence, any party, without authorization
from the copyright holder, infringes the copyright when he puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these exclusive rights.
qualification that [it] does not steal good will, or, perhaps more accurately
stated, deceive others in thinking the creations represent [its] own work.
Id. at 351.
Th392 U.S. 390 (1968).
18
Id. at 393. See Comment, CATV-The Copyright Problem, 13 N.Y.L.F. 395,
398 n.21 (1967) (license restricted the motion pictures to the broadcaster's facilities
and gave no right to sublicense to CATV).
14 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) in pertinent part grants the copyright holder the exclusive right:
(c) To deliver, authorize delivery of .. . or present the copyrighted work
in public for profit if it be a . . .nondramatic literary work . . .and to

play or perform it in public for profit... in any manner or by any method
whatsoever....
(d) To perform . .. the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama . . .

and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or
by any method whatsoever...

"I"The fundamental [principle is] that 'use' is not the same thing as 'infringement,' that use short of infringement is to be encouraged. . . ." B. Kaplan, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT

57 (1967)

[hereinafter cited as

KAPLAN].

See,

e.g., Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Fawcett
Publ., Inc. v. Elliot Publ. Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
1" See note 13 supra.
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United Artists was granted an exclusive right to "perform in public"
the five motion pictures. Thus, the main issue for determination was
whether Fortnightly had performed these copyrighted works and then
whether that performance was in public thereby infringing United Artists'
copyright.
The Fortnightly case was one of first impression.' The main problem for the courts at each stage of the litigation was how to apply the
Copyright Act, which was virtually unchanged since 1909 and had a legislative history demonstrating that problems of radio and television broadcasts were, of course, never considered.18 The district court in Fortnightly,'" relying upon a rather technical electronic analysis, reasoned that
CATV rendered a public performance of the copyrighted motion pictures,
as it applied energy from its own sources to reproduce and amplify the
signals received from the various television broadcasts.20 This technical
approach was rejected by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. To
determine whether Fortnightly had "performed in public" the copyrighted
material, these latter courts reviewed prior case law. These earlier cases,
applying the Act to modern broadcasting methods, revealed basically three
theories. These theories can conveniently be labelled the public performance, implied license, and performance theories.
The theory of public performance within the meaning of the Copyright
Act was expounded in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile

Accessories Co.,2 where it was held that an unlicensed radio broadcast of
a copyrighted musical composition constituted a public performance al" Previously no court had found retransmission by CATV constituted a performance. CATV was merely providing a signal and it was the subscribers themselves who were transcribing and reproducing the signal. Keller, Is Community
Antenna Television a Copyright Infringer?, 43 U. DET. L.J. 367, 371 (1966); Note,
Community Antenna Television: Survey of a Regulatory Problem, 52 GEO. L.J.
136, 157 (1963). Turning on a radio in one's home is considered to be a private

act and therefore a non-infringing use of copyrighted material. See generally
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917), on the requirement that the performance be for profit.
8The legislative history shows that the attention of Congress was directed
to the situation where the dialogue of a play is transcribed by a member
of the audience, and thereafter the play is produced by another with the aid
of the transcript.
392 U.S. at 395 n.15.
"°255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See Note, 52 IowA L. REV. 334 (1966);
Note, 42 WAsH. L. REv. 649 (1967); Note, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 695 (1967).
" For detailed discussions of the technical aspects of this process, see Note,
CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HAirv. L. REv. 1514, 1519 n.32 (1967); Note,
On a Clear Day 1505; Note, CATV Not Copyright Infringement 857 n.12.
" 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925).
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though the listeners enjoyed it separately and in the privacy of their homes.
Reaching a large audience then constituted a public performance. A later
case indicated that absent an actual broadcast, "one who enables another
to hear" a performance-for example, playing a radio in a bar-would not
be liable.2 2 Consequently, Fortnightly insisted that even if it did perform,
m But
it did not do so publicly.2
since the petitioner reached over seventy
percent of the people in the viewing area, its "rebroadcast" could not
be considered private within the meaning of the public performance
theory. 4 In any event, the court of appeals in Fortnightly dismissed this
argument, stating that "it is settled that a broadcast or other transmission
of a work to the public ...results in a public performance although each
5
individual who choses [sic] to enjoy it does so in private. '2
The second theory, implied license, later limited the public performance
theory. In Buck v. Debaum, 20 the copyright licensor was seen as giving an
"implied license in law" to permit any subsequent reception and playing of
the broadcast. When a copyright holder licenses a broadcaster to perform
a copyrighted work, he also grants an implied license in law to receive
and play the work to anyone who can do so, even though economic gain
may be derived from it.27 Hence, if an original radio broadcast were
licensed, the mere playing of that radio broadcast in public would not,
under the implied license theory, constitute infringement. 8 One writer
asserted that the theory of implied license lies at "the heart of the question of CATV copyright liability." 29 However, the court of appeals in
Fortnightly rejected this implied license theory, feeling that the copyright
holder should have practically absolute control over his work, as the primary purpose of the Copyright Act is the protection of the holder's
economic rights.3 Still, the Solicitor General, in an amicus curiae brief
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
392 U.S. 390, 395 n.13 (1968).
2" Comment, CATV-The Copyright Problem, 13 N.Y.L.F. 395, 403 (1967).
" United Artists Telev., Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir.
1967).
2040 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
21 Id. at 736. See Note, CATV Not Copyright Infringement
859.
"Comment, CATV and Copyright Liability, The Final Decision, 1 CONN. L.
REv. 401, 402 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Final Decision].
"9Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1514, 1522 (1967).
Most clearly it raises the key question of "where, if anywhere, in a chain of transmissions and public reception, the copyright owner's control should stop." KAPLAN
22
2

104 (quoting

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED

STATES COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, pt. 6, at 40).
" The court reasoned

that in the age of television and motion pictures the theory

19691

COPYRIGHT LAW-CATV

to the Supreme Court in Fortnightly, proposed the implied license theory
as a compromise in order to accommodate "competing considerations of
copyright, communications, and antitrust policy." 3 ' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Fortnightly also declined to adopt the implied license
theory, stating that the "job is for Congress,"3 2 thus indicating the
Court's reticence to legislate by judicial decision, at least in this area.
The third theory, the performance concept, was defined in Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.3 and Society of European Stage Authors &
Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co. 4 These cases establish
the "multiple performance doctrine"-that even though the original broadcast is licensed, any other person who employs mechanical means to extend
the original broadcast to a larger audience than the boadcast would otherwise command, may also be considered to have "performed" the copyrighted work." The court of appeals in Fortnightly adopted this quantitative contribution test by asking, "[H]ow much did the [petitioner] do
to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?"36 It
reasoned that CATV did much more than the hotel intercoms in JewellLaSalle and SESAC to increase audience size by mechanical means, so
CATV clearly rendered an infringing performance.2 7 The Supreme Court
in Fortnightly rejected this multiple performance or quantitative contriof implied license was clearly inconsistent with the "self-evident" right of a copyright holder to limit licenses to perform his works in public to defined periods,
areas, and audiences. 377 F.2d at 877.
392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968).
-12 Id.
3

283 U.S. 191 (1930). A hotel was held liable for copyright infringement for
an unauthorized public performance when it, provided its guests with radio entertainment through a master radio set wired to loudspeakers or headphones throughout the building. The hotel rendered an independent performance when it received
and played through this system a musical radio broadcast by a local radio station
that had not obtained a license from the copyright holder to make the broadcasts.
" 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). A hotel had installed in its rooms loudspeakers capable of receiving two stations. Even though a guest could choose between the two stations and even though the original broadcast was licensed, the
hotel was found guilty of infringement. Although "the reception of a broadcast
program by one who listens to it is not any part of the performance thereof," the
court concluded that where a hotel "does as much as is done in the Hotel Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction .. .of a broadcast program received by it, it
must be considered as giving a performance. . .

."

Id. at 4.

"Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198, 199 n.7 (1930) ; Note,
CATV Not Copyright Infringement 858.
377 F.2d at 877.
"The court noted the expense involved in installing antennas, cables, and connections to subscribers' television sets and that such installation was the primary
business of CATV. 377 F.2d at 878.
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bution test. In a footnote the Supreme Court stated that Jewell-LaSalle
was limited to its own facts, urging that if the original broadcast by the
hotel had been licensed then the rebroadcast by the hotel might not be an
infringement due to the implied license in law. 9 The Supreme Court concluded that unlike Jewell-LaSalle the original broadcast in Fortnightly
had been authorized,4 ° and therefore Jewell-LaSalle could not be be controlling.4"
All three theories and the electronic analysis of the district court were
rejected by the Supreme Court in Fortnightly. The Supreme Court stated
that "resolution of the issue before us depends upon a determination of the
function that CATV plays in the total process of television broadcasting
and reception. '4' Traditionally, broadcasters have been deemed exhibitors, and viewers members of the theater audience. This general functional
test seeks to determine where CATV falls within the framework of this
broadcaster-viewer dichotomy; that is, does CATV have more in common with broadcasting or with viewing?
When CATV is considered in this framework, we conclude that it falls
on the viewer's side of the line. Essentially, a CATV system no more
than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals;
it provides a well located antenna with an efficient connection to the
viewer's television set. It is true that CATV system plays an "active"
role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary
4
sets and antennas.
" "[M]ere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of television broadcasting." 392 U.S. at 397.
" 392 U.S. 390, 396 n.18 (1968). Mr. Justice Brandeis in Jewell-LaSalle, referring to Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929), suggested that "[i]f the
copyrighted composition had been broadcast . . . with the plaintiffs' consent, a
license for its commercial reception and distribution ...might possibly have been
implied." 283 U.S. at 199 n.5. The Supreme Court in Fortnightly stated that
"existing 'business relationships' would hardly be preserved by extending a questionable 35 year-old decision that in actual practice has not been applied outside its
own factual context." 392 U.S. at 401 n.30.
40 Some uncertainty remains in the area of multiple performance as the Court
in Fortnightly did not discuss or distinguish SESAC, a case in which an infringement was found even though the original broadcast was licensed. See 392 U.S. at
405. 1
Mr. Justice Fortas argued, in dissent, that Jewell-LaSalle should control
and that the footnote relied upon by the majority was too vague to serve as a basis
for distinction. "[T]he interpretation of the term 'perform' cannot logically turn
on the question whether the material used is licensed or not licensed." 392 U.S. at
406-07 n.5.
42 392 U.S. at 397.
13 392 U.S. at 399. Although the Supreme Court used broad language in respect
to CATV, there is some qualification: "While we speak in this opinion generally
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The Court found that CATV rendered no performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act, viewing the primary purpose of the Copyright
Act as encouraging the dissemination of copyrighted works to the public;
the protection of the economic rights of the copyright holder in the fruits
of his creativity was seen only as a secondary aim."
Copyright and unfair competition suits have thus been discarded by
the courts as a means of regulating CATV. Yet the local stations and the
copyright holder seem still in need of protection. CATV is no longer
an infant industry that needs to be nurtured. In fact, CATV hinders the
growth of new local stations.4 5 Copyright holders do not receive anything
from CATV when it utilizes copyrighted broadcasts. CATV has an
important place in the future of the television industry, but it cannot
assume its proper position without paying for its use of copyrighted works.
It is clearly unfair to allow CATV "to reap where it has not sown."4 6
Neither the full imposition of copyright liability in all cases nor the complete denial of copyright liability are satisfactory answers.4 The final
determination of the requirements for CATV must be left to Congress and
the FCC,4" as the Supreme Court intimated. In a recent case decided a
few weeks before Fortnightly-UnitedStates v. Southwestern Cable Co. 49
-the FCC was given very broad authority to regulate CATV, with no
of CATV, we necessarily do so with reference to the facts of this case." 392 U.S.
at 399 n.25.

"392 U.S. at 401. The Court did not rely on the implied license theory in

reaching its decision since it found that the petitioner did not perform. Even if it
had found a performance, there is evidence that the reasoning of Buck v. Debaum,
40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929), would have been adopted. The Court stated that once
a program is "released to the public" it can then be carried to additional viewers by

CATV systems for profit. 392 U.S. at 400.

"Comment, The Final Decision 406.
"Comment, Community Antenna Television and the Copyright Law: End
of the Honeymoon, 15 U. KAN. L. REv. 325, 339 (1967).
" One view reasons: there is no effective way to screen all telecasts received
to determine whether not they are copyrighted; therefore, to impose full copyright
liability in all instances night force CATV out of business. Note, CATV Not
Copyright Infringement 862. One writer concluded that "blanket extension of
copyright liability to CATV ...

could ...

give major copyright holders not just

a means of preserving their exclusive marketing arrangements, but a powerful
weapon to gain control of the CATV industry itself." Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1514, 1528 (1967).
48 As was evidenced at each level of litigation in Fortnightly, this complex problem cannot be resolved satisfactorily by the judiciary. The Solicitor General, as
amicus curiae, recommended that the Court stay its action until Congress had acted.
392 U.S. at 404.
" 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The Court recognized that the FCC has broad powers
under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate CATV systems and prohibit
their expansion where broadcast services to new areas would be jeopardized.
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congressional mandate necessary. The FCC's previous controls over
CATV have proven unsatisfactory."0 The FCC, since 1966 when it
assumed jurisdiction over CATV systems has requested clarifying guidelines from Congress, but Congress has refused."' Moreover, Congress
deleted the provision relating to CATV in its present revision of the
1909 Copyright Act.52 The FCC, with or without congressional guidelines, is the logical governmental agency to resolve most adequately and
amicably the competing private, public, and economic interests involved
in CATV transmission of copyrighted works. In light of the inaction of
Congress and the Southwestern Cable decision, the FCC should adopt its
own policies to protect the small local stations, the copyright holder, and
CATV, thereby accommodating the growth of CATV and of new stations
in local areas.
ERIC MILLS HOLm.ES

Federal Jurisdiction-Expansion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
The Civil Rights Act of 1871' creates a federal cause of action for
persons who are deprived of constitutionally guaranteed rights by anyone
acting under color of state law. Notwithstanding the broad language,2
courts have generally restricted the use of this statute to members of
minority groups who encounter difficulty in receiving a fair hearing in
state courts. 3 As a result, the unlawful actions that most often have been
"0For excellent discussions of this aspect of the CATV dilemma see Note, The,
Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARv. L. REV. 366 (1965); Note, On a Clear
Day 1505. The authority of the FCC to act is unclear, and requests for clarifying
guidelines from Congress have, to date, received no final action. RUCKER 178.
1 It has been most difficult to get Congress to act because of the pressure from
broadcasters and CATV lobbies. Note, CATV Not Copyright Infringnent, 863
5
n.4 . One writer stated that the "reason for all the delays ... was because nearly
a third of the Senate had at least remote financial interests in CATV." Comment,
The Final Decision 406.
" For a summary of the present state of the copyright revision bill, see 392 U.S.
at 396 n.17.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

-Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
'See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)

(Negroes); CORE v.
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dealt with include racial segregation in public accommodations and
facilities4 and in educational facilities,5 unequal employment opportunities,' and similar acts of discrimination.
The judicial limitations on the use of the statute apparently are based
on its history and the supposed intent of Congress. The main purpose of
the Civil Rights Act was to aid Negroes in their struggle to gain full
constitutional rights as guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment.
Conditions that existed in the United States at the time of passage,8 the
title of the bill,' and the legislative history" all indicate a purpose to help
Negroes gain their full rights. In the United States Supreme Court case
of Haig v. CIO, Justice Stone indicated that the statute should be used
to enforce civil rights only. Pointing out that a jurisdictional amount is
required for general federal question jurisdiction, 12 whereas no minimum
amount in controversy is required for jurisdiction under section 1983, he
reasoned that litigants should not be allowed to evade the jurisdictional
amount requirement by invoking section 1983 when their claim was
capable of monetary evaluation. The Supreme Court, in the later cases of
McNeese v. Board of Education3 and Monroe v. Pape,4 concluded that
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (Negroes and Puerto
Ricans); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (state prisoners);
contra, e.g., Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
O'See, e.g., Fleming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.
1956) (segregated bus seating); Brooks v. Tallahassee, 202 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Fla. 1961) (separate waiting rooms and lunch counters at municipal airport);
Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 47
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (denial of admission to municipal
swimming pool).
See, e.g., Hill v. Board of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968) (Negro teacher's
right to employment when school integrated); School Bd. v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497
(4th Cir. 1958) (school open for white students only); Holmes v. Danner, 191 F.
Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961) (admission to public college).
'See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (Negro physician); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963) (Negro attorneys).
'Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) ; Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp.
83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F.
Supp. 7, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Francis v. Lyman, 108 F. Supp. 884, 838 (D. Mass.
1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953).
'See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
' "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The
1871.
popular name was the Ku Klux Act of April 20,
10 See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).
11307 U.S. 496 (1939).

"28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
1373 U.S. 668 (1963).

"365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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the statute was passed to provide a remedy where none was available. 1
Implicit in these decisions is the Court's recognition of Congressional
intent to help minority groups, since members of the dominant group usually receive a fair hearing in state courts.1
Two recent cases, however, held that federal courts had jurisdiction
under this statute even though the historic minority group test was not
met. In Joseph v. Rowlen,'1 plaintiff was selling cooking utensils on the
street when he was arrested by defendant-policeman. Plaintiff alleged
that the arrest was made upon the basis of second-hand, unsupported
reports that he was annoying pedestrians and was, therefore, without
probable cause and in violation of the due process clause. The federal
district court directed a verdict for defendant, holding that the deprivation
of rights complained of must be part of a systematic policy of discrimination against a class or group of persons to support a claim under section
1983.8 The court of appeals, however, ruled that the cases relied on by
the district court were no longer valid'0 and remanded the case for trial.
In Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Commission,20
plaintiff, a physician on the staff of the county hospital, was refused reappointment to the staff following a hearing by the commission, which,
plaintiff alleged, did not comport with the requirements of due process.
The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, apparently upon reasoning similar to that used by the district court in
Joseph.2 But the court of appeals, neglecting the question of plaintiff's
status to sue, addressed itself to questions dealing with whether the
defendants could be held liable under the statute and whether a guaranteed
right of plaintiff's had been denied him. All literal elements of the statute
being met, the district court was held to have jurisdiction, and the case
was remanded for trial.2 2
The jurisdictional facts in these two cases are dissimilar to cases in
which the courts historically have recognized jurisdiction under section
1983. In one case a policeman apparently made an error in judgment
'r 373 U.S. at 671-72; 365 U.S. at 480. For an example of a lower court's view,
see Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).
Contra, e.g., Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

17402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968). The district court's opinion was not published.

402 F.2d at 368-69. The cases relied on were Truitt v. Illinois, 278 F.2d 819
(7th Cir. 1960) ; Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
402 F.2d at 369.
"397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). The district court's opinion was not published.
"See id. at 36 (dissenting opinion of Phillips, J.).
'

"397 F.2d at 34-36.
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by arresting a salesman without probable cause; in the other, a hospital
board failed to allow a doctor to answer charges of misconduct before dismissing him. There was neither claim nor evidence of minority group
discrimination. On the contrary, it was implicit in the results reached by
the trial courts that none was involved.
The court of appeals in Joseph indicated a belief that the minority
group test had not survived the Supreme Court decision in Monroe v.
Pape.23 In Monroe, the same court of appeals had upheld a finding of
no jurisdiction when Monroe accused Pape, a police officer, of illegal
entry and search of his home. 24 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, 25
holding that an entry exceeding a policeman's authority was under color
of state law. It further held that there is no requirement for jurisdiction
under section 1983 that plaintiff's rights be abridged as a result of "a
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right,"2 6 but that the statute
should be used to "afford a federal right in federal court because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced ....
Although the Supreme Court did not mention the minority group
test, 28 the court of appeals indicated that the language that eliminated the
specific intent test also required discontinuing the minority group test.
Monroe, however, was a member of a minority group ;29 thus, even if the
Court had indicated that the minority group test was not a requirement
for jurisdiction under section 1983, it would have been dictum. Since the
Supreme Court's lengthy and thorough opinion explicitly eliminated
only the requirement of a specific intent to deprive federal rights, the
decision in Monroe did not necessarily require the abandonment of the
minority group test in determining jurisdiction under section 1983.30
In Meredith, the court of appeals concerned itself with the problems of
"under color of" state law, the requirements of due process, and the defenses and immunities raised by defendants." It apparently read the
language of the statute strictly as written and neglected to consider the
2 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2 Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
25365 U.S. 167 (1961).
20 Id. at 187.
2
, Id. at 180.
28 402 F.2d at 369.
29 365 U.S. at 203.
oBut cf. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1962), expressly overruling
a similar doctrine, after Monroe was decided by the Supreme Court.
1397

F.2d at 35-36.
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limitation generally imposed by judicial interpretation. Although apparent
Congressional intent should not be absolutely binding in the interpretation
of enactments, such a clearly expressed and judicially accepted intent3 2
should not be be ignored without explanation. 3
Various courts, including the one that decided Joseph, have denounced
the desirability or intention of transforming every case in which a plaintiff
can urge state discrimination into a federal action.3" That result seems
inevitable, however, if the decisions in Joseph and Meredith are followed.
It may not be desirable to allow this new source of cases into federal
courts in situations where the state court is both available and effective,
and is in fact often the court best suited to decide the case." Increasingly
evident today is a desire to restrict federal jurisdiction. Many federal
courts more readily abstain from hearing questions that could be decided
on state law," and there are proposals to limit federal jurisdiction by
statute.3" To needlessly expand the jurisdiction-and consequently the
workloads--of the federal courts through an expanded interpretation of
section 1983 seems undesirable.
CHARLES M. BROWN, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Manufactured Diversity Disassembled
In the recent case of McSparren v. Weist,' the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, reversing its own prior decisions, held that the appointment of an out-of-state guardian of a minor for the purpose of creating
diversity was an assignment improperly invoking jurisdiction under
" Cases cited notes 7-15 supra.
" See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527 (1947).
",402 F.2d at 369 & n.6.
" See generally ALL, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1965); Marden, Reshaping Diversity Jurisdiction, 54

A.B.A.J. 453, 455 (1968).
" Although the recent cases of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), have expanded the use of pendent jurisdiction by restricting the doctrine of abstention, the lower federal courts still
abstain in many cases. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (1966),
rev'd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). It is a widely held belief that "state courts should be
the primary source of interpretation and application of state law." Marden, Re-

shaping Diversity Jurisdiction, 54 A.B.A.J, 453, 455 (1968).
"See ALl, 'STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEN
FEDERAL COURTS

(1965).

'402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).

STATE AND
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section 1359 of Title 28 of the United States Code.2 In McSparren, a
minor, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured in an automobile accident
involving another Pennsylvania citizen. The accident occurred in the
county where the minor resided with his mother. The Pennsylvania
Orphans Court granted a petition for the appointment of an out-of-state
guardian for the estate of the minor.3 Subsequently, this guardian instituted suit in the federal district court against the Pennsylvania driver.
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
diversity jurisdiction,4 and the court of appeals affirmed.
The manufacturing of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts is
hardly a new problem. In the original Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress
enacted the "assignee clause" to prevent the manufacture of diversity
jurisdiction through the assignment device.5 In Sowell v. FederalReserve
Bank,0 the Supreme Court stated that the history of the assignee clause
"shows clearly that its purpose and effect, at the time of enactment, were
to prevent the conferring of jurisdiction on the federal courts, on grounds
of diversity of citizenship, by assignment, in cases where it would not
otherwise exist . . . . "7 The assignee clause was replaced in 1948 by
the present 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which denies the district court jurisdiction
of any case in which "any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."' Section 1359 was derived from former sections 41 (1) and 80,'
and the focal words of section 80, "improperly or collusively," were incorporated into Section 1359 and were probably intended by Congress "to
have the same meaning and connotation which had been given them at the
time of incorporation into the Revised Code."1
Despite the avowed purpose of these statutes, they have not posed any
particular difficulty to those persons seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction
228 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
'It was admitted that the only funds that would pass into the guardian's hands
would be the funds obtained by suit or settlement in an action that -the guardian
would bring in federal district court. 402 F.2d at 868.
'McSparren v. Weist, 270 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
'Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78; see Legislative History, Revisor's
Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964); H. HART and H. WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 918 (1953).

'268 U.S. 449 (1925).
'Id. at 453.

828 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).

'Legislative History, Revisor's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
"0Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 7.4 (10th Cir. 1962); see Legislative His-

tory, Revisor's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
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by the manufacture of diversity. In the classic case of Black and White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,"1
a Kentucky corporation wishing to bring suit in federal court upon a
contract, void under Kentucky law, dissolved the Kentucky entity and
reincorporated in Tennessee. The ostensible purpose of this action was to
create diversity of citizenship. In upholding the jurisdiction of the federal
court, the Supreme Court held that "[tihe succession and transfer were
actual, not feigned or merely colorable. In these circumstances, courts
will not inquire into motives when deciding concerning their jurisdiction." 2 Subsequently, in Jaffe v. Philadelphia& Western Railroad,'3 the
third circuit upheld the manufacture of jurisdiction in a wrongful death
action. The deceased was a resident of Pennsylvania, as was the defendant
corporation. For the admitted purpose of bringing the suit in federal
court, an out-of-state resident was appointed administratrix of the deceased's estate. 4 In upholding federal jurisdiction, the court of appeals
relied heavily upon Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,15 where it was
stated:
To go behind the decree of the probate court would be collaterally to
attack it, not for lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter or absence
of jurisdictional facts, but to inquire into purposes and motives of the
parties before that court when, confessedly, they practiced no fraud
i
upon it.1

In Mecom, however, the purpose of the appointment of an out-of-state
administrator was to defeat diversity jurisdiction and to prevent the
removal of the suit from the state court to the federal court.'1 Although
there is a federal policy against manufacturing federal jurisdiction, "there
is no federal legislative policy against an avoidance of federal jurisdiction."'" Following the line of reasoning begun in Jaffe, the third circuit
"276 U.S. 518 (1928).
"Id. at 524. But cf. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrig. Co., 211
U.S. 293 (1908), where the Court found no federal jurisdiction because, although
a new corporation was formed in another state, the old corporation had not been
dissolved.
1"180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950). At the time suit was filed 28 U.S.C. § 80
(1940) was in effect. This provision was replaced in 1948. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1964).
1 180 F.2d at 1011. The non-resident administratrix was a stenographer in the
office of the widow's attorney.
"284 U.S. 183 (1931).
26 Id. at 189.
"Id. at 185.

" 3A J.

MOORE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE

17.05 [2], at 152 (1968).
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again approved the manufacture of federal jurisdiction in Corabi v. Auto
Racing, Inc., 9 where the resident administratrix resigned to permit the
appointment of a non-resident so that suit could be brought in federal
court. The court held that section 1359 did not bar the action; there was
no collusion involved and the action was not improperly brought in federal
court since there was no impropriety or irregularity involved in the valid
state court proceeding for the appointment of the out-of-state fiduciary.2"
The interpretation given section 1359 by the court in Corabi has
made the case the "authoritative foundation for the maintenance of 'manufactured' diversity jurisdiction." 2 ' For instance, in County of Todd v.
Loegering,2" the court found nothing "improper" or "collusive" although
the motive for the appointment of the out-of-state trustee was clearly to
manufacture diversity. In fact, the court stated that "[t]hese are the
usual expendients employed by counsel and client in matters of this
kind."

'2 3

The rationale of Corabi has also been applied by other circuits to the
appointment24 of administrators and guardians.2 5 In Lang v. Elm City
Construction Co.,2" the second circuit upheld jurisdiction although the
original administratix had resigned solely to permit the appointment of
the non-resident administrator to obtain the requisite diversity. The Connecticut District Court, following the Corabi decision, stated that "[w]hile
the decision of the Third Circuit in Corabiis not controlling on this Court,
it is persuasive and will be followed, absent a decision on the question
'27
by the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit.
Another egregious example of the manufacture of jurisdiction was
City of Eufaula v. Pappas,28 where the resident owners of land subject to
condemnation proceedings quitclaimed their interests to a non-resident
member of the family for consideration of one dollar. Again the only
" 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959). Approved at the same time was Jamison v.
Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
20264 F.2d at 788.
McSparren v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 872 (3d Cir. 1968).
22297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
23Id. at 474.
" Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962). At the time the appointment
was made plaintiff and defendant were fellow Nebraska citizens; prior to filing
suit,8 plaintiff moved to Kansas. The court upheld diversity jurisdiction.
' Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963).
20217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
27217

F. Supp. at 877.

28213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
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purpose of the transaction was to create diversity, and it was conceded
that whatever sum was awarded would be divided among the grantors
in proportion to the interest that they had conveyed. 9 Under Alabama
law the consideration of one dollar was sufficient to support the transfer
and consequently the court upheld the federal jurisdiction, on a rationale
similar to that in the Taxicab case. Perhaps this case goes even beyond
the Taxicab case because of the simplicity of the transaction that created
diversity-obviously it is more difficult to dissolve a corporation, complying with state laws, than to transfer an interest in property by quitclaim deed.
Corabi and the cases following the rationale of that decision have been
criticized for their interpretation of section 1359. Recently, in Caribbean
Mills, Inc. v. Kramer,3 0 the court did not allow the assignment of a claim
from a Panama corporation to a Texas citizen when admittedly the
purpose was to invoke federal jurisdiction and the only duty of the
assignee was to collect the claim. In discussing Corabi, the court stated
that "[b]y focusing on the literal meaning of the two words [improperly
and collusively], the Court [in Corabi] virtually emasculated the statute . . . ."
Similarly, the court in Ferrarav. PhiladelphiaLaboratories,
Inc. 32 dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the claims of the injured

party were assigned to a non-resident trustee in order to invoke federal
jurisdiction. The question whether the plaintiff was "improperly or collusively" made a party was held dependent upon whether the transfer
was "real." '3 3 The court set out several factors to be considered in
determining whether or not the transaction was "real" and not "merely
colorable" or "fictitious": (1) the transferor's retention of an interest
in the subject matter, outcome or control of the litigation; 84 (2) the mo29 Id. at 750.
30392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968); See 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
17.05
[3.-3] (1968); Cohen & Tate, ManufacturingDiversity Jurisdictionby the Appointinent of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201 (1956).
31392 F.2d at 393.
"272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967), aff'd on opinion below, 393 F.2d 934 (2d
Cir. 1968).
" 272 F. Supp. 1000, 1012 (D. Vt. 1967).
The defendants' challenge to jurisdiction under § 1359 is not overcome by
demonstrating that the trust instruments . . . are valid and legally binding
between the parties to it under state law. A 'valid' transfer . . . is not
synonymous with a 'real' transfer in the sense that term is used to delineate
jurisdictional limits under the statute.
Id. at 1008. See also Note, Appointent of Non-Resident Administrators to Create
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,73 YALE L.J. 873 (1963).
" 272 F. Supp. at 1008-11.
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tive or purpose of the transfer;5 (3) the transferor's solicitation of the

plaintiff to bring suit, promising reimbursement for costs and expenses.8 6
Even cases in the third circuit following Corabi admit that the decision
"may seem inconsistent with the intention of the authors of our Constitution and may force the federal courts to decide difficult questions
of state law that might well be avoided .... ,,37
In light of this problem the American Law Institute has proposed two
statutory changes that would severely curtail the manufacture of diversity
jurisdiction.3 s Proposed section 1301(b) (4)39 "is designed to prevent
either the creation or the defeat of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment of a representative having a different citizenship from the infant,
incompetent, or decedent he is appointed to represent." 40 These representatives will be deemed citizens only of the same state as the person
represented. "Although the major impetus for this subsection was the
practice of manufacturing diversity in wrongful death cases, it applies
'41
in terms to an action of any type by an executor or administrator.
Another section of the proposed legislation "deals with appointments of
other types of officers or individuals to such positions as receivers of
debtors' estates, trustees, and the like, and makes the jurisdiction turn on
the same test as is applicable to other business assignments-whether an
object of the appointment or transfer was creation of access to a federal
forum."42
The elimination of the manufactured diversity suits would apparently
significantly reduce the case loads in the federal courts. For example, in
a sample of cases from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, it was
determined that 20.5 per cent of the diversity suits were manufactured. 43
The general tenor of the ALI's proposals is to curtail federal jurisdiction, the justification being that the federal courts "should not be called
r Id. at 1011-12.
"Id. at 1013-15. Corabi was distinguished on the grounds that there was an
appointment of a non-resident administrator by a decree of a state court; in
Ferrara,there was a transfer to the non-resident directly from the beneficiaries
of the litigation.
" Greene v. Basti, 391 F.2d 892, 893-94 n.1 (3d Cir. 1968).

"ALI

STUDY OF THE DIvIsION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS, pt. I (Official Draft 1965) [hereinafter cited as ALI

STUDY].

" Id. at 9.
'Id. at 61.
"Id. at 63.
"Id. at 102-03 (emphasis added),
"Id. at 175 n.7. More than 1,000 cases, filed between November 10, 1958 and
July 7, 1959, were studied. Id. 173 & n.3.
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unless there is some special

reason for their intervention . . . -"" Even those who would disagree
with the study as a whole45 would "favor a prohibition against the manufacture of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment of an out-of-state
personal representative or by a colorable assignment or otherwise."4
In McSparren the court chose to revaluate its prior interpretation of
section 1359, recognizing that "there would be no need for such legislation in 'manufactured' diversity cases but for the interpretation of section
1359 in our leading case of Corabi, and similar decisions." 47 The court
determined that when the sole motive for the appointment of a nonresident is to create diversity, it is "improper" under section 1359; therefore, a district court shall not have jurisdiction of the action. The tHird
circuit's decision overruling Corabi and Jaffe conflicts with the view
that the motive for the appointment of non-residents is immaterial.4"
It has been argued that the holding in McSparren will result in the collateral attack of valid state court proceedings.4" However, the appointment
of the guardian can stand for other purposes, even though the federal
court will not allow him to bring the suit on the basis of diversity. 0
There apparently, then, is little justification in allowing a manufactured
diversity suit to be brought in federal court. Historically, the basis for
the federal forum in diversity cases was fear of prejudicing the out-ofstate litigants. 5 In those cases where diversity is manufactured, however,
the genuine parties are citizens of the same state, and the cause of action
is actually of a local nature. Therefore, the state courts would seem to
be the proper tribunal.
The ALI's proposed legislation furnishes a "bright line" objective test
for refusing federal jurisdiction. If the citizenship of the appointed repre" Id., Foreword at ix.
'"Frank, Federal Diversity J.risditcion-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. Rv.
677 (1965); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past,Present, and Future,
43 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1964).
"'Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TEXAs L. REv. 1, 35 (1964).
47402 F.2d at 873.
" In Corabi the court stated "[w]e cannot distinguish the facts of the Taxicab
Company case in any practical way from those of the case at bar." 264 F.2d at
787. It seems the words "collusive" and "improper" imply that the motive must be
determined.
"Esposito v. Emory, 402 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
o"Neither would the federal court's refusal to allow diversity jurisdiction impugn in any way or collaterally attack the validity of the state court appointment."
3A J. Mooan, FEDERAL PRACTIC
17.05 [3.-3], at 165 (1968).
" See ALI STUDY 47-56.
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sentative is different from the citizenship of the infant, incompetent, or
decedent, the citizenship of the one being represented automatically controls. Also, the rewording of the assignment clause to deprive the district
court of jurisdiction over the parties whenever an object of the transaction is to invoke or to defeat federal jurisdiction is more stringent than
the present statute. 52
Thus, in view of the increasing criticism and study of the concept of
manufactured diversity jurisdiction, the result of McSparren. v. Weist
was not unexpected. Although McSparren is a move in the right direction, the decision leaves several questions unanswered. The court held
where the sole purpose of the appointment of a foreign representative is
to create diversity the action is "improper" and therefore "offends against
§ 1359.""S This leaves open to litigation the question whether the appointment has as its (1) sole purpose (2) its principal purpose or (3) one
of its purposes the manufacture of diversity.54 Although barred by prior
Supreme Court decisions, 55 it seems that the better test would be to look
to the citizenship of the deceased, minor, or incompetent for purposes of
MICKEY A. HERRIN
deciding jurisdiction.

Federal Taxation-Unreasonable Corporate Accumulation and the
"Any Purpose" Test
"It can be contended that every corporation, when organized, has as
one of its purposes, the avoidance of surtax."1 Though this may be true
"2Id. at 102. "Ordinarily, the absolute transfer of property for valuable consideration would negative any conclusion that an object of the transfer was to
create diversity." Id. The proposed statute would certainly change the result in

City of Eufaula.

"' 402 F.2d at 876. Apparently the holding would not include the situation
where the original administrator resigns, because in this instance someone must
be appointed before the suit can be brought.
" Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439 (8th
Cir. 1927). A corporation's reincorporation in another state, though defective, was
interpreted to be permanent. Acquiring federal jurisdiction was only one consideration, and probably a minor one, for the change. Federal jurisdiction was
upheld. Id. at 440. If attorneys begin to choose as foreign representatives out-ofstate relatives with a legitimate interest in the litigation, then the question would
be squarely presented to the court.
" Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903) ; Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 66 (1871); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 306

(1808).
' Halperin, The Surtax on CorporationsImproperly Accumulating Surptu, 18
72, 76 (1940).

TAXEs
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in a theoretical sense, Congress has not sought to penalize such a purpose
when it is merely a normal incident of the use of the corporate form.
When, however, the corporation is "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders . . .by

permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided
or distributed,"' Congress has imposed virtually a confiscatory surtax on
these accumulated earnings.' The purpose of the tax is to compel the
company to distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business
so that shareholders may be taxed on the dividends received.4
Before the tax is imposed, it must first be shown that the accumulation is unreasonable;5 this is a relatively objective test and most of the
cases under the statute have been concerned with its determination.' A
basic issue, however, remains whether or not the tax avoidance purpose
is present in the decision to accumulate. 7 This proof-that the corporation was "formed or availed of for the purpose of tax avoidance"---is
necessarily subjective in nature. Congress, therefore, has provided that
2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a). The basic provisions of the accumulated
earnings tax, now found in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37, have been in existence since 1921 and remain substantially unchanged. See Revenue Act of 1921,
§ 220, 42 Stat. 247.
'Section 531 imposes a tax of 27Y2 percent of the accumulated taxable income
not in excess of 100,000 dollars, plus 383/2 percent of the accumulated taxable in-come in excess of 100,000 dollars. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 531.
"Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533(a). It is interesting to note that in this regard

Congress has provided one of those rare instances in which the taxpayer can

shift the burden of proof to the government. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 534. The
value of this shift, however, is not so great as it might first appear. As it has
been pointed out, "[tihe reasonable needs of the business is really a subsidiary question . . .The burden of proof as to the ultimate question, whether the taxpayer
corporation has been availed of for the purpose of avoiding tax on its stockholders,
always remains with the taxpayer." Hammond & Victor, The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 9 PRAc. LAW. No. 8, 1963, at 92.
"E.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958). Discussion of what factors are relevant in determining
the reasonableness of the accumulation is beyond the scope of this note. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1 (a) (2) (1959); Carey, Accumulations Beyond the
Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102(c), 60 HARV. L.
REv. 1282 (1947); Hernitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 74 HARv. L. REV. 866 (1961); Note, Accumulated Earnings and the Reasonableness Test of Section 537, 43 TJL. L. REv. 129 (1968).
'See Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205, 214 (6th Cir. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 89 S.Ct. 707 (1969) (per curiam).
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
'See Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1959) (concurring
opinion). One writer has pointed out that
proof of state of mind is always fraught with difficulty. Direct evidence is
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the fact that the corporation's profits and earnings are allowed to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of
the proscribed purpose unless the contrary is proven by the preponderance
of the evidence.'0
If there is an unreasonable accumulation of income, what must the
taxpayer do to show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the tax
avoidance motive was absent? Prior to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Donruss Company," the courts were divided
over the issue. Three distinct tests were applied in deciding when there
was sufficient tax avoidance purpose to impose the surtax: (1) tax avoid2
ance must be the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive,' (2) it
must be one of the "determinating purposes" in the decision to accumu4
late, 3 and (3) it is sufficient if "any purpose" is tax avoidance.' In resolving this conflict, the Supreme Court adopted the "any purpose" test, i.e., the
government's contention that "it is sufficient if [tax avoidance] is one of
5
the purposes for the company's accumulation policy."'
The Donruss Company had increased its accumulated earnings over a
six year period from 1.02 to 1.67 million dollars. During this period the
sole shareholder had received no income from the business other than his
normal salary. In a suit for refund of the penalty tax, the jury found
that although the accumulation was beyond the reasonable needs of the
business, there had been no tax avoidance purpose present.'" The court
of appeals reversed the judgment entered on the verdict because the charge
usually unavailable, and reliance must be placed on inferences from the surrounding circumstances. In addition, the taxpayer here is always a corporation, and resort must therefore be had to the motives of the individuals in
control of the corporation since, of course, it can have no independent state
of mind.
Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumndated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REV.
866, 869 (1961).
I0NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a).
1189 S. Ct. 501 (1969).
12 Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1967); accord,
Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
" Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); accord,
World Publ. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 911 (1949).
" R.L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 851 (1937), affd, 103 F.2d
487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 576 (1939); accord, Barrow Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962);
Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d,-278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958).
10 89 S. Ct. at 502.
Id.
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to the jury implied that the proscribed motive had to be the sole determining factor in the decision to accumulate.' 7 On remand the court instructed that the correct test was that tax avoidance must be the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive.""
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the major argument of the parties
dealt with the construction of the words "formed or availed of for the
purpose of tax avoidance" in section 532(a). Taxpayer argued that the
use of the word "the' instead of "a" supported the "dominant purpose"
test applied by the court of appeals.'" The government asserted that
the phrase, when read as a whole, supported its proposed "any purpose"
test.2" Discounting both arguments as inconclusive and referring to the
statutory language as "inherently vague,"'" the Court concentrated on
the factor of congressional intent to find support for the government's
position. In examining the history of the accumulated earnings tax, the
Court noted that Congress had consistently maintained a firm position
against this type of tax avoidance.2 2 The Court interpreted the 1954
additions' to the accumulated earnings tax provisions as congressional
recognition of "the tremendous difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for
corporate accumulations" 2 4 and concluded that the "congressional response
to these facts has been to emphasize unreasonable accumulation as the most
significant factor in the incidence of the tax."25 Since Congress intended
to emphasize the relatively objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the
accumulation, reasoned the Court, it would be inconsistent with this intent
to allow a taxpayer, once the objective criterion is satisfied, to escape the
tax when the proscribed purpose was present to any degree.2 0 Thus, the
Court concluded that Congress intended to impose the surtax if any tax
avoidance motive is present when there is an accuriulation beyond the
reasonable needs of the business.
Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967).
Id.
89 S. Ct. at 504. See Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1960).
2089 S. Ct. at 504.
2
21 Id.
2 Id. at 505-07.
2 Section 535 (c) allows a minimum credit of 100,000 dollars to the corporation.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c). Section 537 provides that the term "reasonable
needs of the business" shall include the "reasonably anticipated needs of the busi'"

'-

ness."

INT. REV. CODE

21 89 S. Ct. at 507.
2r Id.

20 Id.

of 1954, § 537.
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Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
that the congressional intent was to rely more heavily on the objective
test 7 He concluded, however, that the words of section 533 (a) reveal
an intention to give the taxpayer a "last clear chance" to prove the absence
of the avoidance motive. Mr. Justice Harlan took issue with the majority's instruction on remand, which he felt would "effectively deny to
the taxpayer the 'last clear chance' which Congress clearly meant to afford
and substitute a very fuzzy chance indeed." 2 While arguing that the "any
purpose" test of the majority might in reality make the jury believe it
must impose the tax whenever it finds the accumulation unreasonable,2 9
Harlan agreed that the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive test
is also inappropriate since it would apparently require proof that tax
avoidance was the strongest of all purposes." Instead, he reasoned, the
jury should be instructed "to impose the tax if it finds that the taxpayer
would not have accumulated earnings but for its knowledge that a tax
saving would result."3 1 It is arguable that this proposed "but for" test
is the same as the "dominant purpose" standard since if taxpayer would
not have accumulated earnings but for the tax factor, then the tax factor
must have been the "dominant purpose." In light of his specific rejection
of the "dominant purpose" test, however, it would seem that Justice Harlan
intends his "but for" test to be analogous to the "determinating purpose"
test. Under this standard the jury must find that tax avoidance was one
of the principle reasons for the accumulation, though it need not be the
"dominant, controlling, or impelling" motive.3 2
It is questionable whether the test of the majority carries out the true
intentions of Congress. While there is little doubt that the 1954 additions3 to the tax provisions place more emphasis on the reasonableness
of corporate accumulation, it is important to note that both new provisions are designed to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer. 4 Indeed, as
the Court itself concluded, the amendments were a congressional recognition of "the tremendous difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for corporate
accumulations."' 8 It would appear to be inconsistent with this con2 Id. at 508-10.
28 Id. at 508.
2"Id. at 509.
80 Id. at 510.
"Id.
82 See note 13 supra.
"See note 23 supra.
"See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
"89 S. Ct. at 507.
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gressional attitude to require imposition of the tax where the jury, judging
in retrospect, 38 finds the business reasons for accumulation without merit
but further finds only some slight avoidance motive.8 7 The argument for
a less strict congressional intent gains further support from the fact that
the 1954 recodification of section 533(a) deleted the adjective "clear"
from the phrase "clear preponderance of the evidence"-the burden that
the taxpayer must meet to show insufficient tax avoidance motive. While
it may have been a mere change in phraseology, logically the deletion indicates an intent to reduce the taxpayer's burden of proof.
In answer to the Harlan criticism that the "any purpose" test effectively denies the taxpayer a "last clear chance" to escape the tax,8 the
majority pointed out that the taxpayer may "show that even though
knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not
contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings."8 9 This chance, however, is quite slim. As one writer has argued: "Since the issue of whether
to pay a dividend involves a balancing of the needs of the corporation
and the desires of the stockholders for a cash return on their investment,
the potential taxes on such dividends would necessarily play some part
in a decision to have the corporation accumulate its earnings ....
Thus, corporate knowledge of the tax consequences normally does influence the decision to accumulate, and, of course, there is always a chance
that the accumulation might be found to be unreasonable. It has been
suggested that "the only corporations that could safely accumulate income
would be those having stockholders with substantial net losses,"41 thus
having little interest in dividend tax consequences. It is doubtful that
Congress intended such a result.
Perhaps the sounder view is the "determinating purposes" test
promulgated in Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner42 and ostensibly
"Although the rule is that the reasonableness is to be judged as of the time
of the accumulation, normally several years have elapsed between the decision to
accumulate and the trial, and subsequent events realistically do influence the jury's
determination. See Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1957).
"'See Note, Federal Income Taxation--Accumulated Earnings Tax-Tax
Avoidance Must Be the Dominant Purpose For the Accumulation of Earnings and
Profits By a CorporationBefore the Accumulated Earnings Tax May Be Imposed,
43 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 566 (1968).
3889 S.Ct. at 508.
I°
d.
Herwitz, spra note 9, at 875.
"Young Mtr. Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1960).
" 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
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adopted in Mr. Justice Harlan's "but for" test. As noted above this
test would require a jury finding that tax avoidance was a major consideration in the decision to accumulate before imposing the surtax. This
would require more than the mere existence of an avoidance factor but
less than a conclusion that the proscribed purpose was the "dominant, controlling, or compelling" motive. Arguably this would be consistent with
the burden of proof as set forth in section 533(a) since the test, while
placing emphasis on the unreasonable accumulation, would give the taxpayer a realistic "last clear chance" to escape the tax. Clearly Congress intended such a result since the statute provides that even though the objective
criterion of unreasonableness be satisfied, the taxpayer can avoid imposition of the surtax by proving by a "preponderance" of the evidence the
absence of the proscribed purpose.
It is interesting to speculate as to the actual impact of the "any purpose" test. Keeping in mind the fact that any test of taxpayer motive
is subjective in nature, it would seem reasonable to expect an average
jury to engage in a "balancing of the equities." For example, if the jury,
after making the basically objective determination that the accumulation
was unreasonable, found that on a scale of ten motivation factors only
one of the factors was tax avoidance, it might well render its verdict that
no tax avoidance purpose was present. Indeed one might argue that the
average jury is invited to engage in a balancing practice under the "any
purpose" instruction, thus finding no tax avoidance purpose where it
might otherwise have found a slight avoidance purpose present. Since the
existence of the tax avoidance purpose is a factual determination,
appellate courts might be hard pressed to find grounds for overturning
such verdicts.
While in reality the average jury might engage in a balancing practice,
corporate planners must anticipate a literal interpretation of the "any
purpose" instruction. The effect,4" then, of the Donruss decision may be
far-reaching, especially in areas such as corporate diversification.4 4 Since
the Court's instruction is based upon a questionable interpretation of
" The effect of the decision will fall primarily on closely held corporations. As
one writer pointed out, "although there is nothing in the Code of Regulations so
stating, publicly held corporations can be said not to fall within the scope of the
accumulated earnings tax." Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax as a Deterrent
to Business Diversification of Close Corporations, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 98, 103
(1967).
" For discussion of the problems presented corporations by the accumulated
earnings tax see Id.; Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the Problem of
Diversification, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1135 (1966).
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congressional intent, it is submitted that Congress should act to restate
the amount of avoidance motive it feels should be present before imposition of the surtax.
JAMES

R.

CARPENTER

Income Tax-Deductibility of Losses Suffered in Intra-Family
Transfers
In Merritt v. Commissioner,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that section 267 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 precluded
deduction of a loss suffered by a husband when his stock in a family
corporation was sold to his wife in an involuntary sale. The sale had been
forced by the Internal Revenue Service to obtain funds for the payment
of taxes from previous years, and the wife's 25,000 dollar bid was in
sharp contrast to the 135,000 dollar basis at which the husband had been
carrying the property. But the court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the Tax Court2 and disallowed the 110,000 dollar deduction.
The broad terms of section 267 disallow any deduction claimed for
losses suffered in transactions between certain related taxpayers, generally family members. 3 The provisions of this present section originated
in section 24(a) (6) (A) and (B) of the Revenue Act of 1934.' Prior to
1934, the rule was that the deductibilty of all sales, regardless of the
identity of the vendor and vendee, depended on the presence of a bona
1400 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968).
'James H. Merritt, Sr., 47 T.C. 519 (1967).
' Section 267 provides:
(a) Deductions Disallowed.-No deduction shall be allowed(1) Losses.-In respect of loses from sales or exchanges of property
(other than losses in cases of distributions in corporate liquidations), directly
or indirectly, between persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of
subsection (b).
(b) Relationships.-The persons referred to in subsection (a) are:
(1) Members of a family, as defined in subsection (c) (4)
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock-For purposes of determining, in
applying subsection (b), the ownership of stock(4) The family of an individual shall include only his brothers and
sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants.

...

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 267 (emphasis added).
'48 Stat. 680, 691 (1934).
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fide sale as evidenced by the seller's divesting himself of title or control.5
Allegations that a sale was a bona fide one in cases involving transactions
between related taxpayers were often difficult to overcome,6 and section
24(a) was enacted to counter widespread use of these transfers as a
means of tax avoidance. 7 Its provisions were held not applicable to bona
fide transfers.'
This history led the Supreme Court to conclude in the classic case of
McWilliams v. Commissioner,9 relied on in Merritt, that section 267 precluded deduction of losses suffered by a taxpayer from sales of stock on
the open market when the same number of shares were purchased by the
same broker for the taxpayer's wife, and of losses suffered by the wife
when the process was reversed. 10 The Court stated:
The difficulty of determining the finality of an intrafamily transfer was
one with which the courts wrestled under the pre-1934 law, and which
Congress undoubtedly meant to overcome by enacting the provisions of

§ 24(b) [now § 267].
It is clear, however, that this difficulty is one which arises out of the
close relationship of the parties, and would be met whenever, by
prearrangement,one spouse sells and another buys the same property
at a common price, regardless of the mechanics of the transaction....
Moreover, we think the evidentiary problem was not the only one
which Congress intended to meet. Section 24(b) states an absolute
prohibition-not a presumption-against the allowance of losses on any
sales between the members of certain designated groups. The one
common characteristic of these groups is that their members, although
distinct legal entities, generally have a near-identity of economic in' Criteria of "good faith" are discussed in John E. Zimmermann, 36 B.T.A. 279,
284-86 (1937). See also Note, Nondeductible Capital Losses and Bona Fide Sales
under the Federal Income Tax, 49 YALE L.J. 75 (1939).
'See, e.g., Cole v. Helburn, 4 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Ky. 1933).
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934) ; S. REP. No. 588, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1934). The bona fide sale standard still applies to transfers not covered
by § 267. Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-l(c) (1958). See Jesse Johnson, 24 T.C. 107
(1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 752 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 841 (1956); Mintz,
Tax Disallowance of Loss on Sales between Related Companies or Individuals, 4
MIAMi L.Q. 277, 294-300 (1950).
8Frank C. Engelhart, 30 T.C. 1013 (1958); Nathan Blum, 5 T.C. 702 (1945);
W.A. Drake, Inc., 3 T.C. 33, aff'd, 145 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1944). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.267(a)-1(c) (1958).
p331 U.S. 694 (1947).
" See also Robert Boehm, 28 T.C. 407 (1957), aff'd per curiant, 255 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1958), where taxpayer's loss was disallowed when third parties who bought
his securities shortly thereafter sold them to a corporation he controlled. Cf.
Charles E. Cooney, P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 42,589 (1942).
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terests. It is a fair inference that even legally genuine intra-group
transfers were not thought to result, usually, in economically genuine
realizations of loss, and accordingly that Congress did not deem them
to be appropriate occasions for the allowance of deductions."
Inferior courts, in applying section 267 and McWilliams to varied
factual situations involving involuntary transfers, have reached different,
and seemingly inconsistent, results. Courts have rationalized these results
by stressing certain factors such as the lack of exceptions to the statute,
the taxpayer's ability (or lack of it) to determine the time of transfer,
the formalities of title, and the facts surrounding the judicial sale.
For instance, the Tax Court in Thomas Zacek' 2 looked to the literal
language of the statute. The case involved a sheriff's sale of real property. The purchasers, who were also the foreclosing mortgagees, had been
cotenants of the parties (their brothers and sisters) claiming the deduction. The sale price covered only the mortgage, principal, interest, back
taxes, and costs. Although these facts indicated that the sale was in
good faith, the court reasoned that "the language chosen by Congress is
so broad that it includes bona fide transactions, without regard to hardship in particular cases,"' 3 and disallowed any deduction for the loss.
In McCarty v. Cripe,"4 however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
an involuntary sale was not one between persons or groups designated by
section 267. The case involved a foreclosure sale of real property to
satisfy liens for taxes and assessments for public improvements at a loss
of 19,000 dollars. The property was bought after "spirited bidding" by
a trustee for a corporation. But the former owner of the land owned
over fifty per cent of the corporation's stock, and hence the sale was
arguably covered by section 267(b) (2). Nevertheless, the court held that
a tax title had nothing to do with any previous title, and rejected an
argument that McWilliams looks to identity of economic interest. It concluded that the purpose of that decision was to "put an end to the right
of ta.rpayers to choose, by intra-family transfers . . . their own time
for realizing tax losses on investments which, for most practical purposes,
are continued uninterrupted."'"
1331 U.S. at 698-99 (emphasis added).
128 T.C. 1056 (1947).
13
' Id. at 1057.
1 201 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1953).
"Id. at 682, quoting McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 700 (1947).
The next paragraph of the latter decision, however, begins: "We are clear as to
this purpose, too, that its effectuation obviously had to be made independent of the
manner in which an intra-group transfer was accomplished." 331 U.S. at 700.
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in McNeill v. Commissioner,' emphasized the taxpayer's lack of control over the authorities' disposition of
his property. The case is even more difficult to distinguish from Merritt.
Real estate, purchased by McNeill for 20,000 dollars, had been seized by
county commissioners for taxes due, but when they were unable to find
a purchaser, they offered to resell to McNeill for 750 dollars. McNeill
arranged a purchase by Royal Village Corporation, which was owned
by him and his family. The court reasoned that the 19,250 dollar loss
was brought about not by the transfer to Royal Village, but by the
seizure and sale two and one-half years earlier. "[T]he true nature
of the transfer rather than the form" was controlling, and nothing
was found to "warrant the inference that McNeill controlled the . . .
authorities so that in effect the seizure and sale for taxes were his actions
and not theirs .... -17

The Fifth Circuit in Merritt took issue with McCarty and McNeill.
It challenged their assertion that any break in the string of ownership8
occurring when the taxing authority seizes the property has significance.1
The court pointed out that the Supreme Court in McWilliams had faced
a situation where title had passed through an intermediate party (in fact,
the identical property had not been the subject of both the sale and repurchase) and had looked to substance showing the same economic interest had been retained. The court in Merritt also stated that while preventing taxpayers from choosing their own time to realize a benefit might
have been one of Congress' goals, that alone could not explain the broad
sweep of the statute. The court emphasized that continuity of control
and identity of interest were the controlling factors under McWilliams.
Stock, especially stock in a close corporation as in Merritt, is particularly likely to be the subject of the kind of transaction that inspired section 267. It is less attractive to outside bidders and more
amenable to family control, and its purchase by prearrangement at a
judicial sale more likely. The statute, however, says nothing to justify
treating stock any differently from other types of property. While the
presence of "spirited bidding" arguably indicates good faith, or at least
10251 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
1"Id. at 865-66.
8400 F.2d at 420. But see United States v. Norton, 250 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.
1958), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 144 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. La. 1956) (sale of
stock by the son and an identical purchase by the mother twenty-eight days later,
held, the passage of time signified a complete break in control, making it impossible
that the sale was between son and mother).
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a lack of collusion between seller and purchaser, it is difficult to see its
relevance to a statute that purports to reject the good faith standard.
Because such distinctions seem meaningless or inappropriate it is hard
to avoid the conclusion, which the Merritt court reached, that Merritt
is irreconcilable with McNeill, and probably McCarty.
The Fifth Circuit's refusal to treat involuntary sales differently from
voluntary sales under section 267 can have a drastic affect on the tax
liability of taxpayers in the Merritt situation. An important question
will arise if Mrs. Merritt at some future time sells her stock to an outsider. In that case her sale, unlike her husband's, would mark the loss
with finality. Since her bid was 25,000 dollars, however, that would
presumably be her basis for tax purposes unless the same statute that
denied her husband his loss makes some provision for her. Section 267 (d)
of the Code only provides:
(d)

AMOUNT OF GAIN WHERE

Loss PREvIousLY DISALLOWED--IF-

(1) in the case of a sale or exchange of property to the taxpayer a loss
sustained by the transferor is not allowable to the transferor as a
deduction by reason of subsection (a) (1) .. .then such gain shall be

recognized only to the extent that it exceeds so much of such loss as is
properly allocable to the property sold or otherwise disposed of by the
taxpayer .... 19

Hence, if the wife is able to obtain more than 135,000 dollars for the
stock, only the excess over 135,000 dollars will be taxable. What will be
the situation if the price she is able to obtain is between 25,000 dollars
and 135,000 dollars? It might be argued that a transfer between persons
having "an identity of economic interests" is no transfer at all in the eyes
of the taxing authority, and thus her basis should be 135,000 dollars. The
Senate report on the bill,20 the Income Tax Regulations, 2' and commentators' opinions, 22 however, reject this view.' Therefore, if the second
of 1954, § 267(d).
"2Anygain to the taxpayer on the disposition of the property will be recognized only to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the loss not previously
allowable. This rule does not affect the basis of the property for determining
gain, and consequently depreciation and other items which depend upon that
basis are also unaffected.
S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1954).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.267-1(c)1 (1958).
"Hertz, Dealing with Related Persons: Salaries and Other Compensation;
Sales of Property;Interest Accruals and Other Deductions, N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 577, 602 (1963); Holman, Basis Problems in Connection with Family Held
Property, 13th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1203, 1212 (1954); Kutz. Transactions
Between Related Taxpayers, 13th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 69, 77 (1954).
"Herberich, Hall, Harter Agency, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 44,146 (1944), held
" INT. REV. CODE
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sale is for 50,000 dollars, for example, the husband-wife "unit" has been
deprived of 85,000 dollars (the original purchase price of 135,000 dollars
minus the ultimate sale price of 50,000 dollars) in tax deductions merely
because an intra-family transfer occurred, which was not only involuntary
but, worse, forced by the Internal Revenue Service.2" If the second sale
is for less than 25,000 dollars, 10,000 dollars for example, the wife's
deduction apparently will be 15,000 dollars, the difference between the
25,000 dollars and the sale price.2 5
Such a result is harsh when section 267 is applied to voluntary transfers, but when, as in Merritt, the rule is extended to those who were
forced to part with their property, its application is severe indeed. There
is little evidence that involuntary sales of any nature where in the contemplation of Congress when section 267(a)'s predecessors were being
considered. However, there is also little evidence that Congress intended
them to be excluded. Section 267(d) apparently was intended to keep
the purchasing party's basis at the purchase figure, and again, apparently,
no separate consideration was given to the forced sale situation. The
question is obviously a difficult one. If the formal passing of title or the
removal from taxpayer control is relied on to give relief in the forced
sale context, taxpayers may be able to avoid taxes by making intra-family
transfers through a third party. It is difficult, moreover, to determine just
how far the ruling in McWilliams is binding on the lower courts in
the related Merritt situation, or even how it applies.
It has been suggested that section 267 be amended to create a mere
presumption of continued control, with the possibility of the taxpayer's
proving good faith left open. It has been further recommended that a
taxpayer be allowed to establish a "potential loss" after a section 267
transaction, based on the difference between the transferor's adjusted basis
and the section 267 transfer price or the fair market value, whichever is
smaller. This "potential loss" would be deductible if the property thereafter passes out of his sphere of economic control.26
that parties could not rescind a transaction that fell within § 267 and thereby restore
the ",
oldInbasis.
McWilliams it was said: "[i]t is a fair inference ... that Congress

did not
deem . . . [legally genuine intra-family transfers] to be appropriate occasions
for the allowance of deductions." 331 U.S. at 699. If so, would not the transfer
of the property out of the "unit" be a proper "occasion" for the allowance of
the entire deduction?
'Treas. Reg. § 1.267(d)-1 (a) (4), Example 2 (1958).
See Comment, Some Effects of Nonrecognized Losses on Corporations and
Their Shareholders, 35 N.C.L. REV. 31, 59-61 (1956).
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The question of substituting a presumption for section 267's prohibition is not one for the courts. The fact that Congress has enacted 267(d)
seems to imply that no other relief should be granted to intra-family
transferors, especially if such transfer is willful. When a transfer within
the economic "unit" has been forced, however, the equities of the situation, especially in the absence of a specific Congressional pronouncement,
would suggest retention by that "unit" of the original basis.
STEPHEN MASON THOMAS

Labor Law-The Legality of Co-ordinated Bargaining
Co-ordinated or coalition bargaining is a new technique in the power
struggle between labor and management. This approach to collective bargaining consists of forming a multi-union negotiating committee for the
purpose of cooperation and communication among several unions that
represent employees of a common employer. Through this process the
cooperating unions hope to achieve common contract terms.' Management has not welcomed this union practice. When co-ordinated union
bargaining extends to the bargaining table, resistance by management
has taken the form of refusing to negotiate wth joint-union committees.
The legality of union insistence on management's negotiating with
a union coalition was considered by the National Labor Relations Board
in GeneralElectric Co.- In that case the union whose contract was to be
negotiated insisted on including members of other unions on its negotiating committee. The Board held that by refusing to bargain with this
committee, General Electric was guilty of unfair labor practices.
Eight of the unions3 with which G.E. had contracts were dissatisfied
with a lack of progress in previous negotiations with that company and
therefore formed the Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB). 4 The
objective of the CCB was to gain the cooperation in collective bargaining
of unions representing employees of a single employer in order to negotiate
major economic items on a company-wide, national level. G.E.'s labor

'See Hilderbrand, CoordinatedBargaining,An Economist's View, 19 LA-. L.J.
524 (1968).
173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305 (Oct. 25, 1968).
'These eight unions became dissatisfied with the lack of union progress under
G.E.'s purported "whipsawing" tactics. Under this practice G.E. convinced the
weaker unions to accept its contract offers and then used the acceptances to bring
pressure on the stronger unions.
'69 L.R.R.M. at 1305.
2
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contract with the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), a
member of the CCB, was about to expire. G.E.'s representatives walked
out of preliminary negotiations before bargaining could begin when they
discovered that IUE's committee included members of the other seven
unions constituting the CCB. The company persisted in its refusal to
meet with this multi-union commitee beyond the bargaining date specified
by the labor contract.' IUE filed unfair labor practice charges against
G.E., alleging violation of sections 8(a) (5)6 and 8(a) (1)' of the National
8
Labor Relations Act.

In its argument to the Board, G.E. contended that it had no duty
to bargain with these other unions because their contracts had not expired
and because their presence prevented good faith bargaining. IUE asserted,
on the other hand, that the committee's only purpose at that time was to
negotiate a contract for IUE. The Board said that it was crucial to its
analysis of the case that G.E. had refused to bargain even before
negotiations were to begin. As a result of this refusal, the Board held
that it was not required to determine whether IUE's assertion was in fact
true. Absent proof of an agreement between these unions that would
bind the IUE to accept only those contract terms approved by the CCB,10
G.E. had a duty to bargain with the IUE's multi-union bargaining committee. Therefore, the mere presence of the non-IUE union committee
members did not justify G.E.'s walk-out and refusal to bargain. The
Board expressly limited the application of its decision by its focus on
the pre-negotiation walk-out and the lack of proof of a conspiratorial
union agreement by which IUE could accept only CCB-approved terms.
The impact of the holding, however, may in subsequent cases extend
' Also at issue was whether G.E. was guilty of unfair labor practices for refusing

to bargain before the bargaining date set by the labor contract. That question,
however, will not be dealt with here since G.E.'s refusal continued beyond the
contractually required bargaining date.
8
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
" It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right guaranteed by
section 7.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
'A district court enjoined G.E.'s refusal to bargain. McLeod v. General Elect.
Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 385
U.S. 533 (1967). The issues raised in this collateral case are not pertinent to the

problem of the legality of co-ordinated bargaining.
069 L.R.R.M. at 1306-07.
20 69 L.R.R.M. at 1311.
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beyond those limits to allow use of coalition bargaining committees in
all situations, because the unions need never enter into any such binding
conspiratorial agreement in order to carry out their co-ordinated plan.
G.E. was aware of this implication and insisted that the mere presence
of members of other unions on IUE's committee justified its refusal to
bargain. Viewed in light of these considerations, the decision represents a
further development in the use of co-ordinated bargaining. This extension,
however, raises serious questions that are certain to be considered by the
courts.
The development of co-ordinated bargaining has resulted in a conflict
of valid policies, each with a statutory foundation. Section 711 of the
Act guarantees employees the right to select their own bargaining representatives. This in turn involves the correlative right of that representative to choose the members of its negotiating committee. This right,
however, has been construed not to be absolute. It has assumed a subordinate role whenever it has produced a situation that might violate section
8(d) 12 of the Act. This section, as does the entire Act generally, requires
the parties to refrain from conduct destroying the atmosphere conducive
to good faith bargaining. When a company is to bargain with an individual union, as it is required to do, the presence of members of other
unions with which the company has contracts may have an adverse effect
on the collective bargaining atmosphere. The employer may resent the
presence of "outsiders" from unions whose contracts have not yet expired. It may in fact result in the company bargaining with a union when
it is not required to do so. The co-ordinated bargaining committee,
although properly selected by the union, may therefore present an impediment to good-faith bargaining.
The majority opinion in General Electric Co. recognized that the
rights of a union to select its bargaining representatives are not absolute,
but limited the exceptions to those rights to "unusual situations where
the chosen representative is so tainted with conflict or so patently obnox" Employees shall have the right to self-organization.., to bargain collec-

tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
" [T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement....

National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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ious as to negate the effect of good-faith bargaining.' 13 In reaching its decision that no unusual circumstances existed in General Electric Co., the
Board relied on two recent decisions.
In Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB,"4 the union's bargaining committee
included employees who were members of different locals, but were still
within the same international union of which the negotiating union was
a member. The company believed that this technique was an attempt to
bring about company-wide bargaining, and therefore refused to bargain
with this committee. The court affirmed the Board's holding that the
company's refusal to bargain was unjustified. This decision is distinguishable on its facts from the General Electric case. In Standard Oil,
there were several locals of one international union; whereas in General
Electric there were seven other different internationals represented on
IUE's committee.
The facts of American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v.
NLRB 5 are more directly in point with General Electric. The Board
had ruled that the employer was required to bargain with the union's
committee that included members of other unions.' 6 The court denied
enforcement noting that the allegedly unfair employer practice was the
mere writing of a letter suggesting the parties continue to bargain, pending the Board's determination, without the presence of the outsiders. The
company then acquiesced to the union's counter-offer for the company
to continue to bargain under protest. The court concluded that this
conduct did not add up to a refusal to bargain.' 7 Since the court did not
decide the issue involved in General Electric, the decision is hardly a
strong precedent for the Board's decision in General Electric.
The Board's exceptions to the right to select one's own representative
have been limited to "unusual situations," and it failed to see anything unusual in General Electric. There have been only a few cases finding such
a situation as the Board has previously shown a reluctance to give effect
to that limitation. In several cases, in order to overcome this reluctance,
the courts have reversed the Board's determinations. In each case the
courts recognized the right to select one's own bargaining representative.
That right was subordinated, however, as threatening the required good
faith atmosphere.
69 L.R.R.M. at 1307.
1 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1967).
1, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
10
11

155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965).
381 F.2d at 635.
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In NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co., the company refused to bargain with a union's representative who was a former company employee.
The representative in question had been discharged by the company but
then ordered reinstated with back pay by the Board in a prior proceeding.
He declined reinstatement, however, and obtained employment as an international representative of his local's international union. The Board
also had held in a former case that certain testimony given by this representative against the company was untrue. He had, in addition, expressed
his purpose to destroy this company financially. 9 The Board in Kentucky
Utilities0 held that the company's refusal to negotiate constituted a violation of the right of a selected bargaining representative to choose the
individual members of its committee.2 The court of appeals reversed the
Board and emphasized that the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act was to insure an atmosphere of good faith for collective bargaining.
This policy, it was held, would be of no value if the company were required to bargain with this particular union negotiator. The Board's
decision was modified accordingly.
A former union negotiator was the company's bargaining representative in NLRB v. InternationalLadies' Garment Workers' Union.22 This
representative had held highly confidential positions in representing the
union with whom he was now employed to negotiate. The time of this
change of employment was in fact close to the date on which bargaining
was to begin. An official of the company had tauntingly indicated to the
union that they had "'put one over on the union'" and had "'the union
on the spot.' ",23 The Board held that the union's refusal to bargain was
not justified in this situation.24 Here again the court of appeals, though
recognizing the rights of each party to choose its representative, refused
to find these rights "absolute or immutable."2 In denying enforcement,
the court concluded that any negotiations under these circumstances
would be in form only, without good faith.
In Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,20 the board held that a union that
is also a business rival of an employer is not a proper bargaining repre18182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 812.
" 76 N.L.R.B. 845 (1948).
' See In re Oliver Corp., 74 N.L.R.B. 483 (1947).
" 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960).
"*Id. at 379.
122 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1959).
274 F.2d at 378.
2 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
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sentative of that company's employees. The Board stated that the mere
fact that the anticipated conflicts had not yet been realized was not controlling. The latent danger was sufficient. To require the employer to
meet with this union would result in bargaining in which "at best, in7
tensified distrust of the Union's motives would be engendered.""
2
In the more recent case of NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., " the employer refused to meet with a local union on the ground that a loan arrangement by the local's international with the employer's competitor had
raised a serious conflict of interests. The Board concluded that there
was insufficient evidence of connection between the local and the loan, and
2
held unlawful the employer's refusal to bargain. " The court of appeals
stated that although employees have the right to be represented by persons
of their own choosing, "there is the correlative duty of complete loyalty
30
In remanding the case
of such representatives to their constituents."
with the local's
concerned
be
not
should
Board
the
that
the court indicated
autonomy or with its connection with the loan, but rather with an assessment of the potential, not merely actual, conflict of interest.
The principle to be gained from these cases is that whenever a chosen
representative has an unusually hostile interest in the negotiations, or an
independent concern therein that may result in a conflict of interest, exception may be taken if his presence threatens to disrupt good faith bargaining. In applying this principle to the General Electric case, the
dissent stated:
While .. .those who represent other units may claim and honestly
intend to devote their particular skills solely to bargaining in behalf of
the employees currently under consideration, it is virtually impossible
for them to separate their own ultimate goals and problems from those
3
of the unit for which they are currently bargaining. '
A final question is the effect of co-ordinated bargaining upon the
individual bargaining units. Section 932 of the Act provides that the
bargaining unit will be that unit certified by the Board. The employer is
bound to bargain only with the duly elected representative of that certified
unit. The Board and the courts have long held that it is a violation of
27

Id.at 1561.
8361 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1966).
-1 154 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1965).
30 361 F.2d at 305.
3169 L.R.R.M. at 1312.
1229 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
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a union's duty to bargain to insist upon an expansion or change in the
certified unit that it represents. 3 This policy was expressed in Kennecott
Copper Corp., where the Board held that two separate units could not
be merged for bargaining,3 absent an election by the employees approving
such action. As stated by the dissent in General Electric:
[T]o allow representatives of other units to attend and participate in
negotiations for a unit which they do not represent may have the
effect of broadening or narrowing, at the pleasure of the unions concerned, the numbers, types, and locations of the employees covered or
affected by the bargaining. This in turn would conflict with the responsibility of the Board to determine the scope of the appropriate unit
under Section 9 of the Act, and would curtail the Board's power to
enforce the good faith bargaining requirement of Sections 8(a) (5) and
8(b) (3).36
In addition to these legal questions, the practical reasons for the
union's insistence upon this new bargaining technique must be examined.3 7 Co-ordinated bargaining has had its greatest appeal where labor
has felt frustrated by the traditional individual union-management negotiations.38 One of the reasons this technique was instituted by the unions
has been the numerous conglomerate mergers that have weakened the
union's position relative to management in collective bargaining. 9 As a
result of this inequality of bargaining power, the unions found that they
could increase their power by working together and maintaining a high
level of inter-union communication. Through this process the unions have
realized that to bargain effectively, they must bargain for common con"See, e.g., Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1957); Smith Steel Workers, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1969); Hod Carriers,
Local 345, 144 N.L.R.B. 978 (1963); Painters Union, 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960),
enforced, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Chicago Stevedoring), 125 N.L.R.B. 61 (1959),
uwdified and enforced, 286 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) ;

NLRB v. Texlite, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958), enforced sub now. NLRB v.
International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1958).
"98 N.L.R.B. 75 (1952).
"See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); United States Pipe &
Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962).
86 69 L.R.R.M. at 1312. The majority did not think it necessary to discuss this
issue.
"7See Freidin, New Collective Bargaining,50 VA. L. REv. 1034 (1964); Lasser,
CoordinatedBargaining,A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512 (1968).
" Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining, A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512

(1968).
" Hilderbrand, Coordinated Bargaining, An Economist's View, 19 LAB. L.J.
524 (1968).
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tract terms.4 0 These union practices are not be condemned; they may in
fact be quite necessary. The legal implications of this practice, however,
may lead the courts to conclude that it presents too great a threat to good
faith bargaining and to the certified bargaining units to be sustained.
Union insistence upon employer acceptance of a coalition bargaining
committee therefore is not always protected by section 7 of the Act contrary to the Board's implication in General Electric. The detrimental
effect of this practice on the requirement of good faith bargaining may
have justified the employer's refusal to negotiate with that committee.
This conclusion, however, does not preclude the employer's consent to
the union's including "outsiders" on its committee. The propriety of
such consent has been recognized by the courts ;41 co-ordinated bargaining
is not illegal per se. Its use, however, should properly be limited to those
42
situations involving no threat to good faith bargaining.
RICKY LEE WELBORN

Municipal Corporations-Constitutional Law-Eviction From
Public Housing Projects
Public housing in the United States originated in the 1930's as part
of the larger effort to escape from the clutches of the Great Depression.
The Wagner-Steagall Act of 19371 signaled the entry of the federal government into the field of housing and, although amended many times,
remains in force today with its basic design still largely intact. Today,
more than one out of every one hundred persons in the United States lives
in federally assisted, low-rent public housing.2
"Id. According to Mr. Hilderbrand, taking wages out of competition among
unions is the most sought after goal of the unions.
" Cf. NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) ; NLRB
v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).
"'It should be noted that employers may join together in multi-employer associations for the purpose of collective bargaining, if done in good faith and with the
consent of the union, with each party retaining the right to withdraw from this
bargaining arrangement upon reasonable notice. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local
449, 353 U.S. 87, (1957) ; Publishers' Ass'n of New York City v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp &
Paper Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1967); Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
388 (1958).
" 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1402-21a (Supp. III, 1968).
'Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS
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Although reformers had long urged public intervention to alleviate
the deplorable conditions of the slums, the Wagner-Steagall Act was motivated "not so much as a matter of radical ideology, but out of a demand
for positive programs to eliminate the 'undeserved' privations of the unaccustomed poor."3 This attitude resulted from the peculiar character of
the persons burdened by poverty in the thirties. In addition to the "problem poor" (the traditional uneducated, unskilled poor), there were millions
of persons whose style of living was reduced to the poverty level by
the Depression. These persons, formerly prosperous with a middle-class
outlook, constituted a "submerged middle class," 4 and it was this group
who initially benefitted from subsidized public housing.
The projects were for poor but honest workers-the members of the
submerged middle class, biding their time until the day when they
regained their rightful income level. The tenants were not to receive
any "charity." The difference between a dole and a subsidy is psychologically powerful, whether or not the distinction is good economics.
The working class residents of public housing were not to receive a gift
from the government, but their rightful due as citizens. Public housing,
arguably, was no more "charitable" than the free land of the Homestead
Act of 1862-an earlier form of middle-class subsidy. Decent, sanitary
apartments were a stepping-stone -to a fee simple cottage-the American dream. Perhaps a radical fringe of housing reformers looked on
public housing as something more fundamentally "public"; but the core
of support lay in an old and conservative tradition.
Public housing activities were suspended during World War II. The
return of prosperity ended the phenomenon of a submerged middle-class
and consequently the demand for low-rent public housing by these persons.6 "Public housing ... was relegated to the permanent poor in the
city, and to the new urban immigrants. ... [P]ublic housing was ex-

clusively for those who were certainly, indisputably, irreversibly poor." 7
AND REMEDIES

154 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rosen]; see generally Fried-

man, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman].
'Friedman 646.
Id.
Id.at 648-49.

'Actually, many would have been content to remain in subsidized public housing
projects. However, pressures on the government by business interests resulted in
the abandonment of subsidized apartments for homes in the suburbs. Id. at 651.
7Id.

The texture of life in the projects changed for the worse; since more de-

linquent families lived in them, they were the locus for more and more de-

linquency. The attention of the public was now directed to public housing not

1969]

EVICTION FROM PUBLIC HOUSING

Influx of the "problem poor" has altered the whole complexion of
public housing. The location in a public housing project of a povertystricken family, with a history of substandard living spanning several
generations, cannot be expected to transform its members into a respectable
household with middle-class standards, values, outlooks and all the implications thereof. Consequently, public housing administrators have become
more and more rigid and paternalistic in their attitudes toward tenants.
As problems with tenants have multiplied, public housing officials have
become increasingly authoritarian in their approach. Tenants are
bound by complex regulations, much more stringent than those imposed
by private landlords. Admission and continued occupancy standards
are used as weapons for inculcating middle-class standards, and as
shields for protecting the image of the program.8
Public housing tenants have had little opportunity to challenge the inevitable injustices resulting from these attitudes. However, with the
recent explosion of legal services for the poor, public landlords can no
longer remain secure in the belief that their actions will continue to go
unchallenged.
One of the most onerous conditions imposed on tenants of public
housing projects is that they be content with short-term leases, almost
always providing for a month-to-month tenancy. By virtue of these lease
terms, housing authorities have contended that they may terminate the
lease of any tenant merely by giving the requisite notice to quit and that
they are under no duty to give any reason for the eviction. In Thorpe
v. Housing Authority,0 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide
whether a public housing authority may, consistent with due process, evict
a tenant for any reason or for no reason, and whether a tenant may be
as a hopeful program of reform but as the site of public folly and private
decay ....
Id. at 652.

' Comment, Government Houing Assistance to the Poor,76 YALE L.J. 508, 512
(1967). See Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 401, 413

(1967) [hereinafter cited as Fortas]; Friedman 655-56; Rosen 156.

' See Fortas 412; Friedman 660; Rosen 185 & n.67, 203-04. Public housing

authority admission policies have also been attacked. See Holmes v. New York
City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Friedman 656-59; Rosen 157-81.
Also contested have been rules and regulations promulgated by the authorities,

compliance with which is a condition to admission and continued occupancy. See

Lewis v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968); Rosen 224-46. Discussion
of these controversial policies is beyond the scope of this note.
" 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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evicted without being afforded an opportunity to contest the sufficiency
of the authority's reason for terminating the tenancy.
Petitioner Thorpe resided in a federally assisted, low-rent public housing project owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of
Durham, North Carolina. Petitioner's lease provided for a renewable
month-to-month tenancy and also provided for termination of the tenancy
by either party on fifteen days notice prior to the end of any monthly
term. On August 10, 1965, petitioner was elected president of a tenants'
organization, and on August 11 she was given notice that her lease would
be terminated at the end of the month. No reason was given for the
termination and efforts to ascertain the reason were unsuccessful. 1 '
In defending against the Housing Authority's action for summary
eviction, petitioner asserted that she was being evicted for her organizational activities and that eviction for this reason would be in violation
of her first amendment rights. The North Carolina state courts sustained
the Housing Authority's power to evict petitioner, the supreme court
stating: "It is immaterial what may have been the reason for the lessor's
unwillingness to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant after
the expiration of the term as provided in the lease."' 2 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether petitioner was denied
due process.' While the case was pending before the Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs (hereinafter HUD) issued a circular
concerning the termination of tenancies in public housing projects. The
circular provided that "no tenant be given notice to vacate without being
told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate
manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make
such reply or explanation as he may wish."' 4 The Supreme Court then
vacated the Thorpe judgment and remanded to the North Carolina Supreme Court for further proceedings in light of the circular.' " The North
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision holding that
"2Id.
at 270-71 & nn.1, 2 & 3.
Housing Auth. v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 433, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (per
curiam).
Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 385 U.S. 967 (1966).
"Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. at 272-73 n.8.
Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas stated: "I would vacate and remand to the state courts to determine
the precise reason why petitioner was evicted and whether that reason was within
the permissible range for state action against the individual." Id. at 681.
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the circular was prospective only and thus was not applicable to the petitioner's case."6
Once again the Supreme Court granted certiorari"T and reversed
the judgment, holding that "housing authorities of federally assisted
public housing projects must apply the ... HUD circular before evicting
any tenant still residing in such projects. . . ."'I Specifically, the Court
held that the HUD circular is mandatory ;i9that the circular did not unconstitutionally impair the Housing Authority's contract with HUD nor
the Authority's lease agreement with the petitioner ;2o and that the circular
is applicable to eviction proceedings instituted prior to the issuance of
the circular.2 1 Beyond these holdings, the Court's decision provides little,
if any, guidance as to what types of procedure would constitute compliance
with the HUD circular.2 2 Invoking the abstention doctrine,2 the Court
also failed to resolve any of the larger Constitutional issues concerning
the applicability of due process limitations to a public housing authority's
power of eviction.2 4
That a public housing authority is an arm of the state-usually termed
a municipal corporation, created for a public purpose, and invested
with a government function-is virtually undisputed. 25 However, public
housing authorities have insisted that they stand on the same footing as
private landlords and thus are bound only by the terms of the lease agreeHousing Auth. v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 471, 157 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1967).
'¢Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
18

2°

20

393 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 274-76.

Id.at 277-81.
.1 Id. at 281-83. The Court noted that the Housing Authority had begun to comply with the HUD circular but refused to apply it to petitioner because it had
decided to evict her before the circular was issued. Id. at 283.
2. In fact, the Court may have inadvertently minimized the effect of the circular
by quoting with apparent approval the Authority's contention that "the Circular
clearly does not say that a Housing Authority cannot terminate at the end of any
term without cause as is provided in the lease." Id. at 278.
3 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2,393 U.S. at 270 n.2, 284 & n.49.
These same considerations lead us to conclude that it would be... premature
for us to reach a decision on petitioner's contention that it would violate due
process for the Authority to evict her arbitrarily. That issue can be more
appropriately considered if petitioner is in fact evicted arbitrarily.
Id. at 284 n.49.
-" E.g., Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953); Cox
v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940). Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ments into which they enter." The courts have generally upheld this view
with the result that a public housing authority, like a private landlord,
may evict a tenant for whatever reason it chooses, subject only to the
2
provisions of the lease agreementY.
It follows that where the lease does
not specifically provide for termination, a public housing tenant, in possession under a month-to-month tenancy, can be evicted for any reason
merely by landlord compliance with the statutory requirements for the
termination of such tenancies. 2s
In the fifties a notable exception to this general attitude grew out of
the public housing authorities' attempt to comply with the Gwinn Amendment29 by requiring tenants to sign a statement to the effect that they were
not members of any organization designated as subversive by the Attorney
General. Failure to sign such a statement would result in eviction. The
courts consistently held that evictions based on such grounds were arbitrary and in violation of the tenants' constitutional rights."0
28 See Friedman 660-61; Rosen 184-85; Comment, Public Landlords and Private
Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE
L.J. 988 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Landlords and Private
Tenants]. See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" E.g., Brand v. Chicago Housing Auth., 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Housing
Auth. v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966) (per curiam); Housing
Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963). At times 42 U.S.C.
§ 1404a (1964), as amended (Supp. III, 1968), has been interpreted to authorize
such action. E.g., Walton v. Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949). That section provides that "any State or local public agency administering a low-rent housing

project ...

shall continue to have the right to maintain an action or proceeding to

recover possession of any housing accommodations operated by it where such
action is authorized by the statute or regulations under which such housing
accommodations are administered .

. . ."

However, an examination of legislative

history shows that the provision was included to insure that a local authority could
evict a tenant who became ineligible for low-rent housing because of exceeding
maximum income requirements. See 93 CONG. REc. 6044 (1947). In fact, the
only ground for eviction from a public housing project mentioned specifically
in the federal act is eviction for "overincome." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (3) (1964),
as amended (Supp. III, 1968).
2
E.g., the North Carolina statute provides for termination of a month-to-month
tenancy on seven days' notice prior to the end of any term. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14
(1965).
"[N] o housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937,
as amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an organization
designated as subversive by the Attorney General." 66 Stat. 403, reenacted 67
Stat. 307, formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1411(c) (Supp. 1953), expiring with its omission
in 1955.
'0Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Auth. v.
Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956);
Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954);
Kutcher v. Housing Auth., 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Lawson v. Housing
0

Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
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The Gwinn amendment cases contain an abundance of dicta concerning
limitations on the power of a public housing authority to evict a tenant
for no reason or for an arbitrary reason. Perhaps the most well-known
of these dicta is contained in Rudder v. United States3' where the court
stated: "The government as landlord is still the government. It must not
act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due process."3 2
The effect of Rudder and similar dicta on subsequent evictions by public
housing authorities is not at all clear.3 3 For example, in Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority,3" the court enjoined the
eviction of a public housing tenant because it found that the tenant was
being evicted for his participation in establishing a tenants' organization and for being elected its president. Citing Rudder, the court held
that eviction on such grounds would constitute an invalid infringement on
the tenant's first amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly. At the same time the court stated that a public housing tenant
has no vested right in his tenancy, thus implying that any reason not
constituting an infringement on constitutional rights would be sufficient
for eviction.
Consequently, when faced with eviction from a public housing project,
the tenant, in an attempt to ascertain his rights, must look to a vaguelydefined HUD circular and to a series of cases on the subject that are
confusing and often inconsistent. Further clarification by the courts is
inevitable and thus it would be useful to predict what type of clarification
will be forthcoming.
Initially, it should be recognized that the public housing tenant threatened with eviction has a great deal at stake. In addition to the immeasurable emotional implications of an eviction, the tenant is faced with
81226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
" 226 F.2d at 53. See also Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883,
884, 279 P.2d 215, 216, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956):
We believe it fairly obvious that a public body, a housing authority as here,

does not possess the same freedom of action as a private landlord, who is at

liberty to select his tenants as he pleases, and in the absence of a letting for
a prescribed term, may terminate their tenancy either without any reason
or for any reason regardless how arbitrary or unreasonable it may be.
" Compare Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963),

with Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
" 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966).

"Id. at 400-01. See Chicago Housing Auth. v. Stewart, - Ill. 2d -, 237
N.E.2d 463 (1968); Lancaster Housing Auth. v. Gardner, 211 Pa. Super. 502,

240 A.2d 566 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

the task of relocating. Because of a critical housing shortage, he will
often have to be satisfied with a substandard dwelling at a higher rent
payment and his chances of ever being admitted to another public housing
project are severely diminished. 0 On the other hand, it is clear that
public housing authorities must have sufficient power to control their
internal affairs, to maintain order, and to protect project property.37
However, if the authorities impinge upon the rights and privileges of their
tenants in purportedly carrying out these functions, it is incumbent upon
the courts to intervene and protect these rights and privileges.,
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, it seems obvious that an
eviction based on an authority's displeasure with a tenant's exercise of
his constitutional rights cannot be upheld. 39 "It is too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 4 In fact,
in Thorpe the Court noted with approval the Housing Authority's concession that "its power to evict is limited at least to the extent it may not
evict a tenant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity. .. .
This conclusion points up the need for affording the tenant notice and an
opportunity to be heard before he can be evicted. As the Court noted in
Thorpe: "[A] tenant would have considerable difficulty effectively defending against such an

. .

. illegal eviction if the Authority were under

42
no obligation to disclose its reasons."
Assuming that a public housing authority cannot evict a tenant for
engaging in constitutionally protected activity, it remains to be determined
whether a public housing tenant can be evicted for any other reason or for
no reason at all. At the outset, it is important to distinguish the function
of a public landlord from that of a private landlord.

"6Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 990-91.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
'8 See Rosen 247.

For a recent case indicating that a private landlord may, under certain cir-

cumstances, be prohibited from evicting a tenant because of his constitutionally protected activities, see Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690-99 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
40 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 & n.6 (1963).
See also Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
41393 U.S. at 282-83 & n.44.
42

Id. at 283. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1963);

Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Public housing authorities do not hold housing projects for profit and
so have no need for such broad freedom to terminate their relationship
with project residents. The authorities' only legitimate interest in their
property is in its usefulness as a tool of national and state housing
policies.... The public landlord, in short, does not require the broad
43
discretion of a private landlord.
Second, the old distinction between "right" and "privilege," including
the notion that constitutional limitations are not applicable to the denial
or revocation of a privilege, 44 has lost much of its vitality.45 Because of
the obvious parallelism between the government as employer and the
4
government as landlord, the Court's language in Wieman v. Updegraff"
is relevant. "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro:
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. '47 Third, the argument
is often made that the lease provisions to which the public housing tenant
agrees determine the rights and incidents of his tenancy; consequently, a
reservation by the authority of the power to terminate on short notice is
exclusively controlling. However persuasive such an argument might be
in the case of a private landlord, it cannot be sustained where the landlord
is an arm of the government. "[T] he state cannot condition the granting
of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to
48
procedural due process."
In Thorpe the Court at least hinted at its recognition of these distinctions between public and private landlords. This hint came in the
form of a footnote citing the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in
" Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 996-97.
YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van
Aystyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
"See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Willner v. Committee
on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513

"See generally Reich, The New Property, 73

(1958).
" 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
17 Id. at 192.

" Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961). See
Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 A.D.2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1968).
[S]ince their landlord functions are incidental to the administration of
national and state laws, not the converse, courts should look beyond the terms
of 'leases' to the statutory standards which bind the administrator and to the
constitutional standards which the government must respect whenever and
through whomever it acts.
Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 999-1000.
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the Court's previous Thorpe decision. 49 In that opinion Justice Douglas
cited with approval the Rudder dictum that "the government as landlord
is still the government" and thus is subject to the constitutional limitations
of due process.50 Furthermore, the Court indicated its willingness when
the issue is properly before it to consider to what extent the constitutional limitations of due process restrict a public housing authority in its
dealings with tenants. 5
Meanwhile, public housing authorities are bound by the HUD circular
to give any tenant it wishes to evict notice of the reasons for the eviction
and an opportunity to respond. Therefore, the implementation and interpretation of these requirements will, to a large extent, determine the
future role of the courts in litigation of this kind. 2 It seems almost
certain, however, that courts will be called upon to decide what types of
reasons are sufficient to evict a tenant from a public housing project and
to establish guidelines to insure that the tenant will be given a fair hearing
before he may be evicted. As to the proceeding, some sort of trial-type
hearing would seem to be appropriate, 3 with the tenant having an opportunity to present his case and to confront the authority with respect to
the legality and sufficiency of its reasons for the eviction. "4 Furthermore,
it is imperative that the public housing administrator urging eviction
should not be in a position to decide the legality and sufficiency of the
reasons underlying his decision. "That a conclusion satisfies one's private
conscience does not attest its reliability."55
It would be easy to criticize the Thorpe decision for not setting forth
the extent to which public housing authorities are bound by considerations of due process, and such criticism will undoubtedly be forthcoming.
11393 U.S. at 283 n.4 5.
50 386 U.S. at 678.
02393 U.S. at 289 n.49.

For an early interpretation of the circular, see Lancaster Housing Auth. v.
Gardner, 211 Pa. Super. 502, 240 A.2d 566 (1968).
' See Rosen 211.
'Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
"Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter continued:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode
by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and
self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, and perhaps..more importantly, the decision clearly
puts public housing officials on notice that their actions in the future will
be subject to judicial scrutiny. Hopefully, this factor will cause public
housing officials to reEvaluate their attitudes and to bring their policies
into line with the goals and purposes underlying the public housing pro56
gram.
Advocates of the system of justice found in the United States have
often compared it favorably with judicial practices in other countries.
Yet that very system has too often permitted those of our citizens who
are dependent on government assistance in such areas as public housing to
be treated "as nonpersons in a constitutional sense; as persons who have,
in return for welfare payments, surrendered to the state's social workers
their constitutional rights to privacy and personal security. ' '1 7 To permit
this state of affairs to continue would be intolerable.
We need not go so far as to embrace the argument that the state has a
constitutional duty to provide its indigent citizens with support; but if
the state chooses to do so, it must proceed with careful regard to the
rights of the recipients, for they, too, are persons within our constitutional scheme. Indeed, it may be that in the final analysis, a nation is
measured-perhaps its future is determined-not by the protection
which its institutions afford to the rich and strong, but by the meticulous
care with which the rights of the weak and humble are safeguarded. 58
MICHAEL

R.

ABEL

Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirety in Real Property
During Marriage
In determining the respective rights and interests of husband and wife
(H and W) in jointly held real property, the common law accepted literally the Biblical statement that H and W are one. This legal fiction of
"unity of person" was utilized to vest title to the real property in H and
W simultaneously, i.e., both owned the whole estate with neither holding
"""Because serious injury attends eviciton from public housing, the threat
of termination is a dangerous weapon. Used carelessly, it can create a hostile,
bitter atmosphere in a housing project. Tenants, made to feel insecure, begin
to distrust each other as well as project officials."
Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 991.
11 Fortas 413.
r1_rd. at 414.
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a divisible portion.' This estate is called a tenancy by the entirety and is
presently recognized in twenty-two jurisdictions, 2 but its incidents have
been modified in most states.3
The common law incidents of tenancy by the entirety can be summarized as follows: H alone had the right to manage and control the
property and was entitled to all rents and profits without having to
account to W. He could thus lease, mortgage, or convey the property,
but subject to W's contingent right of survivorship. Although H's creditors could reach his right to the rents and profits during the marriage, W's
creditors had no recourse against the property during coverture. The
estate was, however, liable for the joint obligations of H and W. Each
spouse had a contingent right of survivorship that could not be defeated by
either spouse alone during the marriage. On the death of either H or W,
the right of survivorship vested the entire fee in the surviving spouse. If
W survived, she was not bound by any encumbrance of the realty in which
she did not join.4 Thus, the basic theory of the tenancy of the entirety at
common law was that there was unity of the spouses with H in control
of the realty.
Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court show that North
4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
621-24 (1968) [hereinafter cited as POWELL] ;
Huber, Creditors' Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REV. 197 (1960); Lee, Tennacy by the Entirety in North Carolina,41 N.C.L. REV.
67 (1962) ; Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Phipps]. Tenancies by the entirety and joint tenancies with survivorship
should not be confused. The basic distinction is that an estate by the entirety can
only exist between H and W, whereas a joint tenancy may exist between any number of persons with each tenant having a specific and identifiable interest. In a joint
tenancy the interest of each tenant may be executed against for his debts. In most
entirety jurisdictions this is not the case. Id. at 35-41; POWELL
616-18.
2 POWELL
621, at 685 n.7. MISS. CODE ANN. § 834 (1956) allows creation of a
tenancy by the entirety with right of survivorship if it manifestly appears that the
estate was intended. Cuevas v. Cuevas, - Miss. -, 191 So. 2d 843 (1966).
'In Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming the common law has
been modified so that there is joint use and disposition of the rents and profits. See
Phipps 46-57. One writer includes Tennesssee and Maryland in this group. Id.
Seven jurisdictions have gone even further and hold that each spouse is entitled to
one-half the rents and profits, and use. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397
(D. Alas. 1960); Franks v. Wood, 217 Ark. 10, 228 S.W.2d 480 (1950); In re
Dean's Trust, 47 Hawaii 629, 394 P.2d 432 (1964) (inference); Wardrop v.
Wardrop, 211 Md. 14, 124 A.2d 576 (1956); Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J. Super.
306, 241 A.2d 841 (1968) ; College Point Say. Bank v. Tomlinson, 42 Misc. 2d 1061,
249 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Brownley v. Lincoln County, 218 Ore. 7, 343
P.2d 529 (1959). But see POWELL 623 at 703, and Phipps 46-57, who cite only
Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon in this group.
'Material cited note 1 supra; contra, Note, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 457 (1960).
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Carolina is a "strong" tennacy by the entirety state, i.e., North Carolina
adheres to the foregoing common law incidents.5 Despite its well established traditions, however, changing times continue to produce new situations with which the tenancy must deal. This note will examine some
of the continued legal problems raised by the estate by the entirety in real
property in North Carolina during the joint lives of the spouses.
The extent of modern day marital problems was unfamiliar to the
common law history of the tenancy by the entirety. In today's setting,
however, it has been necessary to deal by statute with the effect of the
estate on W's right to alimony. Rents and profits from entirety property
in North Carolina may be charged with the support of W in an action for
alimony or alimony pendente lite without divorce. 6 A prior statute
allowed the court to issue a writ of possession that gave W control of the
property so that she could apply the rents and profits, when they had
accrued and become personalty, to pay the alimony and counsel fees. Yet,
W could not get title to the property. Under a new statute enacted by
the 1967 General Assembly,' if W is separated from H and is seeking alimony or alimony pendente lite without divorce, the superior
court can order payment to W by transfer of title or possession of
personal property, or an interest therein, or by a security interest in or
possession of real property.9 A subsection'0 gives the court power to order
transfer of title to real property under N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 1-277 and

1-278. Thus, in this domestic setting, the tenancy by the entirety can be
conveyed to W by the superior court without the joinder or consent of
H, thereby establishing a statutory exception to the common law rule of
exclusive possession and control by H during the marriage.
A voluntary transfer of entirety property by both spouses terminates
the tenancy and the proceeds are held by H and W as tenants in common.
Where the transfer is involuntary, however, more serious problems may
arise.' In North CarolinaHighway Commission v. Myers,'2 the proceeds
from the condemnation of entirety property were deposited with the clerk
of superior court. W brought an action seeking a greafer condemnation
Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E.2d 472 (1954).
'Porter v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 251 N.C. 573, 111 S.E.2d 904 (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-17 (1966).
'N.C.

9 Id.

'I1d.

GEN. STAT.

§ 50-16.7 (Supp. 1967).

(c).

"Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947).

"270 N.C. 258, 154 S.E.2d 86 (1967).
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award from the state, but also asked that a portion of the deposit be
distributed to her pending her current action for alimony without divorce.
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that an involuntary conveyance
of title did not destroy the estate; the compensation award had the same
status as the real property that had been owned by the entireties. Thus,
W had no present right to any portion of the proceeds since neither spouse
has a separate interest in the entirety realty.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also ruled that a private sale
under a state statute"3 authorizing such sale when land is held by the entireties and one spouse is incompetent, is an involuntary transfer. 4 The
court held that the entirety nature of the estate was not destroyed, but that
the right of survivorship attached to the fund. It was further held, however, that H held the corpus as trustee for the survivor." Thus, where W
is incompetent, her interest in the proceeds from an involuntary sale of the
entirety property is protected by H's fiduciary status. In the typical situation, however, W, even though competent, can not protect her interest
in the entirety realty or the proceeds. If W continues to live with H even
though there are serious marital difficulties, or where she is separated from
H but not seeking alimony, her contingent interest could be destroyed.
The proceeds from an involuntary sale are paid to H and he would
continue to be legally entitled to control the proceeds since they represent
the real property. In these latter situations there is no safeguard after
payment to prevent an inconsiderate or irresponsible H from wasting the
entire proceeds, thereby destroying W's contingent right of survivorship,
which could not have been defeated by H's individual attempt to convey
the realty itself.
One solution to this problem would be to hold H as trustee of involuntary sale proceeds for the survivor, even when W is competent, rather
than simply giving the proceeds to him with no safeguards. Under such
an approach, H would at least be bound by the usual rules of conduct for
a fiduciary and could be made to account if he was delinquent in his duties
as trustee. Even then, however, a judicial decree would be of little
comfort or benefit to W if H were insolvent or without assets.
In order to provide W with protection when there is disharmony
in the marriage, the fund could be deposited in a savings account in the
name of H and W as tenants by the entirety with H entitled to the
" N.C.

GEN. STAT.

35-14 (1935).

"'Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 306, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963).
" Id. at 314, 130 S.E.2d at 661.
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interest during the spouses' joint lives and with the survivor entitled to
the cash account. A more ideal arrangement might be to authorize the
superior courts by statute to appoint a bank or savings and loan company
as trustee to invest the fund from an involuntary transfer and order it
to pay a reasonable return to H with the remainder being accumulated
to be paid with the principal to the survivor. Under either arrangement,
H continues to be entitled to the profits from the estate, but the desired
protection is provided for W's contingent right of survivorship.
In determining the respective rights of the spouses to insurance
proceeds, North Carolina does not treat the loss of insured entirety property as an involuntary transfer. The North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled in Carter v. Continental Insurance Company1 6 that although the
H had an insurable interest in entirety property,
since the proprietary interest of the husband was an inseparable part of
the single-entity title held in unity by him and the wife, his insurable
interest ran to the whole property and covered the entire estate ...
[T]he loss benefits created thereby inured to the entire estate ....17
Since an absolute divorce had terminated the estate subsequent to the
fire, the court held W was entitled to one-half the proceeds."' In a recent
decision,1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that insurance
proceeds from entirety property received before divorce is personal property, there being no involuntary conversion. The H had requested that
the fund be deposited in joint savings accounts to the credit of H and
W with right of survivorship, but with the interest payable to H. The
court upheld the trial court's determination that one-half was to be distributed to each spouse.
Thus, even if a spouse paid all the premiums and had the policy issued
in his name alone, the spouse still could not insure to the exclusion of the
other spouse. In the insurance area, the "oneness" of the spouses requires
that the insurance policy, although purchased by one spouse through a
contract with a third party, belongs to both. As a practical matter, the
loss of the insured structure can result in a diminution of the rents and
1 242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955). Accord, Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790,
112 S.E.2d 556 (1960) (dictum).
2242 N.C. at 580, 89 S.E.2d at 124. But see Henderson v. Stuart, 221 N.C. 3'7,
18 S.E.2d 705 (1942) (holding H had the right to use some of the proceeds of a fire
policy to pay individual indebtedness).
"8For a thorough discussion of the Cartercase, see Note, FireInsurance-Estates
by the Entirety-InsurableInterest-Right to Proceeds,35 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1956).
10 Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 2 N.C. App. 373, 163 S.E.2d 97 (1968).
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profits going to H, even though the land is still there. It would seem
therefore that H, if he pays all the premiums should be entitled to all
the insurance proceeds.
One of the most fertile sources of problems continuing to arise under
the tenancy by the entirety is the broad area of creditors' claims. North
Carolina has consistently followed the common law immunity of the
entirety estate to the separate debts of the spouses, even recently applying
it to a political subdivision's attempts to avoid this incident. In Duplin
County v. Jones2 land was owned by the entirety, but listed on the tax
records in the name of H alone. A county tax on separate personal property owned by H and by W was not paid. The court held that no lien
attached to the tenancy by the entirety because of the unpaid tax levied
upon either spouse's separately owned property. Not only a private creditor then, but the state, can be frustrated by this incident of the estate in
attempting to satisfy a claim.
Determining when one spouse alone acts for both is important to
the creditor seeking to levy execution on entirety property for a joint
obligation. North Carolina is in accord with the general rule that marriage
alone does not make one spouse the agent of the other.2 In General Air
Conditioning Company v. Douglass,22 H had contracted with the plaintiff
to install a number of heating systems in homes constructed by H, a
builder, and owned by the entirety. The plaintiff alleged that H was the
agent of W in entering the written contract in question for the installation
of the heating system in a home built for resale by H. The plaintiff
thereby hoped to be able to levy execution upon the entirety property
to satisfy what then would be a joint obligation. The plaintiff had knowledge, however, that all property was owned by the entireties, yet he
admitted that he dealt exclusively with H, never talking to or reaching
any agreement with W. A judgment of nonsuit for W was sustained.
The court said that marriage did not make H the agent of W, nor did it
create a presumption of agency. 23 To establish agency, said the court, it
had to be proven. The court also found no evidence of ratification by word
2267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966).
"E.g., Lo Medico v. Simkowitz, 158 A.2d 681 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960);
Wohlmuther v. Mt. Airy Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 244 Md. 321, 223 A.2d 562

"(1966) ; Vaughn v. Great American Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. App. 1965);

Falk v. Krumm, 39 Misc. 2d 448, 240 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Godwin Bldg.

Supply Co. v. Hight, 268 N.C. 572, 151 S.E.2d 50 (1966).
"2241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954).
Id. at 173, 84 S.E.2d at 831.
2
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or act of W. Neither could estoppel apply since no proof was offered that
W by her words or conduct represented to anyone that H was her agent
in the transaction.
As the rule now stands concerning agency between the spouses in
North Carolina, a correct result was rendered under the facts of the
Douglass case. However, where W is directly benefited by the work performed the question of agency is more difficult to resolve. Grant v.
Arti1 4 involved a suit brought against H and W for the price of electrical
equipment and its installation in a dwelling that was owned by the entireties. Without reviewing the evidence below or even citing Douglass,
the court in a per curiam opinion held that the evidence was sufficient to
go to the jury for a determination of the question of whether W was a
party to the contract for the services performed. Because the facts are not
fully set forth it is hard to distinguish a difference between Artis and
Douglass. The only apparent distinction between them is that there was
a direct benefit to W from H's actions in Artis, since the equipment was
installed in a home that was occupied as a dwelling by the couple and not
just held for resale as in Douglass. The record of appeal of the Artis
case shows that the W had pointed out to the plaintiff where she wanted
the stove to go in the house and where she wished other electrical outlets
located.2 5 The evidence was in conflict as to whether both H and W agreed
with the plaintiff to pay for the work, but the jury found for the plaintiff.
The Douglass decision is a good example of an individual creditor of
one spouse being prevented by the device of the entirety estate from collecting on his debt. Since Artis, however, a creditor may be able to at least
get to the jury on some agency theory, even if W did not sign a writing,
if W derived some direct benefit from the contract or if the creditor can
show that W knew of the work and did not object. Also, the theory of
ratification or estoppel is available on the proper set of facts.2"
24253 N.C. 226, 116 S.E.2d 383 (1960).
" Brief for Appellant at 3, Grant v. Artis, 253 N.C. 226, 116 S.E.2d 383 (1960).
"' Pennsylvania's rule is unique and seems to better balance the interest involved
in the agency question. In J.R. Christ Constr. Co. v. Olevsky, 426 Pa. 343, 232 A.2d

196 (1967), H rented heavy equipment to grade farm land owned by the entirety
to build a riding ring for their personal enjoyment. W had knowledge of the work,
but she was not involved in the business transaction. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff construction company and ruled that
there is a presumption
with respect to properties held by the entireties ... that during the term of.a
marriage, either spouse has the power to act for both without specific authority, so long as the benefits of such action inure to both. This presumption
... does not require knowledge on the part of the other'spouse in question,
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A tenancy by the entirety naturally lends itself to abuse by persons
trying to escape creditors because of the property's immunity from levy
for either spouse's separate debts. A debtor in North Carolina, however,
can not defraud creditors by intentionally transferring his separate land
to himself and his W as tenants by the entirety in order to avoid levy on
the land for his debts." The conveyance is deemed fraudulent on the
theory that but for the conveyance the asset would have been a source
from which creditors had a right to be paid.2"
The North Carolina Supreme Court held in Winchester-Simmons
Company v. Cuttler29 that a conveyance by H and W of entirety property
to a grandaughter was not fraudulent, even though the purpose and intent
of the transfer was to prevent creditors from levying on the realty should
H survive. W was in poor health at the time of the conveyance, and died
soon thereafter. The court said that when the entirety land was conveyed
H had only a contingent right of survivorship which could not be sold
to satisfy the judgment.30 Seven years after Cuttler, the court, following the common law rule, held in Lewis v. Pate1 that creditors of H
could levy upon the rents and profits of the estate to which H alone was
entitled to satisfy his debts. 2 As a result of these two rulings, if the
property conveyed to the granddaughter in C'uttler had been producing
rents and profits, the important question arises whether the conveyance
then would have been fraudulent since the creditors would be denied this
present interest upon which to levy execution. The North Carolina Supreme Court chose recently not to avail itself of an opportunity to consider
this question, and it was left to a concurring opinion to provide the
probable answer.
In L & M Gas Company v. Leggetts3 a judgment lien was obtained
against H when land was held by the entirety. Subsequently H conveyed
his interest to W. The judgment creditor sought to have the conveyance
set aside as fraudulent. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint,
but only that it may be rebutted if, in fact, the spouse so acting was not
authorized to act by the other spouse.
Id. at 345, 232 A.2d at 199.
" Sills v. Morgan, 217 N.C. 662, 9 S.E.2d 518 (1940).
2 L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
199 N.C. 709, 155 S.E. 611 (1930).
80 Id. at 714, 155 S.E. at 613.
81212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
" A receiver will not be appointed to rent the property in order to pay creditor's
Grabenhoffer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963).
claims.
3273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
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reiterating that a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the separate
debts of either spouse. Justice Sharp in a concurring opinion 4 said the
main question was whether it would be a fraudulent conveyance for a
debtor H to convey to W his interest in income producing property held
by the entirety. She concluded that such a transfer would not be fraudulent. She reasoned that land owned by the entireties is not subject to the
claims of either spouse's creditors and an individual creditor's lien can
not attach to the property unless the debtor spouse survives. The income,
rents, and profits are personalty, not realty. In conveying his interest to
W, H transfers the realty, which includes as an incident the right to all
the profits, but does not actually convey the personalty. Therefore the
transfer is not fraudulent since the property conveyed, i.e., entirety property, could not be reached initially by the creditors to satisfy any individual claims against H.
This conclusion may initially seem unfair to creditors, but it is the
only reasonable one considering the relevant incident of the estate by the
entirety, i.e., immunity from individual debts of the spouses. Since the
spouses can convey the entire fee to a third party, they should be able
together to convey the fee to either one or the other. If its income producing nature were to prevent the transfer of the entirety property because a fraud on creditors, the practical effect would be a restraint on
alienation since potential purchasers would be concerned that a transfer
could be set aside by creditors. The contrary argument, of course, is that
the conveyance can be set aside only if it was made with the intent to
defraud or hinder creditors. Thus, H and W need only negate any proof
35
of intent to overcome the voiding of the transfer.

ROBERT A. WICKER

Securities Regulation-Application of Rule lob-5 to Open-Market
Transactions
Securities trading in the United States is growing each year. Daily
volume on the New York Stock Exchange now averages in excess of ten

Id. at 553, 161 S.E.2d at 28.
Since H alone is entitled to the rents and profits, if he assigned only his right
to the income, individual creditors might successfully contend that this was a fraudulent transfer, provided the intent to defraud were present. In this instance H conveys not the land, but the personal property itself to defraud creditors, and the court
has ruled that the rents and profits can be reached by individual creditors.
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million shares, which represents an estimated monetary value of five
hundred million dollars. Yet these transactions represent only a fraction
of the total open-market transactions in the United States because there
are dozens of other organized exchanges and an even larger over-thecounter market.
The public securities market is unique in that it is normally centralized, efficient, and highly sensitive in an economic sense. Theoretically,
prices are determined by supply and demand, which in turn are heavily
influenced by the information available about a particular security and
general economic conditions. If a corporation whose stock is publicly
traded were to issue any false information about its condition, a buyer
or seller in the open-market who relied on this information could suffer
severe losses. It would seem that if the investor has been wronged, he
should be able to recover his losses; but the solution is not that simple.
In the recent case of Heit v. Weitzen,' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit addressed itself to this important question. This appeal
represented the consolidation of two actions from the district court 2 that
raised the same issues on essentially the same facts. In both cases, plaintiffs alleged that defendants, Belock Instrument Corporation and its directors, misrepresented the earnings of the corporation for fiscal year 1964
by failing to disclose that a substantial amount of its reported income
was derived from various fraudulent overcharges on government contracts." Relying on the misrepresentations contained in Belock's annual
report, press releases, and documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,4 plaintiffs purchased Belock5 securities on the American Stock Exchange and later allegedly suffered losses. At no time during the alleged fraud, however, did defendant corporation or any of its
"insiders" trade in these securities. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contended
1402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S.
Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894).
2Heit
v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), noted in 35 FoRD. L.
REv. 565 (1967), and Howard v. Levine, 262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
S'On August 18, 1965, the grand jury in the Eastern District of New York returned a forty-one count indictment against certain officers of Belock charging them
with presentation of false claims to the government. Brief for Appellee at 4, Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
'Hereinafter referred to as the SEC.
'On March 1, 1967, the name of defendant Belock was changed to Applied
Devices Corporation. Brief for Appellee at 2, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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that such actions by defendants violated section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19346 and SEC Rule 10b-57 promulgated thereunder.'
In both cases, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that
the alleged violation of rule 10b-5 did not occur "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" as required by the rule, since neither
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
' SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
' In addition to plaintiffs' rule lOb-S cause of action at issue in this case, plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had violated section 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964), which provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement provided in subsection .(d) of section 78o of this title, which
statement was at the time and in light of the circumstances under which
it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
Plaintiffs contended that Belock's annual report and the "10K Report" (a detailed
document similar to an annual report), which were submitted by Belock to the
SEC, constituted "filed" documents within the meaning of section 18(a). The
court of appeals in Heit upheld the lower court decision that the copies of the
annual report submitted to the SEC were not "filed" documents within section
18(a). See SEC Rule 14a-3(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1968). But the court
did rule that the "10K Report" was a "filed" document within section 18(a) and
remanded this point on the question of reliance. 402 F.2d at 914-17.
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the corporation nor its "insiders" used the fraud for their own benefit.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs did have
a sufficient cause of action under rule 10b-5, and reversed and remanded
the case for trial on the merits. In so holding, the court of appeals
adopted the same broad interpretation of rule 10b-5 in private actions
for damages that it used in the recent decision of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,10 which was primarily an SEC enforcement proceeding.
The implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur have already elicited a voluminous
literature,-1 yet Heit may have even greater implications for the business
community.
'Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Howard v. Levine, 262
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
10401 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968), reang and aff'g in part 258 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Because this case bears directly on Heit, it is essential to set
out some pertinent facts and part of the court's holding. In October, 1963, officials
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company began exploring for ore on the Canadian
Shield near Timmins, Ontario. Early results were extremely encouraging and
further sampling continued until April, 1964. Between October, 1963, and April,
1964, certain persons associated with the company bought large quantities of the
company's stock in the open market. However, no disclosure of the discovery
was made until April 12, 1964, when the company issued a press release that confirmed that the company was exploring the area but that results were uncertain.
Yet on April 16, 1964, just four days later, the company made full disclosure of a
huge discovery. During that four day period, certain "insiders" continued to purchase stock.
As a result of these actions, the SEC brought an action against the company
and the individual "insiders." The SEC sought an injunction against the company
on the grounds that the company's press release of April 12, 1964, was deceptive
and sought rescission of the transactions by the alleged "insiders." The district
court held substantially for the defendants. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). On the issue of the press release, the district court
ruled that the April 12 release did not violate rule lOb-5 because it was not issued
for the purpose of benefiting the corporation. The court also noted that there was
no evidence that any "insider" used the release to his personal advantage. Furthermore, the district court did not feel the release was really misleading, based
on the facts known at the time by the company. Id. at 292-96. In reversing the
decision of the trial court, the court of appeals held that the true test was whether
the release was misleading to the reasonable investor, regardless of whether
the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officers for ulterior purposes,
and remanded the case on this point. 401 F.2d at 857-64. In so holding, the
court gave rule lOb-5 a very broad construction and the references hereinafter
to the I exas Gulf Sulphur case are to the language of the court on this point. As
a result of this decision, there are now over one hundred suits pending in the
Southern District of New York by private investors against the company and its
officers for violations of rule lOb-5.
" For discussions of the district court case, see, e.g., Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices:The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271 (1965) ; Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf
Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW. 1057 (1965); Ruder, Corporate
Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implica-

1969]

OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS

Since rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942 by the SEC, its use has
greatly expanded to cover many different types of securities fraud. 2 The
most prevalent application of the rule is in cases where two parties are
dealing "directly"' 3 with each other, i.e., each party knows with whom he
is dealing. 4 For example, a common rule lOb-5 case involves fraud in
the sale of securities in a close corporation from one party to another.
Originally, the only remedy under rule lOb-5 was injunctive relief in an
SEC enforcement proceeding. Later, however, an implied civil action
for damages developed to compensate investors for their losses.' 5
Open-market transactions are "indirect" and "impersonal"' 6 in the
sense that the parties to a transaction are usually unknown to each other
and their communication is through some impersonal media. For this
reason, Congress and the SEC have developed an articulated policy of
keeping the market informed and free of manipulation. This is reflected
in the fact that Congress, the SEC, and the major market institutions
require prompt release of earnings and other significant developments
by publicly traded corporations. 17 Moreover, the SEC has the broad
power to suspend trading in any security when it feels the information
available about a security is unreliable. 8
Yet the impersonal nature of the open-market transaction has delayed
the development of remedies in the form of private civil actions for
damages uider rule lOb-5. The rule expressly requires that a violation
tions of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1967). For discussion of the
recent court of appeals decision, see Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second
Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63

Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; Comment, Securities

Regulation: SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 44 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 252 (1968); Comment, Insider Share Trading-Trading Without Disclosure of Prospective Mine
Held to Violate Rule 10b-5, 14 VILL. L. REv. 140 (1968).
1"-For background in the area covered by this note, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1757-97 (2d ed. 1961). For an excellent analysis of rule lOb-5, see
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FAuD---SEC RULE 1OB-5

(1967) [hereinafter

cited as BROMBERG]. See also Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and
Rule lOb-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599 (1968).
" The terms "direct, .... indirect," and "impersonal" are part of the Bromberg
classification of rule lob-5 cases. See BROMBERG § 3.1, at 62.
14 Id. §§ 4.1-6.5.
'Id. §§ 2.4(1)-(2).
Id. §§ 7.1-.4.
'E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8m (1964).
"'Id.§ 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. 78s(a) (4) (1964) (exchange); id.§ 15(c) (5),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (3) (over-the-counter). The SEC suspended trading in Belock
securities on June 22, 1965, when the irregularities involved in this case came
to light. Trading was resumed November 9, 1965. Brief for Appellee at 12, Heit
v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
20
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Courts

initially interpreted this clause narrowly, thus restricting the application
of the rule. First, they adopted the common law notion of fraud, by
holding that the "in connection with" clause required that privity of
contract exist between the defrauded party and the defendant." Conceivably, the privity requirement could have prevented any application of
the rule to open-market transactions since one who buys or sells rarely,
if ever, knows the party on the other side of the transaction. The privity
requirement, however, has begun to disappear, first in SEC enforcement
proceedings, and now in private actions, as courts have realized that the
rule has to be relaxed in order to protect the public in the expanding
securities market.2 0 Despite the trend away from requiring privity, the
issue is still debatable as both sides in Heit felt compelled to argue the
point in their briefs. 2 '
In addition to the privity requirement, other restrictions have grown
up around the "in connection with" clause to hinder the rule 10b-5 plaintiff. One of these restrictions deals with the defendant's state of mind.
In Heit the facts indicated that the "purpose" of the fraudulent reports
by Belock and its directors was not to inflate the market price of the stock
but rather to conceal certain fraudulent overcharges from the government.22 Both trial court decisions relied heavily on this point in their
dismissals. In Howard v. Levine,23 District Judge Cooper held that one
of the prime defects in plaintiff's cause of action was that "[w]hatever
fraud is alleged here . . .is directed against the government, notwithSee Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and Ride lOb-5-A Survey
of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 601-02 (1968).
2 See BROMBERG §§ 2.5(3), 8.5.
2 Brief for Appellants at 14-26, Brief for Appellees at 17-23, Heit v. Weitzen,
402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). Apparently, the parties argued the privity requirement because an earlier Second Circuit case had dismissed a rule lob-5 complaint
when plaintiff failed to allege "[a] semblance of privity between the vendor and
purchaser of the security." Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), atf'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
Some courts have rejected Farnsworth. See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [19611964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. Ill.
1964). Several
recent decisions in the Second Circuit seem to reject it. New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211
F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). A 1967 Second Circuit case, Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), casts grave doubt on it, and Het
seems completely to overrule it.
19

22402
2262

F.2d at 913. See note 3 supra.
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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standing its possible incidental market impact."24 Similarly, District
Judge Sugarman in Heit v. Weitzeni 5 stated:
The fraud against the Government in overcharging it on the contract
having been already accomplished, the concealment thereof from the
filed statements was for the purpose of further defrauding the Government by not disclosing the original malfeasance and not for the purpose
practice usually
of perpetrating a "misrepresentation or fraudulent
'2
associated with the sale or purchase of securities. 6
Thus the trial courts agreed with defendants that the alleged violation
could not have been "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" because the fraud was not aimed at the market.
The court of appeals, however, relying on its recent decision in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 7 construed the "in connection with" requirement broadly and carried over the Texas Gulf Sulphur holding that the
clause was satisfied whenever a device was employed" ' of a sort that would
cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith,
so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities.' "2
Although Texas Gulf Sulphur was primarily an SEC enforcement proceeding, the Heit court showed no reluctance in carrying over the same
rule to private actions for damages:
"Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever assertions are made ...in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means
of the financial media ...if such assertions are false or misleading or
are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of
'29
the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
The court concluded by saying:
It is reasonable to assume that investors may very well rely on the
material contained in false corporate financial statements which have
been disseminated in the market place, and in so relying may subsequently purchase securities of the corporation. The "ulterior motive"
present in the instant case-the concealment of the fraud from the
government-is irrelevant, since the false information was circulated
2

1 Id. at 645.
2'260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
20 Id. at 602.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
402 F.2d at 913, quoting from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
860 (2d Cir. 1968).
" 402 F.2d at 913, quothig from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
862 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to a large segment of the investing public. It is impossible to isolate the
particular "fraudulent" acts and consider them as directed toward the
government alone.80
The court seems to be saying that although a much clearer case could
be made out under rule 10b-5 if it could be shown that defendants'
actions were "deliberate," i.e., with an intent to injure, the rule is still
satisfied if defendants' state of mind can be termed "knowing," i.e., with
knowledge that others will be misled even though there is no intent to
injure.3 This holding appears clearly justified" in light of the stated
policy of rule 10b-5 to protect the innocent investor and furthermore
accords with the common law concept that the law presumes every man to
intend the natural consequences of his acts,3 3 even though his true
''motive" is different.
A third problem in the case, in addition to that of privity and state
of mind, was that at no time did the corporation or any of its "insiders"
trade in the securities or in any way seek to benefit from the alleged
fraud in the market. For this reason, defendants contended that the
rule 10b-5 requirement that a violation occur "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" could never be satisfied where the
defendants take no action whatsover to benefit from the fraud. 34 The
district courts agreed with defendants and relied on this point as one
basis for the dismissal of plaintiffs' cases." Again, however, the court
of appeals disagreed with the district courts, relying on Texas Gulf
Sulphur, and held that "[t]here is no necessity for contemporaneous
trading in securities by insiders or by the corporation itself"', in order
to satisfy the "in connection with" clause.
13402 F.2d at 913.
31 There are actually five classifications commonly used to describe defendant's
state of mind: deliberate, knowing, reckless, negligent, and innocent. See Ruder
436-37.
Cf. id. at 441-42.
, Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 95 (1884). Indications are
that the Supreme Court would probably agree. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Court, in interpreting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1964), said it would defeat the manifest purpose of that Act to "require proof of intent to injure." 375 U.S. at 195.
Moreover, since the common law recognizes this form of intent, it is doubtful that
courts would interpret rule 10b-5 to be more strict. Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
Brief for Appellee at 17-23, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d. Cir. 1968).
32
Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Howard ,.Levine,
262 F. Supp. 643, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
36402 F.2d at 913.
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In most rule lOb-5 cases, the requirements of the "in connection with"
clause are met because the parties are in privity. It is in a non-privity
context that the clause poses problems. The holding in Heit that there
is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders or
the corporation constitutes the broadest interpretation yet in a non-privity
case of the "in connection with" clause. Although this same interpretation was used by the same court in Texas Gulf Sulphur, that case as
pointed out was only an SEC enforcement proceeding and obviously there
interpretation
was speculation as to whether the Texas Gulf Sulphur
7
would be, or should be, carried over to private actions.
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of the "in connection with" clause
in a non-privity context before Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit came in
the fairly recent open-market case, Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc.",
In Freed, management of a widely held over-the-counter firm made a
false prediction as to the combined earnings of it and a privately held
company with whom it proposed to merge. By the use of this false prediction of earnings, management hoped to induce shareholder approval
of the proposed merger. Apparently, management's predictions were so
optimistic that the price of the company's stock doubled in two and
one-half months. Plaintiffs, who were open-market purchasers during
that period, sued the company after its annual report revealed that actual
earnings were only half of the prediction and plaintiffs had sold their
shares at substantial losses.
In sustaining plaintiff's claim against a motion to dismiss, the court
apparently felt that the "in connection with" clause was satisfied, despite
the absence of corporate or insider trading, because management had
issued the false report in order to facilitate shareholder approval of the
pending merger. 9 Thus, in Freed the fraud was at least aimed at the
market and management did use the scheme to benefit it in a stock-related
venture. Heit, however, carries the Freed interpretation one step further,
because the scheme was aimed at the government, not the shareholders.
What the court in Heit ultimately had to decide was exactly to whom
the "in connection with" clause applied. Before Heit, the clause had been
universally applied by courts to rule lOb-5 plaintiffs in civil cases, i.e., the
courts had interpreted "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
"'E.g., Ruder 423.

[1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCII
1964).
" BROMBERG § 7.2(2), at 150.
28

FED. SEC.

L. Rni.

91,317 (N.D.'Il.
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security" to mean that a rule lOb-5 plaintiff in civil cases must be a purchaser or seller of securities.40 Heit continues this interpretation. But
the primary question raised in Heit was whether the clause also applies
to a rule lOb-5 defendant-more specifically, must defendant have traded
in securities with the plaintiff or at least with a third party? The court
held that the fundamental policy behind rule lOb-5, to protect investors,
required a rule in which only plaintiff need be involved in a securities
transaction. Otherwise, a corporate defendant would be immune from
liability for false statements that caused damage as long as it did not
trade in securities.
Heit raises difficult and what could be termed frightening questions.
The reaction in the business community to its immediate predecessor,
Texas Gulf Sulphur, was one of great alarm. 4 ' Needless to say, in
carrying over the Texas Gulf Sulphur tests to private actions, Heft will
create even more fear in corporate board rooms. The critical questions at
this point are whether Heit was correctly decided, and, if so, should it be
extended to cover other situations.
In order to make any decisions on these issues, it is important to
isolate the factors that should be considered in determining liability under
rule lOb-5. 4 2 Three factors appear throughout the decisions under rule
lOb-5-the relation of the parties (privity versus no privity), the state of
defendant's mind, and the general policies behind rule lOb-5. All of these
factors have been thoroughly discussed and debated by writers as they
were in Heit. One factor, however, seems to be of critical importance
and yet receives very little attention in the reported decisions-the amount
of damages a defendant would have to pay if he were held liable under
rule lOb-5. 4" Apparently, one reason for this omission is that most reported decisions under rule lOb-5 discuss only whether there is a cause
of action and do not reach the remedy issue. In fact, most rule lOb-5
"0See Comment, Fraudin Securities Transactionsand Ride lOb-5-A Survey of
Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 601-05 (1968), pointing out the
problems in defining purchaser or seller.
"The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
42 E.g., Comment, Negligent Misrepresentationsunder Rile 10b-5, 32 U. Cur .
L. REv. 824 (1965); Comment, Civil Liability under Section lOB and Rile 1OB-5:
A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
For an excellent analysis of potential liability under rule 10b-5, see Ruder, supra
note 9. He uses a classification based on several factors: privity versus nonprivity, misrepresentation versus nondisclosure, and state of mind (deliberate,
knowing, reckless, negligent, or innocent). The conclusions drawn hereinafter in

the text are in substantial agreement with the Ruder analysis.
" Ruder 427.
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cases do not reach trial on the merits, but are settled out of court.4 4 This
policy of defendants to avoid the remedy issue may be a tactical error
because a court fully apprised of the potential liabilities of a defendant
might take a different view of the case. It is difficult, however, to estimate what the liability of the Belock Instrument Corporation or Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company would be. However, some estimates are available
on the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company. Assuming a rescission measure
of damages for all those who sold their stock during the fraudulent
period,4 5 Texas Gulf Sulphur's liability to private investors could range
as high as 390 million dollars, some 150 million dollars greater than the
company's net worth.
Although Texas Gulf Sulphur's liability may be
§ 1.3(2).
The issue of damages is one of the most perplexing problems surrounding rule
10b-5 violations in the open market. In a trial on the merits, plaintiff must prove
that defendant's conduct caused his losses. Because of the multiple factors that can
influence the market, causation is often hard to determine. For example, the court
of appeals in Texas Gilf Sulphur admitted that the evidence as to the effect of the
press release on the investing public was equivocal and less than abundant. 401
F.2d at 846.
The nature of the remedy is further complicated by the impersonal nature of
the open market. If a corporation issues false information that is misleadingly
pessimistic and that enables insiders to buy stock from defrauded sellers, almost
all would agree that the profits of the insiders should be returned. Insider profits,
however, will never equal the total loss of all sellers unless insiders were the only
buyers in the market at the time of the fraud. In most cases, there are likely to be
many innocent buyers in the market who reap a windfall gain by purchasing the
security at less than its intrinsic worth. Of course, all losses by sellers would be
windfall gains to innocent buyers in cases similar to Heit where neither the corporation nor its insiders trade in the securities.
One solution to this problem would be to find out exactly who sold to the
insiders as a result of the fraud and rescind the transactions. Yet this solution is
less than satisfactory. As pointed out, it is not the transactions of -the insiders
that cause losses to investors, but rather the misrepresentations. Those who sell
in the open market and wind up in unwitting privity with the insiders should not
have a stronger claim for recovery than all the other investors who sold during
the period. The only solution is to hold the defendant liable for the losses of all
sellers, regardless of whether there was insider trading.
The final question that remains is the appropriate measure of damages. At least
two theories are feasible. One theory, the out-of-pocket theory, would award
the defrauded seller the difference between what he received for the stock at the
time of sale and its intrinsic worth at the time. The second theory, a rescission
measure of damages, would produce higher damages, as the measure is the difference between the sale price and the value of the stock when the fraud is remedied.
In privity situations, the trend has been toward a rescission measure of damages.
See Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968). Because of the potential
liability, there would seem to be good reasons to limit open-market, non-privity
liability to an out-of-pocket measure. 'For a more thorough discussion of this
issue, see BROM1BERG § 8.7, at 213-20; Ruder 427-29.
"Ruder 427-29.
"BROMBERG
'
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substantially greater than Belock's would be because Texas Gulf Sulphur's
stock went from thirty dollars a share to an amazing one hundred and
sixty dollars a share during the alleged fraud,4T Belock still has a large
potential liability. For this reason, the amount of damages should be a
critical factor in determining ultimate liability under rule 10b-5.
Taking into account all four factors in Heit, the decision appears to
be correct. Few would disagree that privity, as in other fields, must not
be strictly required in open-market transactions if investors are to be
adequately protected. Regarding defendant's state of mind, the holding
of the court as to "knowing" violations is justified to deter wilful acts
of misconduct, and it is unimportant whether defendants engaged in
transactions at the time of the alleged violation because it was the misrepresentation of defendants, not their transactions, which caused the
plaintiffs' loss.48 The general policy behind the rule and the undesirable
consequences of immunity for a corporation under these circumstances
dictate liability despite the magnitude of the potential liability.
Under similar facts, however, liability should not extend to negligent
misrepresentation by the corporation. 9 In Texas Gulf Sadphur, the
court held that proof of negligence was sufficient to sustain an action for
injunctive relief under rule 10b-5(b), but at the same time found it
unnecessary to decide whether negligence would suffice in a private suit
for damages.50 Judge Friendly, however, in his concurring opinion
intimated that the appropriate standard in a private suit should embody a
2
51
scienter requirement. In Heit, the court again did not reach the issue.
There are several reasons why the line should be drawn at intentional
conduct. First, the potential damages, as pointed out above, are immense.
Furthermore, it would not further the goal of deterrence to any great
extent to hold the defendant liable for negligence. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, if a corporation is held liable for negligent misrepresentations when it has no intent to harm, it will simply not say anything
rather than risk the possibility of liability. This silence will defeat the
primary purpose of rule 10b-5-a continuous flow of information for the
&Id.

BROMBERG § 8.7(2), at 217; Ruder 442.
'9 Ruder 442.
401 F.2d at 863.
Id. at 864-69.
There is no occasion for us to enter this
"The question is troublesome ....
legal thicket as we pass only upon the legal sufficiency of the complaints to allege
a claim for relief." 402 F.2d at 913-14. The court held that plaintiffs' alternative
pleading of intent or negligence was sufficient to sustain the complaint. Id. at 914.
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investor. Of course, this last observation raises the intriguing question
as to whether a corporation not in privity, which is not engaging in
securities transactions, can be liable under rule lOb-5 for deliberate and
knowing nondisclosure. The answer would seem to be no. 3
A final factor to be considered in any decision concerning corporate
liability is the question of who in the corporation will bear the ultimate
burden of the liability. Conceivably, the ultimate burden may fall on
innocent shareholders of the corporate defendant when the corporation
has to pay these awards. It is unlikely that management will be tagged with
the ultimate burden, and this should be an important consideration in
54
formulating an appropriate remedy.
Thus, Heit and Texas Gulf Sulphur raise some very crucial questions.
Counsel for defendants in Heit have filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.5 5 Although the Supreme Court has never spoken directly
on rule lOb-5, its general remarks in the securities field have been proinvestor.5" Because of the implications of these cases, it is important
for Congress or the Court to speak soon.
Assuming that Congress does not act, it is interesting to speculate
as to what the Supreme Court might do with this problem. It would
seem that an analogy5" could be drawn between the problem in Heit and
the problem the Court faced in New York Times v. Sullivan.5" In Sullivan,
the Court used "definitional balancing" 9 to reconcile the state libel laws
5' [W]here the violation is nondisclosure, the defendant's duty to disclose
arises from the "inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such information." .

. .

. Since the non-trading, nondisclosing defendant

has not taken advantage of the information, it can hardly be said that he
has violated his duty, for that duty is said to arise from his use of inside
information when it is unfair for him to do so.
Ruder 442.
" Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1370 (1967);
Symposiu -Ride 10b-5: Developments in the Law, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 523 (1968).
", 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894).
"See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
The Court held that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21
(1964), "like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
fraud,'" must be construed "not technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." 375 U.S. at 195. "The broad policy of affording
broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (interpreting
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964)).
" See Comment, Securities Regulation: SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 252, 262-63 (1968).
58376 U.S. 254 (1964).

"See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

and the first amendment right of free speech with regard to public officials.
The Court held the standard to be one of actual malice, that is, knowledge
that a statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. Of course Heit is distinguishable in many respects, primarily
because Congress could presumably legislate a negligence standard if it so
desired without running afoul of the Constitution. Absent congressional
action, however, and in view of the competing policy goals-preventing
fraud without interfering with the flow of corporate information-the
Sullivan line would be an appropriate resolution of the matter. Until then,
sales of corporate executives' liability insurance will probably continue to
60

soar.

RALEIGH A. SHOEMAKER

Securities Regulation-In Pari Delicto as a Defense for a Violation
of Rule Lob-5
In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,' the plaintiff had become acquainted
through business dealings with the defendant, president of Texstar, and
a personal friendship had soon developed. Over a period of five months,
the defendant continuously supplied the plaintiff with inside information
consisting of assurances of increased stock dividends and proposed profitable business dealings with two major oil companies. Relying primarily
on this confidential information,2 the plaintiff began buying Texstar stock
on margin on the open market. None of the value-enhancing occurrences
ever materialized, and the plaintiff was forced to sell his stock and suffered
a large financial loss.' The federal district court held that the plaintiff was
a tippee under Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 4 and denied
"0Symposiu-Rule 10b-5: Developments in the Law, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 544
(1968) (suggesting that no insurance be allowed corporate executives for intentional or negligent violations of rule lOb-5).
1286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968). On May 9, 1969, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 decision. - F.2d - (1969).
'Apparently, another reason for Kuehnert's purchases was to help defendant
retain the presidency of the company. Brief for Appellee at 5-9, Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969).
286 F. Supp. at 342-43.
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
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him relief because of his knowledge that he was using inside information.5
When a tippee is a party to the action, he is normally the defendant.
He usually receives information from an insider that is not available to
the general investing public and uses this information to purchase or sell
stock, either directly from a third party, 6 or indirectly on the open
market.7 The stock then increases or decreases in value as expected by
the tippee, and he in turn is sued by the third party who suffered a loss
because of this transaction. The instant case differs from this normal
situation in at least two respects: the inside information received by
Kuehnert was false, and this false information led to substantial losses,
placing the tippee in the position of a plaintiff.
In holding that the plaintiff, as a tippee, could not recover under Rule
10b-5, the court stated that the Rule
cannot be used by such a person to sustain a cause of action for fraud.
It is the ordinary person that buys and sells securities based upon information generally available to the investing public who is protected
by Section 78j (b) of the Act and Rule lOb-5 and not one that has
access to or believes he has access to secret, material, confidential,
corporate information. s
This language would seem to preclude recovery under the Rule by anyone
that has participated in insider trading regardless of the validity of the
information.' Yet, denying recovery to the tippee who has lost money
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or

would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964), which provides that

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
286 F. Supp. at 345.
'E.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
286 F. Supp. at 345.

° It was also argued that because the information was false, it would constitute
a violation of the rule for the tippee to disseminate it to the general public. Brief
for Appellant at 5, Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., - F.2d

-

(5th Cir. 1969).
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in a transaction induced by an insider is seemingly inconsistent with the
trend of imposing civil liability under Rule lOb-5 whenever any false
information given concerning the financial situation of a corporation
results in a loss to the purchaser who relied on this information. In conjunction with potential criminal sanctions and administrative regulations,
the use of Rule lOb-5 to impose civil liability ° on insiders for violation
of the Rule provides an additional deterrent to fraudulent practices in
security transactions.1 1 The holding in this case may thus lessen the
deterrent effect of the Rule by relieving many defendant-insiders from
such liability. This seems particularly true in light of the growing class
of persons who may be considered "tippees.' '1 2 Under the Kuehnert
language, insiders could disseminate false information with relative impunity, for whatever reason, to the large class of traders who are tippees.
The imposition of civil liability under lOb-5 requires three elements
in order to establish a right of recovery, all of which seem to be present
in this case: 1) a purchase by the plaintiff, 2) reliance on misleading
statements made by the defendant, and 3) a financial loss suffered through
this purchase. 3 It seems clear, then, that Kuehnert would have been
allowed to recover, absent the defense permitted by the court. The reason
for denying recovery was unclear, but the court did use the doctrine of
in pari delicto' 4 as an alternative holding. 5 Although the doctrine was
mentioned only briefly in the opinion, its rationale permeates the entire
decision. For example, the court stated that "the tippee such as Kuehnert
must be painted with the same brush and the same color as the insider from
whom the tippee receives his information,""' and that "Rule lOb-5 [was]
" The first instance in which civil liability was imposed under Rule 10b-5 was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). There have,
apparently, been no subsequent decisions rejecting this innovation, and it has met
with overwhelming acceptance. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1966). See also Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the FederalSecurities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf

Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1967).
1 See

Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953): "[N]othing ...

would tend more... to deter fraudulent practices in security transactions ... than
the right of defrauded sellers or buyers . . . to seek redress in damages in federal

courts."
" See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.4, at 76 & n.33.1 (1967).
1" Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 22 Bus. LAW. 645,
654 (1967).
1

For different applications of this doctrine, compare Hall v. Corcoran, 107

Mass. 251 (1871), with Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R.I. 230 (1865).
" "Alternatively, the defense of in pari delicto asserted by the defendants is good
as against Kuehnert, although because of the above holding no further discussion
of that doctrine and its applicability here is necessary." 286 F. Supp. at 345.
16 Id.
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not intended to be and cannot be used by such a person to sustain a cause
of action for fraud."' 7 These passages seem to reiterate the policy of the
in pari delicto doctrine-that someone who is at fault will be precluded
from recovery from another party at fault, even if the other party may
be more blameworthy.'

8

In using this language, the court may have felt that if the plaintiff himself were found to be a violator of the Rule, denying him recovery might be
an effective deterrent to people who find themselves in the position of
the tippee in the future. Since there could be no possibility of recovery
from anyone in the event the insider information was incorrect, the
tippee would theoretically refrain from trading on any inside information.
Another possibility left open by the court's language is that a balancing
test could be used to determine whether a particular tippee would be
allowed to recover based on the comparative guilt in each individual case.
But the judicial imposition of civil liability under the Rule has eliminated
the necessity of proving all the required elements"8 of common law fraud,2"
and it is arguable that to preserve the overall deterrent effect of permitting
civil recovery under Rule 10b-5, the Rule should also preclude the equitable
defense of in pari delicto under any circumstances.
Traditionally the concepts inherent in in pari- delicto were used in
litigation involving private parties, where public regulation was not
involved. When private litigants have been given a significant role in
furthering public aims, as is evidenced by the civil remedy in connection
with criminal sanctions for a violation of the Securities Exchange Act,
sound arguments exist for limiting the scope of equitable defenses. 2 ' An
illustrative analogy 2 is found in recent antitrust litigation. 3 The Supreme
Court of the United States eliminated the doctrine of in pari delicto as a
Id.
See, e.g., Note, It PariDelicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust
Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965).
'"The common law elements of fraud are: (1) a false representatation, (2) of
a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, and (4) with intent to
deceive, (5) which representation is relied upon by plaintiff, (6) resulting in
damage to him. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 100, 104, at 700, 736 (3d ed. 1964).
"0E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951).
" Cf. Note, In PariDelicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
78 HARV. L. Rnv. 1241, 1241-42 (1965).
2 The following analogy has been drawn between these two fields. "Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action.
As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunc3.7
1'

tive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
" Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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defense to a civil action for an antitrust violation under both Section 1
of the Sherman Act 24 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 5 The court concluded that the public policy of permitting civil recovery as an additional
deterrent for a violation of the antitrust laws was paramount to the
equitable doctrine of in pari delicto.
It would appear also that the overriding interest of maintaining the
integrity of the securities exchange can probably be best achieved by
preventing fraud at its source. Admittedly, an individual plaintiff may be
allowed to recover when his actions have been just as blameworthy as the
defendant's, but the limited number of situations in which the plaintiff
might be equally blameworthy would not seem to justify the administrative
costs and burdens of allowing the defendant to prove that the equities are
in his favor in a particular case.
Permitting equitable defenses also appears inconsistent with developing trends of lOb-5 enforcement, and in fact with the purpose of the Rule
itself, which was designed in large part to protect the integrity of stock
transactions2" by deterring the misconduct of insiders."' Judicial attempts
to eliminate misconduct by facilitating recovery for a violation of the
Rule are evidenced by the steady liberalizing of its requirements: the
common law elements of fraud do not have to be proved,," the requirement
of privity has been emasculated, 29 and the concept of who may qualify as
an "insider" subject to the Rule is expanding.8" These trends all serve
to discourage securities fraud, and allowing equitable defenses for the
initiator of the false information could serve to weaken any such deterrent effect. Further, by holding that the Rule was not intended to
protect one "that has access to or believes he has access to secret, material,
confidential, corporate information,"'" the court arguably reads out that
part of the Rule that states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person...
to make any untrue statement . . . in connection with the purchase or
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
'o Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
's

List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 22 Bus.

LAW.

654 (1967).

645,

" Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The
Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872, 892-96

(1967).
"oE.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
" 286 F. Supp. at 345.
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2

sale of any security."" It seems unlikely that the court could have intended to weaken so substantially such a significant part of the Rule, but
at least insofar as the civil remedy is concerned the effect of its language
could have this result.
In denying the plaintiff the use of the Rule in this case, the court
does not employ all the potential deterrent force it has available. All the
court requires in order to bar a plaintiff from recovery under the Rule is
that he believe that he is using some secret information.33 A different
result in this case would have the effect of reducing the number of
initial false statements, and recovery would not be dependent on the later
actions of the one who received the information. The subsequent action
by the plaintiff does not lessen the evil of giving false statements in the
first place, and should not relieve the defendant of any liability, either civil
or criminal. In short, the subjective intent of the tippee should not lessen
the responsibility of an instigator who has clearly violated the Act himself.
ALEXANDER P. SANDS, III

Torts-Liability of Builder-Vendor's Lender for Failure to Protect
Vendee against Defective Home
In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association,1 the California Supreme Court held that a lender who provided financing for a
subdeveloper had a duty to purchasers to exercise reasonable care to prevent the builder from constructing and selling defective houses. The subdeveloper was inexperienced and undercapitalized, and its lender retained
substantial control over the subdevelopment planning almost to the point
of being an entrepreneur without sharing attendant risks. Connor is a
decision without precedent,2 and it pioneers a new area in a field that was
already in a great state of flux-tort liability in the home-building in02 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
286 F. Supp. at 345.
Cal. 2d -, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (Traynor, C.J., in a 4-3
decision).
' The intermediate appellate court did reach almost the same result, however,
in holding that Great Western owed purchasers of housing built by the subdeveloper
a duty "at least to the extent of protecting these persons from gross structural
hazards." Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -,

333, 344 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

-,

61 Cal. Rptr.
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dustry' Before the decision, California subscribed to the fast-developing
majority view that builder-vendors are liable for their negligence to
vendees and third parties who might foreseeably be injured by latent
defects in home design and construction.4 But at least three jurisdictions
have gone further and have held building contractors strictly liable in
tort for the sale of defective homes.'
'See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 99, at 693-96 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rle, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961); Brown, Building Contractor's Liability
After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 193 (1967) ; Note, Torts
-Recent Extensions in Builder-Veudor's Liability for Defects, 47 N.C.L. REv.
236 (1968); Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects
in New Housing, 35 U. Cni. L. REv. 739 (1968).
' Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) ; Dow
v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958). See PROSSER § 99, at 695
& nn.80-84.
'State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113, cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1966) (Mississippi); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965) (New Jersey); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)
(Texas). The Mississippi decision was based in part on the fact that a manufactured product-a water heater-caused the damage to the home. The court emphasized, however, that defendant contractors were held liable not only as retailers
or wholesalers of the water heater but also as builders of the house in which it was
installed. - Miss. at -, 189 So. 2d at 123. The New Jersey decision used some
language that could be interpreted to mean a warranty liability rather than strict
liability in tort. But in Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d
169 (1968), modifying 93 N.J. Super. 49, 224 A.2d 689 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the statute of limitations
and other sales warranty defenses are not applicable in tort suits against buildervendors. Other jurisdictions have cited Schipper with approval or spoken of strict
liability, but the fact situation and the language used implies more of a warranty
liability theory than one of strict liability in tort. E.g., F & S Const. Co. v. Berube,
322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698
(1966); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev. Co., - S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) ; Haye v. Century Builders, 52 Wash.
2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
After this case note went to press, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., - Cal.
App. 2d -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) was handed down adding California to the jurisdictions that hold builder-vendors of defective homes strictly liable
in tort for injuries to users of the homes and their property. Plaintiff homeowner
brought an action for damages as a result of the failure of a heating system against
the builder, a mass-producer of housing. Affirming a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the court of appeal cited with approval Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). It observed that "in terms of today's society,
there are no meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass production and sale
of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent
overriding policy considerations are the same." - Cal. App. 2d at -, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 752. The court adopted the arguments made in Schipper that there is
no real opportunity for the buyer effectively to inspect a house for defects and
agreed that the builder-vendor is in the best position to bear the loss. Although
the language of the court implies that strict tort liability for builder-vendors is
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Connor could presage the application of strict liability to lenders who
finance housing developers in those jurisdictions that hold builder-vendors
strictly liable. This result would supplement favorably the policies behind
holding builder-vendors liable for defective homes in cases where the
lender retains a certain amount of control over the capital loaned.
Arguably, the best policy result that will emerge from the disparity of
liability law in the building field is that both builder-vendors, whether
large or small, and their financial backers who retain any control over the
project, whether one home or a subdevelopment, will be held strictly liable
for any dangerously defective houses sold. With a substantial number
of builder-vendors operating on such dangerously thin capitalization that
plaintiffs with claims against them for defective homes may find it impossible to satisfy judgments,' the home-construction industry is an area
in which vicarious liability can be extended to lenders for valid social
policy reasons.
Concededly, Connor involved liability of the lender predicated upon
some fault-negligence-and the holding is revolutionary in extending
the duty of the lender who backs a financially weak contractor to the
vendees of the houses constructed. Since builder-vendors in California
are liable to third-party users of homes for negligence in design and
construction, it is reasonable to assume that Connor also imposes a duty
on lenders that runs to such third parties. But the fact situation and the
policy reasons set forth by the majority are also important in an argument for extending strict liability to lenders.
The situation in Connor was as follows: defendant Great Western
Savings & Loan agreed to supply funds necessary for two contractors
doing business as the Conejo Development Company to purchase a onehundred acre tract and to construct homes thereon. Upon investigating the
developer's financial condition, Great Western learned that it was extremely weak-the builder-vendor having only $5,000 capital when it started
its development plans.7 Yet Great Western exercised less than normal
care in making the loan and failed to examine the foundation plans, failed
limited to mass developers, these two basic arguments also can be applied to
small builder-vendors of individual houses. See text p. 997 infra. Now that California has adopted strict tort liability for at least some classes of builder-vendors,
the way has been cleared for holding their lenders strictly liable upon application
of the criteria outlined p. 993 infra.
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New
Housing, supra note 3, at 740.
Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
-
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to require soil tests, and failed "to discover gross structural defects that
it could have discovered by reasonable inspection."' Plaintiffs in two
actions consolidated for trial were home-buyers who suffered serious
property damage when foundations ill-designed for the adobe soil cracked.
Chief Justice Traynor, in reversing the trial court's nonsuit in favor
of defendant Great Western, first concluded that the lender's acts of
omission were sufficient for a finding of a negligent breach of duty to its
shareholders, to whom it owed a duty not to finance defectively-built
homes since the value of security for the construction loans depended on
sound construction.' But he also concluded that the lender was negligent
in failing to take reasonable steps to prevent potential buyers from receiving defective homes and that it owed a duty of reasonable care to
them. 10
Of great significance to the holding of a duty extending to the buying
public was the finding that Great Western exercised significant control
over the project. It dictated the price of the homes and insisted on substantial fees in excess of ordinary interest for making the construction loan
to Conejo. It also received an agreement from Conejo to protect it from
lost profits in the event that home-buyers could not be persuaded to obtain
their loans through Great Western. Thus, concluded the majority of the
court, the risk of harm foreseeable to the plaintiffs because of Conejo's
"dangerously thin capitalization" was increased "by the additional pressures on Conejo ensuing from its onerous burdens as a borrower from
Great Western.""
Although California and most other jurisdictions have not yet accepted
the theory of strict liability in tort for builder-vendors, 1 2 Connor made
8 Id.

at -, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
Id.
'1Od. at -, 447 P.2d at 617-19, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377-79. The policy reasons
specifically set forth were that Great Western's transactions were intended to affect
and did affect the plaintiffs to a significant degree; there was a foreseeable risk
of harm to plaintiffs; the certain injury suffered by plaintiffs was closely connected
with Great Western's negligent omissions; substantial moral blame attached to
defendant; and the policy of tort law to prevent future harm called for extension
of duty.
11 Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
12 See note 5 supra. California has specifically refused to adopt the theory of
strict liability in tort for builder-vendors. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 749,
65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482,
53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). It is questionable, however, that the most
9

important reason given for refusal-that a buyer of real property has an oppor-

tunity to inspect for defects-will withstand the language of the California Supreme Court in Connor. See text accompanying notes 17-18 infra. The other
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most of the policy arguments that have been advanced for holding buildervendors strictly liable for selling defective homes. These arguments generally have one underlying theory: the builder of a home should stand no
differently in the law than manufacturers of chattels who, in an increasing
number of jurisdictions, 3 are held strictly liable for defective products
unreasonably dangerous to persons or property.' 4 The same arguments
for holding both the manufacturer of chattels and the builder of homes
strictly liable follow quite logically. In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc.," a recent case involving a suit against the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective carpet, the New Jersey Supreme Court said,
the great mass of the purchasing public has neither adequate knowledge
nor sufficient opportunity to determine if articles bought or used are
defective. Obviously they must rely upon the skill, care and reputation of the maker.... [W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to
the public for sale he accompanies them with a representation that they
16
are suitable and safe for the intended use.
Certainly the vast majority of the home-buying public also relies on the
skill, care and reputation of the builder. And if an ordinary citizen is
unable to tell whether carpeting, power tools, and the like are defective in
a manner dangerous to persons or property, he is usually less able to
detect defective conditions in the home he purchases. In Connor, Chief
Justice Traynor pointed out that "the usual buyer of a home, [sic] is illequipped with experience or financial means to discern such structural
reasons set forth by the two cases are also dubious. They suggest that a contractorvendor is seldom in a position to limit liability by such devices as express warranties and disclaimers. However, chattel manufacturers, who are often held strictly
liable, are not permitted by most courts to limit liability in these ways because to
do so is considered unconscionable. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mtrs., Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The final reason for refusal to apply strict
liability to builder-vendors is that an occupant of a building can more easily trace
a defect to the negligence of the builder than a user of a chattel can trace a defect
to the manufacturer. This argument fails to meet the primary economic purpose for
the application of strict liability: The individual earning a profit from his products
or structures should bear the risks of their being defective because he is the most
effective risk-spreader.
See PROSSER § 97, at 678-84.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311. Accord, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Cf. Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), which approves
holding manufacturers strictly liable in tort for personal injuries or property damage, but criticizes the result in Santor for allowing recovery for loss of bargain on
the strict liability theory.
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defects.... Moreover a home is not only a major investment for the
usual buyer but also the only shelter he has. Hence it becomes doubly
important to protect him against structural defects ....,1

The theory often used in the past by courts unwilling to hold buildervendors liable even for negligence in construction after a buyer accepted
the house was that he had an opportunity to inspect the house and should
have rejected it if defective.' As a practical matter, however, it simply
is not possible for the average home buyer to detect defects in the home
that he is about to acquire; even an architect would generally be unable
to discover a defective foundation.
Santor also based the strict liability of the manufacturer on the theory
that it could best bear the expense of personal or property injuries sustained
because of defects in a manufactured product, even if not caused by negligence of the defendant.'" This risk-spreading theory may be extended
by logical analogy to builders of homes. 20 They have the opportunity to
insure or spread the risks through prices just as do manufacturers of
chattels.
Chief Justice Traynor in Connor adopted the argument that prevention of future harm through the use of tort liability supported holding the
lender liable to the home purchaser for negligence, for "[r]ules that tend
to discourage misconduct are particularly appropriate when applied to an
established industry.' 2' The risk of tort liability may not prevent injuries in many areas such as automobile driving, but an established industry with the habit of considering all of the angles of profit and loss is
apt, as the court's language suggests, to take greater care to protect the
public if it knows it could face damage suits for failure to check and
control its activities. 22 If strict tort liability is applied to builder-vendors
and their financial backers, arguably they would exercise even more diligence to insure the safety of homes.
Courts, then, can rely on these basic reasons for the view that buildervendors are strictly liable in tort: risk-spreading by the party most able
to do so, the helplessness and disadvantage of the buyer, prevention of
17 Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Compare Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) and Humber v. Morton,
426 8S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. 1968).
' See PROSSER § 99, at 694.
1944

N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.

2

chipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
-, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
" This idea is also suggested in Brown, supra note 3, at 218.
2

- Cal. 2d at
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future harm, and the general feeling that the party engaging in an enterprise for profit should bear the burden if something goes awry. Connor
used the same reasons for holding that the lender had a duty extending
to the home purchaser. It is arguable that California may reasonably
adopt the policies underlying Connor to hold builder-vendors strictly liable.
And with this foundation laid, California logically could go further and
hold lenders in the situation of Great Western strictly liable for defects
in houses sold by builder-vendors that they finance.
Such an ultimate extension can be supported by the language of the
intermediate California appellate court in its treatment of Connor :23
Since we recognize the obligation of the manufacturer who has the
capacity to launch numerous potentially hazardous products on the
market, should we not be prepared to impose similar standards of responsibility on the experienced and knowledgeable home-lending institution when it financially launches an untried developer by assisting
him to produce and sell residential units to the uninformed public?24
All of the policy arguments for holding manufacturers and builders
strictly liable for defects in what they produce can be applied with equal
force to savings and loan associations, banks, and other lenders who back
the home-construction industry. The lender is familiar with the entire
transaction and, in all practicality, is the moving force behind most housing
developments today.2 5 Without the lender's money most builder-vendors
could not carry out their projects. Because it controls the capital, the
lender is in the best position to prevent fraud and defectively-designed or
defectively-constructed housing.
Furthermore, lenders are better risk-bearers and risk-spreaders than
are builders and subdevelopers. As the facts in Connor indicate, many
of the builder-vendors in the residential construction field are undercapitalized and inexperienced; they are often insolvent or no longer in
business by the time defects in their housing are discovered. 2' Thus contractors who build and sell homes, even if held strictly liable for defects
that prove dangerous, will often be too irresponsible or too insolvent to
" Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr. 333
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at -, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
For a good summary of financing of the residential construction industry, see
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New
Housing,
supra note 3, at 741-48.
"0 d. at 740.
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have done anything, such as insuring, to spread the risks. Lenders, on the
other hand, generally would tend to be more responsible and see that the
risk is spread in at least two ways-by requiring the builder to insure or
27
by charging the builder higher interest rates.
Finally, extension of strict liability to lenders such as Great Western
probably would enhance the possibility of preventing future harm from
defective housing. Lenders logically would take greater precaution in
approving development plans and in inspecting the progress of the construction if held strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous defects. This
really would cast no greater burden upon them, for lending institutions
already owe a duty of care to stockholders to make sure housing on which
they loan money will be sound enough to serve as proper collateral. As
standard practice, savings and loan associations normally check soil conditions for potential foundation hazards, usually at the borrower's expense;
inspect plans to insure that they are adapted to the building site; and check
for structural defects during the course of construction when lending
money for residential construction projects. 8
Under the strict liability theory, lenders of course would not have to
fear that they would be held accountable for any and all defects. The
theory is founded upon the idea that the house will be reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it is sold. Only if it is defective through a condition unreasonably dangerous to persons using it or to their property would
2
strict liability be imposed.

As illustrated by the fact situation in Connor, courts should consider
a number of factors in determining whether to impose strict liability on a
lender backing a builder-vendor. While the decisions necessarily must
develop on a case by case basis, the experience of the builder-vendor, its
solvency, the control exercised by the lending institution, and the degree
to which the lender becomes enmeshed in the enterprise are all highly
relevant elements for consideration concerning the ultimate issue of lender
liability. For instance, a lender that so involves itself in the housing
scheme that it in effect becomes an entrepreneur ought to bear the full
risks of its involvement to the extent of strict liability. Lenders financing
2, For a discussion speculating as to the effect of these risk-spreading devices
on the housing industry, see id. at 754-55.
"s UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROCEDURES

5, 8, 36 (1966).
2

Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
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inexperienced or financially-weak builders should under the Connor doctrine exercise control over the projects to insure sound construction; but
even if they choose not to do so, such lenders should be held strictly liable
for housing defects since their money launched the homes on the market.
On the other hand, lending institutions that provide money for experienced, solvent builders and that are not negligent toward potential purchasers for not exercising substantial control over the planning and construction of the homes, and that do not involve themselves in the enterprise to an extent greater than lending money outright to the buildervendor should not face strict tort liability for defective homes. Indeed,
under the holding in Connor, they would not be liable in negligence. The
circumstances surrounding each case would determine, of course, the
weight a court would give each relevant element.
One difficulty in holding lenders strictly liable may be the issue of
whether the independent contractor who builds and sells one house at a
time should be held strictly liable for dangerous defects. It has been suggested that courts may distinguish between the subdeveloper who builds
a number of homes and the independent contractor." However, both
Texas and Mississippi have declined to recognize any such distinction 1
and the New Jersey Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to do so
in a recent case.3 2 Logically lenders should not be held strictly liable
where there is no basis for such liability in the builders that they support.
But the decisions indicate that where courts are willing to apply strict
liability to builder-vendors, the size of their operation makes no difference.
Just as the large developer, the independent contractor
is in full control of the construction of the house and therefore is in
the best position to assume the responsibility for remedying structural
defects. If he reaps profits from his activities, he ought to bear the
risks involved in these activities. Consequently, he will 3use greater
care to protect the lives and property of users of the home.
" The basic argument in favor of such a distinction is that the small, independent
contractor is a poor risk-bearer and risk-shifter. See, e.g., Note, Builder-Vendors:
Liability for Negligence and for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, 51
CORNELL

L.

REV.

389, 399-400 (1965); Note, 41

WASH.

L. REv. 166, 172-73

(1966); Recent Developinents, the Strict Tort Liability of Builder-Vendors, 28
OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 352 (1967).
" State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113, cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1966); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
"Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
"Recent Developments, the Strict Tort Liability of Builder-Vendors, supra
note 30, at 351 (citations omitted).
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In short, the argument that the single contractor is often a poor riskbearer and risk-shifter can be obviated if the lender who backs him is
also held strictly liable.
Under any extension of strict liability to the lender, the builder-vendor
should remain primarily liable since he is the one with the most immediate
control over the construction. Then the lending agency can protect itself
not only by spreading the risk through interest rates on loans and requiring
the borrower to insure against products liability, but can also seek indemnification from a solvent builder who builds a defective house, at
least if the builder was actively negligent.3 4 These methods of protection
might make courts less reluctant in the future to extend the Connor principle so that lenders financing builder-vendors are strictly liable for housing
defects.
When all arguments on the subject are examined, such vicarious strict
liability for lenders must rest on a social policy concept rather than on
a fault principle. But this is nothing new in the law of torts.
Vicarious liability is based on a relationship between the parties, irrespective of participation, either by act or omisson, of the one vicariously
liable, under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that
one person should be liable for the act of the other. Its true basis is
largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined
of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts
that, irrespective
35
of another.
THOMAS

F.

LOFLIN

III

Torts-Municipal Corporations-Liability for Failure to Provide
Requested Police Protection Against-Assault by a Third Person
The doctrine of immunity for 'municipal corporations has long been
invoked to insulate municipalities from liability for the torts of their law
enforcement officials.' Even in those jurisdictions that have abolished
"See Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Strctueral Defects
in New Houtsing, supra note 3, at 760-61 & n.12 2 .
" Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 375-76, 110 N.W.2d 29, 34 (1961) (citations
omitted).
1On the doctrine of municipal immunity, see generally W. PROSSER, LAW or
TORTS 996-1013 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. As to municipal

liability for the torts of law enforcement officials, see 18 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 53.79-53.81a (3rd ed. 1963); Comment, Municipal Liability for

Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 475 (1963).
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municipal immunity, however, a city does not become an insurer for those
who are injured by the acts or omissions of police officers. Rather, the
municipality is answerable in accordance with the same rules of law
applicable to individuals and private corporations.' Municipal liability
is thus imposed or limited by traditional concepts of tort law.
The recent case of Riss v. City of New York is illustrative. Plaintiff
was an attractive young woman who for more than six months had been
terrorized by threats from a rejected suitor. Her repeated pleas for police
protection were received with little more than indifference. Upon learning
that plaintiff had become engaged to another, the suitor once more threatened to have her killed or maimed, indicating that it was her "last
chance." Again the police refused to respond to her pleas for help. The
next day a hired thug threw lye in plaintiff's face. She was blinded in one
eye, lost a good portion of her vision in the other, and her face was
permanently disfigured. She was given around-the-clock police protection
for three and one-half years following the assault.
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a dismissal of the complaint, holding, despite a strong dissent, that police have no duty to
furnish requested protection against assaults by third parties to individual
members of the community. The failure to recognize such a duty was
obviously predicated upon a general fear of the burdensome consequences
that might ensue, and upon the uncertainty of whether liability based
upon such a duty could be held within reasonable bounds. In so holding,
the court failed to explore fully the relevant policy considerations. Moreover, in hinging its decision on the duty issue, it apparently did not consider the availability of other tort concepts that could be utilized to circumscribe the area of responsibility.
To merely state that there is or is not a duty would be, of course,
to beg the essential question of whether plaintiff's interests are entitled to
legal protection against the defendant's conduct.4 Although various
attempts have been made to define the factors that are relevant to the
determination of a legally recognizable duty, the question can be answered
2
E.g., Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, - Ind. -, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 .(1968). The New York
law abolishing municipal immunity consists of specific statutory enactments augmented by a broader decisional liability. See Bernardine v. City of New York, 294
N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945) ; Comment, Municipal Liability for Torts of Firevien, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 256 (1967).
' PROSSEr 332-33.
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only by an assessment of all policy considerations relevant to the factual
situation at hand.'
Difficulties of administration have always been of great significance
in any new development of the law,6 and fear of admittedly unpredictable
administrative consequences may have been a factor in the Riss decision.
It is significant to observe, however, that such fear of drastically increased caseloads and groundless suits has seldom materialized. 7 Yet, for
this reason, courts originally denied recovery for injuries resulting in
death s refused to allow recovery for nervous shock unless accompanied
by a physical impact,9 and denied protection to injured consumers of
manufactured products in the absence of privity of contract with the
manufacturer.' 0 Undeniably the cumulative effect of recognizing these
interests has had a significant impact upon the administrative burden of
the courts, but in no single instance has the resultant burden been in
proportion to the fears that it engendered. Furthermore, the existence
of modern procedural devices makes it increasingly improbable that unmeritorious actions can survive."
'The ultimate question is whether such a duty should be imposed as a matter
of policy. This in turn will depend upon the balancing of several factors,
namely the burden it would put on defendant's activity; the extent to which
the risk is one normally incident to the activity; the risk and the burden to
plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the two parties;
the prevalence of insurance in fact ....
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES].

' See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014,
1044-45 (1928). See also Comment, Muenicipat Immunity for the Torts of Police
Officers in South Dakota, 11 S.D.L. REv. 87 (1966), where it is stated:
The initiation of municipal liability would ultimately result in an increase
in the number of suits brought in local courts and might possibly stimulate
false claims. Such an increase could overload our present judicial system and
swamp the courts in a sea of litigation ....
Id. at 98.
See Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 351 (1957). Dean Leon Green has suggested that courts have overestimated
the number of cases that may be attributed to the negligence of governmental employees. Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REv. 369 (1944).
'E.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265
(1856); Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, (K.B. 1808).
°Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bosley
v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
"E.g., Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907); Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921); Heizer
v. Kingsland & Douglas Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S.W. 630 (1892).
" Modem pre-trial and discovery procedures should aid in the weeding out of
groundless suits. Furthermore, prompt notice is normally a condition precedent to
a suit against a municipality and should serve to thwart the malingering plaintiff.
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In addition to the administrative considerations involved in carving
out new areas of tort liability, the relative economic burdens to which the
litigants may be subjected have concerned the courts.' The fear of
potentially unbearable financial burdens that might be thrust upon
municipalities has been a major factor in perpetuating the doctrine of
municipal immunity.' 3 Furthermore, even where the immunity doctrine
has been abolished, courts have continued to fret over the specter of a
depleted municipal treasury. 14 Yet empirical studies indicate that the imposition of tort liability has not saddled municipalities with as great a
financial burden as was feared.'" Of course, if recognition of a duty to
provide police protection against personal assaults would seriously jeopardize the public treasury, such a duty should be denied.
It appears that courts, in assessing the potential economic impact,
may have failed to distinguish between those losses attributable to the lack
of adequate police protection and those involving a failure to provide fire
protection. Such a comparison is imprecise at best. Municipal liability
for fire damage could well become a crushing financial burden in the
event of a conflagration. Moreover, fire insurance is widely held by
property owners and, in comparison with the cumbersome process of
imposing legal liability upon a city, may represent a more economical
way to administer fire losses.' 6 On the other hand, while personal accident
insurance normally covers injuries intentionally inflicted by others,' 7 it is
unlikely that the coverage would be sufficient to compensate for serious
injury or death. Furthermore, it may be that those who need such insurance the most are least likely to hold it.'8
The possibility that a duty to provide police protection against per12 "Finally... judges give attention to the parties before them. They place the
loss where it will be felt the least and can best be borne." Green, The Duty Problem
in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 256 (1929).
1" See Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Snall Municipalities, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
" E.g., Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
" See Antieau, supra note 7; Warp, supra note 13.
" HARPER & JAMES § 18.6, at 1053; cf. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 513 (1963).
145
C.J.S. Insurance § 772 (1955).
10 National victimization rates indicate that the risk of criminally inflicted personal injury is considerably greater for those persons in lower income groups. THE

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 19 (1967). Because of their eco-

nomic status (and perhaps other cultural factors), these individuals are less likely
to carry personal accident insurance.
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sonal injury, once recognized, might easily be extended to include a duty
to protect against property loss, may be another factor in perpetuating
fears of drastic financial burdens. However, the availability and practicality of property insurance, as distinguished from accident insurance,
may also provide a rational basis for limiting liability for failure to
provide police protection to those instances that involve personal injury.
In addition, the municipality could insure against liability and spread the
cost of premiums among the taxpaying public.
In refusing to recognize a duty to provide police protection because
of the potential administrative and economic consequences, courts have
apparently ignored the existence of other tort principles-principles that,
given the existence of the duty, could still be used to hold liability within
reasonable bounds.' 0 Negation of the doctrine of municipal immunity does
not contemplate the imposition of absolute liability; those seeking recovery
must still satisfy the traditional elements of a negligence action. In addition to the establishment of a duty, plaintiff must also show a failure
to exercise reasonable care in the performance of that duty. The application of a standard of reasonable care to the operation of a municipal police
department would require that all circumstances be taken into consideration. The gravity of the foreseeable harm, the resources and other responsibilities of the police, the probability of injury, and the extent of
protection necessary to prevent the injury would all be relevant factors.2"
Furthermore, given the duty and the breach of that duty, plaintiff must
also establish a causal relationship between the breach and the injury,
often in itself a formidable task. The availability of these traditional
tort concepts, therefore, may be adequate to circumscribe the area of
responsibility.
Quite apart from administrative and economic considerations, courts
may rely upon the traditional dichotomy between misfeasance and nonfeasance to deny the existence of a duty to provide police protection against
personal assault.F1 The distinction between active misconduct working
positive injury, and passive inaction or failure to protect from harm, is
" Comment, Municipality Liable for Negligent Failure to Protect Informer: The
Schuster Case, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 503 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 59 CoLum.
L. REV.].
20
Id. at 503.
21
E.g., Murrain v. Wilson Lines, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947) (although municipal immunity
had been waived by statute,.municipality not liable for failure to provide police protection).
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Various rationalizations have been
deeply rooted in the common
most
of which appear to be a product of
offered to explain the distinction,
the extreme individualism characteristic of Anglo-Saxon legal thought.2 3
It has been said that active conduct creates a new risk, while mere inaction fails to alter the status quo ;24 that one should provide for his own
protection; and that forcing affirmative conduct places a more serious
restraint upon personal freedom than imposing limitations on one's liberty
to act. 5 A further, and perhaps more rational, justification for refusing
to recognize a duty of affirmative action is the difficulty of imposing
liability upon a particular individual when all members of a group have
had the opportunity and failed to act.26
The misfeasance-nonfeasance rule is not without exception. A duty
imposed by statute or charter has in some instances given rise to liability
for a failure to act. For example, persons injured in automobile accidents
have recovered upon the theory that the state failed to perform its statutory duty to maintain safe highways.17 Liability has been denied, however, in cases where the cause of action is based upon a statutory or
charter-imposed duty to provide police services.28 The courts usually
attempt to explain the distinction upon the rather dubious theory that the
duty to maintain highways inures to the benefit of the individual members
of a particular class of persons, while the duty to provide police protec29
tion runs to the general public rather than particular individuals.
Additional theories have been utilized to undercut the nonfeasance
rule. Courts have held that a duty to act may be created by the existence
of a special relationship between the parties ;3o that one who gratuitously
undertakes to render aid to another is under a duty to continue, unless
withdrawal of such assistance would leave the other in a position no
worse than when the aid was initially extended ;31 and that a duty to act
2' PROSSER 334-46; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Comment, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58
YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
2 Bohlen, szpra note 22, at 220.
24 PROSSER 334; Bohlen, supra note 22, at 220-21.
" Comment, Affirmative Duties in Tort, supra note 22, at 1288.
PROSSER 336-37.
'E.g., Eastman v. State, 278 App. Div. 1, 102 N.Y.S.2d 925, afi'd, 303 N.Y.

22'

691,2'103
N.E.2d 56 (1951).
59 CoLtm. L. REV. at 492.
2

0Id.
" See generally HARPER & JAMES § 18.7; HARPER & KImE, The Ditty to Control
the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
"2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§§ 323-24 (1965).
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may be found when one's prior conduct has created a risk of harm to
another. 2 In Schuster v. City of New York,3" these exceptions were
applied in order to impose liability for failure to provide police protection. After recognizing Willie "the Actor" Sutton, an escaped criminal,
Schuster promptly notified the police. After Sutton's arrest the police
publicly acknowledged Schuster's role in effectuating the capture. Following telephone calls that threatened physical violence, Schuster was shot
to death on a public street by unidentified persons. A decision affirming
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action was reversed, on the theory that plaintiff's performance of his
public "duty" to aid in the apprehension of a criminal gave rise to a
reciprocal governmental duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection, or alternatively, that the city had a duty to continue the partial protection that had been extended. It has also been suggested that the publicity acknowledging Schuster's role in the capture could have been classified as prior conduct that created a risk of harm, thus giving rise to a duty
to provide protection.3"
One eminent commentator has suggested that Schuster could have
been decided on the theory of a duty to exercise control over the conduct
of third persons.3 5 Courts have applied such a rule to impose an obligation upon common carriers to protect their passengers from the wrongful
conduct of third persons, 6 and, in addition, the rule has been applied
to such relationships as innkeeper-guest,3 7 employer-employee,38 jailerprisoner, 9 and school-pupil.4" Admittedly, the opportunity to control the
potential wrongdoer in these relationships is inherently greater than that
32

Id. § 321.
" 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The Riss court cited

and distinguished the Schuster case: "Quite distinguishable, of course, is the situation where the police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members
of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then
materialize into actual losses . . . ." Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968).
59 COLUM. L. Ruv. at 495.
"PROSSER 344-45.
"'E.g., Birmingham Elec. Ry. Co. v. Driver, 232 Ala. 36, 166 So. 701 (1936);
Kline v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 146 Wis. 134, 131 N.W. 427 (1911).
"'E.g., Fortney v. Hotel Bancroft, Inc., 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544
-,

(1955).
3

" E.g., David v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 437, 41 S.W.2d 179 (1931).
"E.g., Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935).
'E.g., McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360

(1953).
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which exists in the context of a police protection case.4 1 But this distinction overlooks the fact that controlling the conduct of wrongdoers is the
very essence of police work. Furthermore, if the opportunity to exert
control over a potential wrongdoer is a factor to consider, then Riss, a
case in which the identity of the plaintiff's suitor was known, becomes
a stronger case for recognition of the duty than Schuster, where the party
who made the threatening calls was unidentified.
Although the duty to protect was recognized in Schuster, it is clear
that a plaintiff such as in Riss could not avail himself of either the
"assumption of duty" or the "prior dangerous conduct" exceptions to
the nonfeasance rule. Moreover, the New York court was obviously unwilling to find a special relationship--one that had been afforded to
Schuster because of his status as an informer. The nonfeasance rule
should not, however, be sacrosanct. It would seem that many of the
justifications traditionally advanced for the distinction do not apply to
4
a failure to provide police protection against assault 'y a third person. 1
The common law attitude of individualism, which r,.garded men as independent and self-reliant, should perhaps be tempered by the realization
that, notwithstanding one's ruggedness, there may be occasions when
preservation of life is dependent upon the affirmative action of the
police.4 3 Moreover, the rationale that regards the imposition of an affirmative duty to act as a serious encroachment upon individual liberty surely
has no application to members of an institution charged with maintenance
of the public safety. Even the most rational justification-the difficulty
of imposing liability upon one of several who failed to render aid is
clearly inapplicable.
Considering the inapplicability of the traditional nonfeasance rules, it
therefore seems quite plausible to argue that the potentially catastrophic
individual loss brought about by a clear failure to protect life should
weigh more heavily than the more remote possibility of serious administrative consequences or economic loss to the municipality.
JAMES

G.

BILLINGS

41 See Note, Torts: Municipal Corporation'sLiability for Failure to Perform
Governmental Acts, 47 CAL. L. REv. 409, 412 (1959).
42 59 COLUr. L. REv. at 502.
Cf. Hale, Prina Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 CoLum.

L.

REv.

196, 214 (1946).
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Torts-Recognition of Wife's Right to Husband's Consortium
Consortium is the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the
1
right of each to the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other.
The three most prominent elements in the unique consortium interest are
services, sexual intercourse, and general companionship. 2 Notwithstanding
the intangible value of the "sentimental" elements inherent in the consortium interest, the common law early recognized the husband's legal right to
consortium.3
Adhering to the common law, most states initially recognized a separate
and independent cause of action in the husband for loss of consortium
4
as a result of a defendant's negligent injury to his wife. A mutual cause
of action was not afforded the wife because at common law she had no
5
reciprocal proprietary rights in her husband. The relationship of the wife
to the husband was that of servant to master, and the servant had no
interest in the master.6 The wife could only recover for injuries to herself
by bringing a suit in her husband's name, and since she had no property
7
rights, any recovery inured to the benefit of her husband.
With the advent of the Married Women's Acts, the wife was granted
the right to sue, the right to be sued, the right to contract, and the right
to own and control property.8 At the turn of the twentieth century, courts
began to recognize the wife's consortium interest by allowing her to
'BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 382 (4th ed. 1951). "In old English law, the term
signified company or society, and in the language of pleading, as in the phrase per
quod consortium amisit, it has substantially the same meaning, viz., the companionship or society of a wife. .. " Id.
"The concept of consortium includes not only loss of support, it also embraces
such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace
and more." Millington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, -, 239 N.E.2d
897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968).
'Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620). See generally Note, Case of
2

the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium, 18 WEs. REs. L.
REv. 621 (1967).
'W.

PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS

§

119 (3d ed. 1964)

[hereinafter cited as

PROSSER].

'Id.

at 916.

Blackstone compared the relationship of the husband and wife to that of
master and servant: "[T]he inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care,
or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury." 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 143 (Lewis ed. 1897).
PROSSER § 111, at 881.
'Id. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1953).
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relationship.9

recover for an intentionalinterference with her marital
This
recognition set the stage for the decision of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Hipp v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,' ° where the court

allowed a wife to recover for loss of consortium as a result of a negligent
injury to her husband. The court reasoned that the Married Women's Act
was intended to give the wife separate legal remedies for the same rights
and remedies allowed a husband. Thus, the court saw no reason to withhold from the wife the consortium action that the husband enjoyed. Five
years later, however, in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co." the court
not only abolished such an action in the wife,1 2 but also implied that the
Married Women's Act extinguished this consortium right in the husband.
Then, in Helinstetler v. Duke Power Co.' the husband's cause of action
was expressly abolished.' 4
This issue remained dormant in most jurisdictions until the landmark
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,' 5
which allowed the wife a reciprocal action for loss of consortium as a
result of a negligent injury to her husband. Following the trend established by Hitaffer,'6 fifteen states now recognize a cause of action in
' PROSSER § 118, at 903. An intentional interference with the marital relations
is the basis of actions such as criminal conversation, alienation of affections, or enticement. The damages recoverable in these actions are for loss of consortium, and
courts have interpreted the Married Women's Acts or more specific statutes as
recognizing a wife's mutual consortium interest in her husband.
10 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921). See Note, 3 N.C.L. REv. 98 (1925).
189 N.C. 120, 126 SE. 307 (1925). See Note, 3 N.C.L. Rnv. 98 (1925).
The court apparently reasoned that the wife had no right to recover for the
loss of her husband's domestic services since he recovered his loss to perform those
services in his own action for personal injury. Since loss of services was the prominent, if not indispensable, element of a consortium action, the wife had no basis
for her action. Without a loss of services, the other elements involved in loss of
consortium were not a proximate result of the injury to the husband.
" 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
" The reasoning of the court was that, as a result of the Married Women's Act,
the wife had to recover any loss of ability to perform domestic services in her own
personal injury action; thus, since the husband did not have a right to recover for
loss of his wife's services, a necessary element of his consortium action, he had no
basis for the consortium action.
" 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). See Note,
Loss of Consortium from Injury to Spouse, 29 N.C.L. Rnv. 178 (1951).
" See, e.g., Jaffe, Damages for PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953) ; Payne, Tortious Invasions of Right of Marital
Consortium, 8 J. FAm. LAW 41 (1968); Rossman & Allen, What's New in the
Law: Husband and Wife-Consortium, 52 A.B.A.J. 492 (1966); Spero, Wife's

Action for Loss of Consortium, 17 ClV.-MAR. L. REv. 462 (1968); Note, 26 MD.

L. REv. 361 (1966); Note, Loss of Consortium from Injury to Spouse, 29 N.C.L.
Rzv. 178 (1951); Note, Case of the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's Action for Loss of
Consortium, 18 WEs. REs. L. REv. 621 (1967).
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either spouse when the other is negligently injured." Seventeen states,
however, continue to confine such right to the husband,"' and at least seven
other states afford the action to neither spouse."9
In Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 20 New York became the

fifteenth state to recognize this consortium action in either spouse as a
result of a negligent injury to the other spouse. The plaintiff-wife asked
the court to recognize that she had been deprived of definite rights involved in her marital relationship when her husband had been paralyzed
from his waist down because of the defendant's negligence. The defendant
raised at least five major arguments that, taken together, have been
advanced in other courts to deny the wife's right to recover. But the
reasoning of these arguments in fact "take[s] us on a tour similar to that
of Minos in the labyrinth of Daedalus. Each path leads to a dead end of
reasoning and logic." 2'
The first major argument offered for denying a consortium action
to the wife is that the Married Women's Acts were not intended to give
the wife any new rights, but were only to provide her with personal
remedies for rights that she always had at common law, which did not
include the right to her husband's consort. Thus, allowing the wife to
bring an action for loss of consortium would not only be granting her a
new right and remedy, contrary to the purpose of the Married Women's
Acts, but also would be invading the legislative domain. The critics of
such logic assert that the wife did have a right to her husband's consort
"Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
The following federal decisions interpreting state law have allowed the action to
either spouse in additional states: Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958)
(interpreting Nebraska law); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820
(W.D. Mich. 1966) (interpreting Indiana law); Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Constr. Co., 214 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1963) (interpreting Montana law).
But see Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968) (interpreting Indiana law not to allow the action to the wife).
8
Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.
" California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and Virginia. See Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah
1967) (interpreting Utah's law to allow neither spouse the action).
2022 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968), overruling Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 151 N.E.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354
(1959).
2" Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 41, 101 N.W.2d 227, 231 (1959).
2
'See, e.g., Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307
(1925); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
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at common law, but no remedy, and that the very purpose of the Married
Women's Acts was to grant remedies to the wife for rights such as consortium.23
Both of these arguments concerning whether the wife has a right
without a remedy at common law seem meaningless in light of the Married
Women's Acts. The general legislative intent behind the Acts was
apparently that of affording the wife a legal status equal to her husband's. 2 4 Moreover, since the Acts are generally interpreted as giving the
wife a new cause of action for an intentional interference with her marital
relations, an action which she did not have at common law,2 5 it is inconsistent to argue that the same Acts did not similarly give her a new
consortium action for a negligent injury to her husband.2
A second argument advanced against permitting the wife a recovery
under the consortium action is that the creation of a new cause of action
and the subsequent extension of the defendant's liability should be left
to the legislatures. This argument is closely related to the first argument
because it assumes that the legislature has not already spoken through
the Married Women's Acts. s Yet, fear of invading the legislative domain
is anomalous when a court asserts that the creation of a consortium action
in the wife should be left for the legislature, but then abolishes the husband's action in order to achieve symmetry and equality. 9 "Thus a case
" See, e.g., Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 519, 126 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
"* See, e.g.,
v.McClain,
N.C. 182,
S.E.2d§ 79
v. Mumrie,
398Knighten
Pa. 13, 156
A.2d 537 227
(1959).
See 44
PROSSER
118,(1947)
at 903.; Karchner
25Td
.
26 Compare Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307
(1925), with Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947); compare
Neuburg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960), with Karchner v. Mumrie,
398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959).
See, e.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153
(1960) ;West v.San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr.289 (1960);
Page v.Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
2' Once a court realizes that the traditional arguments against the wife's consortium action stem from antiquated common law fictions, it becomes "as much the
duty of this court to restore a right which has been erroneously withheld by judicial
opinion as it is to recognize it properly in the first instance." Brown v. GeorgiaTenn. Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 533, 77 S.E.2d 24, 32 (1953).
" See, e.g., West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1960). Compare Hinant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120. 126 S.E. 307
(1925), with Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
These courts seem to be "legislating" unreasonably when they abolish the husband's
action that has been established since early common law. Moreover, equality and
symmetry in our laws are usually thought of as being attained by giving the deprived group the same rights as the more privileged group, not by eliminating
the latter's rights.
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predicated upon the theory that the court is bound to follow the common
law rule becomes converted into a case holding that the court must now
reverse a common law rule.""' Admittedly. if a state's wrongful death
statute restricts recovery of a surviving spouse to pecuniary loss,2 ' the
court could infer a legislative intent against the sentimental elements involved in the consortium action. On the other hand. the opposite inference
is logical in those states that do allow recovery for loss of companionship
and other sentimental elements under their wrongful death statutes.a2
Similar arguments against courts creating new causes of action and
thus legislating have been espoused to thwart recovery for prenatal injury," 3 mental distress, "4 and the right to privacy,:" but the courts have
had little trouble "enacting" these new torts. In fact, the law of torts is
highly "judge-made," and perhaps its strength lies in this fact. "
The third major argument is based on the premise that the so-called
"sentimental" elements of a husband's action for loss of consortium are
parasitic to the basic and indispensable element of services, and since the
wife has never had a reciprocal right to her husband's services, she cannot
have a right to his consortium. 3

1

Those who oppose such reasoning claim

that the loss of services element was never an indispensable element of
the husband's action for loss of consortium, and that the wife's action
should merely be limited to the other elements within the consortium
38
interest.
"0West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 485, 353 P.2d 929, 939, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289.
299 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
"1 E.g., Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968) (the pecuniary
loss rule). The North Carolina pecuniary loss limitation has now been amended
to allow recovery of consortium elements in a wrongful death action. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (as amended by S.B. 95, 1969 General Assembly).
'West v. San Diego, 54 Cal.2d 469, 487, 353 P.2d 929, 940, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289,
300 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
' PROSSER § 56, at 355. The initial "legislative" decision for this tort, which
almost every state court has now recognized, came from the District of Columbia,
as did the landmark decision allowing the wife a consortium action. Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
" PROSSER § 55.

3rId. § 112.
" In Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960), the
court answered the legislative argument very appropriately: "The obstacles to the
wife's action were judge-invented and they are herewith judge-destroyed," Id.
at 49, 101 N.WV.2d at 235.
"See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) ; Hoffman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615
(1964); Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
"See. e.g.. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
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Loss of services was a probable element of the husband's consortium
action for a negligent injury to his wife at common law, but the courts
did not feel compelled to assert it as indispensable until the wife attempted
to bring a similar action when her husband was injured by a negligent
defendant.39 Moreover, the loss of services is not indispensable to a wife's
action for an intentional interference with her marital relations.40
Judicial treatment of the "sentimental" elements of the consortium
interest as parasitic to the service element is similar to the requirement at
common law of an immediate impact to the person of the plaintiff in order
for him to maintain an action for negligent infliction of mental distress.4
Although few courts require this today, most courts do continue to require
consequential physical effects to which the "parasitic" damages of mental
distress may attach.4 2 The apparent purpose behind this basic prerequisite
to both a negligent infliction of mental distress action and the loss of
consortium action is that of establishing tangible damages and preventing
fictitious claims. 43 A more realistic approach, however, would be to recognize that the essence of recovery is for the damage to these intangible but
44
important interests, and that the requirement of a superficial scratch or
" In earlier cases from states purporting to follow the common law rule, where

a husband brought an action for loss of consortium as a result of an injury to his

wife, services are not mentioned as indispensable to his action. See, e.g., Kimberly
v. Howard, 143 N.C. 398. 55 S.E. 778 (1906) (husband can recover for loss of

society or services of his wife) : Holleman v. Howard, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972
(1896) (same).

'"See, e.g., Litchfield v.Cox, 266 N.C. 622, 146 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Knighten

v. McClain. 227 N.C. 682. 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947). See also PROSSER § 118, at 904.
" See, e.g., Victorian Ry. Comm'r v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).

The "impact" not only was necessary to establish the tort action for trespass on the
case. but it assured the court that damages of a physical nature were present, thus
establishing the "piggyback" for the more subtle mental anguish or distress claims.
"See PROSSER § 55, at 350.
"Id. at 351. See Recent Developments in North Carolina Statutory and Case

La--Torts, 47 N.C.L. REv. 262, 280 (1968).
The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today
recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social, economic and
industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law.
11, at 44 n.45 (quoting 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
460, 470 (1906)). Although this transition has not completely occurred in the
PROSSER §

mental distress actions, courts will be more liberal in determining the basic physical
injury to which the mental damages may attach where there is sufficient certainty
that damages have resulted. See. e.g., Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684,
157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
" E.g., Tuttle v.Meyer Dairy Prod. Co., 100 Ohio App. 133, 138 N.E.2d 429
(1956) (plaintiff gota mouthful of broken glass, but received no cuts, and thus was
denied recoverv for his mental distress).
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a subordinate loss of services often leads to an inequitable result when the
'4
only substantial damages are "parasitic. 1
Even if the parasitic treatment of a negligent infliction of mental distress action may sometimes be justified on the basis of the subjective nature
of the damages involved, there is no parallel justification for parasitic treatment of the consortium action. The consortium interests are obviously
damaged when the marital relationship is disrupted because of an injury
to the husband, just as the same consortium interests are damaged when
there is an intentional interference 46 with the marital relations. The very
nature of the consortium interests inherent in the legally recognized and
protected marriage contract preclude any basis for fear of spurious
claims.47
The absence of proximate cause is the fourth major argument adspouse. 48
vanced for denying the consortium action to the wife or either
Apparently the proximate causation problem was only recently discovered,
for neither the common law courts nor those courts that allowed the
husband to recover before the Married Women's Acts experienced diffi49
In fact. the courts that presently
culty in discerning proximate cause.
"' Courts allow recovery in circumstances especially likely to produce serious
and genuine mental distress, without requiring an impact or resulting physical
effects because there is little probability of a fictitious claim. E.g., Russ v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) (recovery for mental distress
caused by negligent transmission of a message announcing death).
"'Sentimental elements are not treated as parasitic to loss of services in this
type of consortium action because the damages to the marital relationship are
obvious. But resulting physical damage is not required by most courts today as
essential in an action for intentional infliction of mental distress, not because the
damages are as obvious as those in an intentional interference with the marital
relationship, nor because the damages are more obvious than those in an action for
negligent infliction of mental distress, but because of the aggravated circumstances
of the tort, which usually assure the court that damages are more probable and
that there is less chance of a spurious claim.
" The requirement of a causal connection should not be confused with the need
for proof that there have been damages in fact. Intangible damages are not treated
as parasitic in intentional torts while the same type of damages are treated as
parasitic in negligent torts because damages are more certain to follow. Whether
a defendant has usurped the affections of plaintiff's husband or whether he has
paralyzed her husband for life, the plaintiff-wife suffers an obvious loss of consortium.
"8West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1960);
Gallagher v. Pequot Spring Water Co., 2 Conn. Cir. 354, 199 A.2d 172 (1963).
But see Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Durham
v. Gabriel, 16 Ohio App. 2d 51, 241 N.E.2d 401 (1968).
-" Compare Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916), with Hinnant
v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925) and Helmstetler v.
Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
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allow only the husband the consortium action do not offer this argument
against allowing the wife to recover in a mutual action."
This reluctance to apply a proximate cause analysis is obviously based
on a policy consideration against further extension of a defendant's
liability for a single negligent act. Undoubtedly an incalculable influence
on this policy determination is the fear of a future extension of a similar
cause of action to other members of the family, especially the children,
once the consortium action is allowed to either or both spouses."' However, the consortium 'interest should be confined to the unique relationship
between the husband and wife, and not extended to the products of that
relationship. While there are some similar interests within the parentchild relationship, such interests are less important and more temporary,
5 2
as the child is expected eventually to leave his home and family.
This policy determination on which the courts base their proximate
cause argument becomes even less convincing when the defendant has
committed a battery or other intentional tort on the husband or wife
resulting in a loss of consortium to the other spouse."3 The moral fault
of the defendant should encourage the court to cast aside its fear of extending the defendant's liability in favor of a derivative consortium action
in the spouse of the injured husband or wife."
A useful analogy may once again be drawn to the development of
an action for the negligent infliction of mental distress, although a sole
action for the negligent,5 5 or even intentional,5 6 infliction of mental
distress, unlike an action for loss of consortium, was not recognized
at common law. The reasons offered for preventing the development
of such an action were that the damages were too speculative and outside the boundaries of any reasonable "proximate" connection with
50 Courts contending that a wife's loss of consortium is too remote from the
defendant's negligent injury to her husband do not use a proximate cause analysis.
" E.g., West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1960).
(dissenting
52 Neuburg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 160, 162 A.2d 662, 668 (1960)
opinion).
" E.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960)
(the defendant committed a battery on plaintiff's husband, but the court denied her
an action for loss of consortium).
" There is a general attitude of the courts to impose greater responsibility upon
an intentional wrongdoer, upon the obvious basis that it is better for losses caused
by the defendant's act to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than upon the innocent
victim. PROSSER § 9, at 37.
1"Id. § 55, at 346. See, e.g., Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
" PROSSER § II, at 41-42.
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the defendant's act, 5' and were grounded in fear of unlimited, liability
in the defendant and a multiplicity of fictitious suits arising from the
defendant's negligent or intentional act. 58 But these arguments have
deterred few courts from recognizing independent mental distress actions,
apart from any other tort involved in the defendant's act.
The final 'argument against an action in the wife for loss of consortium
concerns the danger of double recovery.'
Since the injured husband
recovers for his own loss of services in his separate action for personal
injury, any recovery by the wife for the loss of her husband's services in
her consortium action would be a double recovery." The court in Millington v. Southeastern Elevaator Co.,(; and two other courts,("' have alleviated

this danger of double recovery by requiring the wife to join her derivative
consortium action with her husband's personal injury action. Thus, if the
injured husband's action has been terminated either by judgment, settlement or otherwise, this would bar the wife's action for consortium.
Other courts that recognize reciprocal consortium actions in either
spouse for an injury to the other spouse treat the consortium action as a
separate and independent cause of action, which derives from the injured
spouse's actionY Thus, the consortium action need not be joined with
the injured spouse's suit. and a judgment in either action is not binding
in the other action, nor does it bar recovery in the other action. The danger
of double recovery is avoided by eliminating the loss of services element
from the wife's consortium action. A special verdict may be employed
to disclose any mistake by the jury in allowing the wife to recover for loss
of her husband's services. No matter what procedure is followed in
allowing either spouse the consortium action, all the courts treat the
action as derivative of the injured spouse's action; thus, any defens'
" Id. § 55, at 346-48.
" Id.at 351-52.
" It could be claimed that technically the husband is made "whole" again when
he recovers for his injuries from the defendant: thus the wife could suffer no future
loss of consortium. But such a fiction begs the question of whether the wife has
suffered
a loss of consortium in fact.
"0 See e.g., West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1960) ; Villington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
" 88 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
"Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 TMd. 95. 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Ekalo v.
Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
"'E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jiles, 115 Ga. App. 193, 154 S.E.2d
286 (1967); Wolff v. Du Puis, 233 Ore. 330, 378 P.2d 707 (1963); Fitzgerald v.
Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968).
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available to the defendant against the injured spouse is applicable to
prevent recovery in the consortium action. 4
An additional damages problem is that of evaluating the loss of consortium. 5 Admittedly, damages for loss of consortium are not readily
subject to exact assessment, nor can any monetary recovery realistically
replace the loss. -owever, courts refuse to allow similar problems to
prevent recovery for loss of consortium when there has been an intentional interference with the plaintiff's marital relations; nor do the
intangible aspects of the damages prevent evaluation of pain and suffering
or mental distress in other tort actions.
A final argument in favor of the wife's recovery in those states that
allow only the husband a consortium action is that this policy discriminates
against the wife in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 66 In Levy v. Lonisiana,6 7 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Louisiana wrongful death statute forbidding a suit by
illegitimate children for the wrongful death of their mother. The Court
held that the "[liegitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
'
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother," ," and that the
App. 2d 361, 237 N.E.2d 562 (1968);
"See. e.g.. Tjaden v. Moses, 94 Ill.
Patusco v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d 465 (1967). Recovery for
the loss of consortium is limited to the estimated life of the joint relationship after
the injury. The diminution of the husband's life expectancy as a result of the
injury is not significant. When the injured spouse dies, his action or right to
recovery dies with him and is a valid defense against any recovery for loss of
consortium after the husband's estimated time of death. In those states that allow
the surviving spouse to recover consortium elements in a subsequent wrongful
death action, where the actions can complement each other, the possibility of an
inequitable recovery by the wife is slight. But in those states that allow the surviving spouse only a pecuniary loss recovery in a wrongful death action, there
may be inequitable and conflicting results. E.g.. compare Walden v. Coleman, 105
Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313 (1962) (wife allowed to bring a consortium action
for the two hours that her husband survived his injury), with Lampe v. Lagomarcino-Grupe Co., 251 Iowa 204, 100 N.W.2d 1 (1959) (wife not allowed a consortium action for the hour that her husband survived his injuries).
"See, e.g.. West v. San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1960) (injury hard to express in monetary terms); Gallager v. Pequot Spring
Water Co.. 2 Conn. Cir. 354, 199 A.2d 172 (1963) (damages too speculative).
" E.g.. Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966)
(interpreting Indiana law); Durham v. Gabriel, 16 Ohio App. 2d 251, 241 N.E.2d
40 (1968). But see Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir.
1968) (Indiana law not an impermissible discrimination violative of the fourteenth
amendment, but a permissible classification to prevent double recovery) ; Krohn v.
Richardson-M'Aerrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 970 (1967) (not an impermissible discrimination but a permissible classification).
't 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
61
Id. at 72.
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statute, therefore, violated the equal protection clause. Like reasoning
would seem applicable to those decisions that allow only the husband the
consortium action. The court in Millington assumed that such a practice
did violate the fourteenth amendment, but refused to base its opinion on
a constitutional mandate. It chose instead considerations of policy and
fairness6 9
Ultimately, in deciding whether to allow the wife a cause of action for
loss of consortium as a result of a negligent injury to her husband, there
must be a balancing of interests. Although the wife may be indisputably
deprived of the mutual consortium of her husband as a result of the
negligent injury to him, to permit recovery the liability of a defendant
must be extended. The realities and enlightment of our age, however,
seem to weigh more heavily in favor of judicial recognition of the damage
that can be done by a negligent defendant to the mutual rights within the
unique consortium relationship.70
JoHN E. BUGG
0 22 N.Y.2d at -, 239 N.E.2d at 903, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
oNote, Husband and W~ife, Parent and Child-Punitive Damages Disallowed
In Hitsband's Cause of Action Arising Out of Injuries to His Wife and Minor
Child, 19 S.C.L. REV. 871 (1967) (punitive damages should not be allowed even if
such damages are allowed the injured spouse). See Note, 28 U. Pirr. L. REV. 366
(1966) (discussing the need for the mitigation of damages on behalf of the defendant where there is a lack of conjugal regard and affection between the
spouses).

